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Bayreuth International Graduate School of 
African Studies (BIGSAS) 
Since the year 2007, BIGSAS is part of the competitive ‘Excellence 
Initiative’ by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the 
German Council of Science and Humanities (WR). The basic aims of 
BIGSAS are to bring together excellent young African and non-
African scholars to work jointly in the field of African Studies and to 
offer a centre of creative and innovative PhD training and research. 
On 15th June 2012, BIGSAS was one of the successful DGF funded 
‘Centers of Excellence’ which were granted support for the next 5 
years. BIGSAS has more than 100 junior fellows from 25 African, 
American, Asian and European countries. BIGSAS builds on this 
experience and offers a multi- and interdisciplinary research 
environment based upon three clearly defined general Research 
Areas which are:  
 
A.   Uncertainty, Innovation and the Quest for Order in Africa  
B. Culture, Concepts and Cognition in Africa: Approaches through 
Language, Literature and Media  
C. Concepts and Conflicts in Development Cooperation with Africa 
and Coping with Environmental Criticality and Disasters in Africa 
 
The Research Areas allow for challenging theoretical studies 
sensitive to emerging basic problems; they also take into account 
practical questions and problems of the African continent. Thus, the 
BIGSAS Research Areas encompass basic, strategic and applied 
research. BIGSAS also contributes to the creation of an African 
universities’ network. It brings together African and European 
networks and fosters partnership not only between the University of 
Bayreuth and universities in Africa but also between the universities 
in Africa themselves. Six African Partner Universities, namely the 
University of Abomey-Calavi, Cotonou (Benin), Moi-University, 
Eldoret (Kenya), Université Mohammed V-Agdal, Rabat (Morocco), 
Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo (Mozambique), the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban (South Africa), and Addis Ababa 
University (Ethiopia) cooperate closely with BIGSAS in recruitment, 
selection, training and mentoring of doctoral students. Other partners 
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are the Universities of the Africa-Europe Group for Interdisciplinary 
Studies, AEGIS.  
 
PhD training in BIGSAS is based on various strategies which ensure 
a quality in the field of African Studies: multi- and interdisciplinary 
research with a multidisciplinary mentorship; specialist academic 
training with a cross-disciplinarily focus; clearly structured Individual 
Research Training Plans (IRTP). Also of high importance are: the 
offer of employment-oriented transferable skills, individual career 
planning, early integration into the international academic community, 
shorter time-to-degree with structural and financial encouragements 
or specific support of female Junior Fellows.  
 
Over the past 20 years Bayreuth has amassed considerable 
experience in co-ordinated research programmes, integrating various 
disciplines into a stimulating research in the field of African Studies. 
The Institute of African Studies (IAS) promotes 63 researchers and 
coordinates African studies at the University of Bayreuth in 12 subject 
groups distributed over four of the six faculties of the university. 
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BIGSASworks! 
BIGSASworks! aims at offering Junior Fellows at the Graduate 
School of African Studies a platform for publishing research-related 
articles. This new online-journal provides an excellent platform for 
representing and promoting the idea of BIGSAS. It opens a space for 
showcasing ongoing research, creating transparency of the work 
carried out by Junior Fellows and providing a space for trying out 
articles and working jointly on them towards further publication. Each 
issue focuses on a certain thematic field or theoretical concept and 
Junior Fellows from any discipline are invited to submit papers, 
enabling common interests beyond the predetermined BIGSAS 
research areas to flourish. At the same time BIGSASworks! offers its 
work group participants deeper insights into and practical experience 
of what it means to be an editor. Last but not least BIGSASworks! 
makes BIGSAS and its research(ers), visible before their theses are 
published.  
 
 
 
 
Bayreuth, August 2012 
 
Meron Zeleke, Halkano Abdi Wario 
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Editors of this volume 
Meron Zeleke is a Social Anthropologist who completed her PhD 
study in BIGSAS in June 2012. The title of her dissertation is 
‘Faith at the Crossroads: Religious Syncretism and Dispute 
Settlement in Northern Ethiopia’. She obtained her MA degree in 
Social Anthropology from Addis Ababa University and BA degree 
in history from the same university. Her areas of expertise are 
Gender, Traditional Institutions of conflict resolution, Religion and 
peace. Meron has worked for three years as coordinator of the 
work group of Religion in Contemporary Africa in BIGSAS 
together with Halkano Abdi and have co-organized two 
international workshops on Religion in Africa.  
 
Halkano Abdi Wario is in the field of Islamic Studies and finished his 
studies in April 2012. His research project was titled ‘Networking 
the Nomads: A Study of Tablīghī Jamāʿat among the Borana of 
Northern Kenya’. He did Bachelor and MPhil degrees at Moi 
University in Kenya. His research interests include transnational 
Islamic movements, religion and spatiality, religious reformism 
among pastoralist communities of the Horn of Africa, Muslim 
personal law courts and religion and media. Halkano has also 
been a co-coordinator of the work group of Religion in 
Contemporary Africa. 
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Foreword by Professor Ulrich Berner 
Prof. Dr. Ulrich Berner 
The first issue on religion in this journal deserves special attention 
and appreciation. It comprises contributions from BIGSAS students 
and alumni, representing different disciplines: Anthropology, Islamic 
Studies, Religious Studies, Literature, and Economics. This collection 
of articles mirrors the interdisciplinary composition of the BIGSAS 
religion-workgroup, and such an interdisciplinary workgroup is a very 
conducive, indeed ideal context for doing Religious Studies. As an 
academic discipline, Religious Studies (or History of Religions which 
would still be preferable as an equivalent for Religionswissenschaft) 
should be done not in isolation but in collaboration, since its object – 
religion – is not an entity of its own alongside literature, music, and 
so on, but an aspect of human activities crossing the boundaries of 
these various sections of culture. Therefore, the discipline of 
Religious Studies has to be contextualized in the framework of 
cultural studies. 
 
In the past, Religious Studies has often dealt with its object in such a 
way as isolating it from its historical context, in order to focus on and 
take care of the specific “religious” character of the phenomena. In 
more recent times, Religious studies scholars, as, for instance, Bruce 
Lincoln, have rightly criticized this “decontextualizing” approach to 
the study of religion.  Taking into consideration the full context of 
religious phenomena, means, according to this new critical approach, 
focussing on conflicts and taking into account causes for conflict that 
lie outside the religious field. This requirement for Religious Studies, 
the contextualization of religious phenomena, is perfectly met by the 
collection of articles in this issue of the BIGSAS works online journal.  
 
The focus on conflict, however, must not lead to neglecting or even 
ignoring cases of peaceful coexistence or even cooperation among 
adherents of different religious traditions, as it is described in the first 
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contribution, based on fieldwork in Ethiopia. Thus the collection of 
articles clearly shows the ambivalence of religion as having the 
potential for intensifying conflict as well as strengthening peace or, 
more precisely said: the divergent interpretations and appropriations 
of a given religious tradition by its adherents. 
 
The interdisciplinary composition of the religion-workgroup in 
BIGSAS, corresponds well to the study and research program of the 
department of Religious Studies (Lehrstuhl für Religionswissenschaft 
I) at the University of Bayreuth, based on collaboration of experts in 
different fields of Religious Studies: History (Ulrich Berner), 
Anthropology with a focus on Ritual Studies (Magnus Echtler) and 
Sociology with a focus on Media Studies (Asonzeh Ukah). Joint 
seminars, for instance, on “Bourdieu in Africa”, or on “Witchcraft in 
Africa and Europe”, have brought together students from a great 
variety of disciplines. It should be mentioned that a junior fellow of 
BIGSAS is integrated into a research project on “The Economy of 
Sacred Space in Durban, South Africa”, covering classical African 
Initiated Churches (M. Echtler), new African migrant churches (A. 
Ukah), various Muslim communities (F. Kogelmann), and various 
Hindu communities (Z. Kopecka). 
 
It is part of the program of this department to invite Religious Studies 
scholars representing the various strands of this discipline – 
historical, phenomenological, and sociological approaches to the 
study of religion. To name but a few colleagues: Prof. James Cox 
(University of Edinburgh), Prof. Richard Kieckhefer (Northwestern 
University), and Prof. Bruce Lincoln (University of Chicago) followed 
the invitation to give lectures and offer private consultation to junior 
fellows of BIGSAS. Just this intention to present, in a balanced way, 
the various approaches to the study of religion, is perfectly mirrored 
in this collection of essays. It is perhaps worth mentioning that Afe 
Adogame, Senior Lecturer in World Christianity at the University of 
Edinburgh, who attended several workshops of the BIGSAS religion 
workgroup, holds a Ph.D. in Religious Studies from the University of 
Bayreuth.  
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Ulrich Berner 
Chair: Religious Studies (Lehrstuhl Religionswissenschaft I), Faculty 
of Cultural Studies (Kulturwissenschaftliche Fakultät), University 
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Introduction 
Meron Zeleke Eresso and Halkano Abdi Wario 
Religion in Africa has for long been a woven cultural fabric of life, a 
great moving force that guided people’s behavior, interaction and 
action since time immemorial. A decade after the United States 
experience of the 9/11, the unfortunate event has set the landmark 
for a geopolitics in contemporary Africa that securitizes religious 
movements and that identify them with the so-called global war on 
terror, a phenomenon within which most African nations play a  
significant regional role. The current wave of developments related to 
religion in the contingent became fossilized through religious 
manipulation and politicization in the post-colonial era 
 
One of the most dramatic news event in recent past was destruction 
of some century old Sufi shrines and tombs in Timbuktu by Ansar 
Dine, an insurgent militant group that agitate for establishment of 
strict Islamic law in the restive region of northern Mali that aspire to 
form an independent Tuareg majority state. The group views the 
UNESCO cultural heritage sites as idolatry and sacrilege to the true 
faith as based on their interpretation of the fundamental of faith. 
Similarly a ragtag militant group called Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna 
Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the 
Prophet's Teachings and Jihad) popularly known as Boko Haram has 
waged attacks against the Nigerian state institutions and a wide 
range of Muslim and non-Muslim targets in order to achieve its 
ultimate goals that ranged from avoidance of western education, 
separation from and annihilation of non-members, to institution of 
‘proper’ Islamic law in northern Nigerian Muslim majority states. 
Similar smal scale protests have also been reported in other Sub-
Saharan countries such as Sudan and Ethiopia. The last two years 
have also witnessed emergence of popular protests fueled by long 
standing political disenchantment dubbed the Arab Spring that led to 
the fall of northern Africa’s long serving leaders from Mouammar 
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Gadhafi to Hosni Mubarak. All these events though appearing 
disconnected often depict entanglement of religious and socio-
political discourses in everyday struggles and the embedded nature 
of religious faith as fundamental for mobilization of groups, formation 
of identities, agitation for recognition and negotiation for state 
resources and opportunities. 
 
In everyday circumstances, the evangelical pastors or popular imams 
on a popular religious broadcast in Africa yield immense power and 
influence over their constituencies, as do political leaders. From state 
governments’ involvement in global war against terror to mundane 
issues such as drawing up national constitutions, religious groups 
and individuals constitute pivotal stakeholders in everyday life in 
Africa. The question then moves from the motivation behind such 
resilience to how such groups pervasively imprint their influence in 
society. To better understand the impact of religious groups and 
ideas, we need to move beyond the search for the reasons behind 
the resurgence of religion and examine the manifestation of 
interconnected phenomena that intricately display increased 
presence of religion in daily life.   
 
Therefore three thematic concepts have been identified, i.e., religious 
trends, cultural discourses and representation, in order to capture 
some of the most contemporary issues of concern to Muslim, 
Christian and indigenous religious communities in Africa. The call for 
abstracts and papers for this issue of BIGSAS Works! hence targeted 
current doctoral researches from a wide range of disciplines and 
successfully integrated a cross-disciplinary approach to appreciate 
the complexity of faith matters in the continent , Africa,  which is a 
focal point of the graduate school, BIGSAS. 
 
The issue is a culmination of workshops, informal discussions, guest 
lectures and seminar presentations organized by a BIGSAS work-
group, Religion in Contemporary Africa (RiCA), initiated by the 
editors of this issue. The work-group brings together junior fellows in 
BIGSAS interested in the theme of religion as part of their research 
concerns. As can be seen in the profiles of the authors, the authors’ 
thematic interest cuts across such diverse religious denominations as 
Christianity, Islam and African traditional religions within a 
multidisciplinary environment  that includes anthropology, sociology, 
religious studies, geography, and media studies. Apart from serving 
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as a platform for junior fellows to exchange field experiences and 
their preliminary understanding of research findings, the work-group 
also availed forum for interactions with invited guests and senior 
fellows. In June-July 2011, a lecture series titled ‘Missionization, 
Revivalism and Creation of Transnational Communities’ brought 
together invited guest scholars, senior and junior fellows and other 
interested students to discuss topics such as transnationalization of 
African Christianity in diasporic communities, changing gender roles 
in transnational Islamic movements, rapid rise and challenges of 
Islamic banking sector in East Africa, media and missionization, and 
emerging issues in informal dispute settlement in Sufi communities in 
the north of Africa. In June 2012, the work-group brought together 
senior researchers and junior fellows in a oneday workshop titled 
‘Dynamics of Religions Reform Movements in Africa’. The forum 
gave junior scholars an opportunity to share their preliminary findings 
and benefit from discussions and criticism from the work-group 
attendees/participants. 
 
The first issue of BIGSAS Works titled “Women’s Life World ‘in-
between’ ’’ raised, through insightful articles, critical gender questions  
concerning women in Africa. How, for example, do African women 
perceive themselves since their understanding of gender roles differs 
from that of Western feminism? How and to what extent do African 
women change their life worlds when they feel disadvantaged or 
discontented? To what extent are African women expanding their 
involvement in the social, political or economic realm? Does this 
change result in a re-definition of gender roles? How do women in 
Africa deal with gendered hierarchies and authority? Are there 
conflicts or ‘in-betweens’ among ‘traditional roles’ and the behaviour 
of women? What do we learn from the empirical data and 
experiences gained within our various research projects? ‘In-
between-ness’ is hence seen as referring to a situation when the life 
worlds of women transform, resulting from social, political, economic 
or environmental changes or uncertainties. In such a situation 
women negotiate between conflicting or contradictory assumed 
norms, roles, social practices or orders. Opportunities for women 
may change, expand or become limited (BIGSAS Works, 1).  
 
The articles in the second issue though dealing with different 
religious traditions and from varying disciplinary backgrounds are 
closely interconnected. As mentioned earlier, the three main themes, 
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namely religious trends, cultural discourses and representation, are 
more all less represented in all the papers.. The papers ‘Stocktacking  
in a Transnational Islamic Movement: Accounting for Growth of 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya’ by Halkano Abdi Wario: ‘The Fragmented 
Entity: Conflict and the Emerging Faces of Jos’ by Timothy O. 
Baiyewu; and ‘Politics of Islamic Banking: A Hindrance on the 
National Unity of Sudan?’ by Ahmed Elhassab Omer, concern 
localization of transnational Islamic movements, embededness of 
religious and ethnic conflicts, and recent developments in Islamic 
economics, respectively, and fall under the theme of religious trends. 
Meron Zeleke’s article titled ‘Unity in Diversity: Local Accounts on 
Pilgrimage and Religious Boundary Crossing at Islamic Sufi Shrines 
in north-central Ethiopia’ and Serawit Bekele’s paper ‘Traditional 
Religious Practices in Axum Town, a Sacred Christian Center: 
Ethiopia’ expound on the theme of cultural discourses by exploring 
the multiplicity of religious practices that compete, complement and 
contrast as religious groups and individuals appropriate different 
traditions to renew their faith. These articles also demonstrate how 
issues of representation come to the forefront in matters pertaining to 
debates of religious orthodoxy, hence interlinking two of the three 
central themes of this issue (representation and cultural discourses). 
Under the theme of representation, the paper, ‘Moulding and Shaping 
Space: Editorial Cartoons, Terrorism and Islamic Space in Kenya’, by 
Dan Omanga, insightfully analyses how editorial cartoons in Kenyan 
newspapers depict the terrorism and various actors engaged in and 
targeted by the global ‘war on terror’ while Magdaline Wafula’s ‘Faith 
versus Reason: The Place of Religion in the Socialization Process as 
Depicted in Two Kiswahili Novels: Kufa Kuzikana &Unaitwa Nani?’ 
expounds the portrayal of religious beliefs, behaviours and 
socialization in two Kiswahili novels. 
 
As a way of linking to the first issue of BIGSAS works on gender, the 
themes raised in some of the articles in this issue touch on gender 
related themes. The paper Unity in Diversity by Meron Zeleke shows 
how gender comes to the forefront in the discursive gendering 
strategy of the Sufis’ counter-narrative. Halkano Abdi’s work on the 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat in its discussion of the profile of the members 
shows the different duties assigned along gender lines. Serawit 
Bekele’s work on the traditional beliefs and rituals in Axum shows 
how some religious congregations are defined along gender lines.  
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The discussions of the respective contributions included in this 
volume raise a variety of issues that are ripe for further investigation. 
As the discussions suggest, the dynamic elements related to religion 
in contemporary Africa are an intriguing development that should be 
explored in further research.  
 
 
Editors 
Meron Zeleke Eresso and Halkano Abdi Wario  
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Moulding and Shaping Space: Editorial 
Cartoons, Terrorism and Islamic Space in 
Kenya 
Duncan Omanga 
Abstract: 
Following the terror attacks in Nairobi on 7th August 1998, the 9/11 Attacks in 
New York and the Kikambala hotel bombings in November 2002, editorial 
cartoons in the Kenyan press have come under close scrutiny for their ability to 
capture the dominant discourses on ‘the war on terror.’ As expected, Islam, 
already seeking to assert itself across the country, has found itself at the core 
of a (spatial) discourse on terrorism. Using Lefebvre’s concept of the 
production of space (complemented by elements of semiotics) this paper 
interrogates the relationship between (social) space in Kenya on one hand and 
Islam, the media and terrorism on the other. 
 
Key Words: Islam, Space, Kenya, Editorial Cartoons 
Introduction 
On 7th August 1998, terrorism made its entry into Kenya.1 Two men 
allegedly acting on behalf of terror master mind Osama bin Laden 
packed a 2000 pound bomb behind a truck, following an all night 
assembling of the bomb at a posh Nairobi estate. The consignment 
was to be driven to the basement of the United States embassy, then 
located at the centre of Nairobi and detonated. After driving through 
the treacherous Nairobi traffic, the two men were forced to stop at the 
embassies gate for routine security checks. Claiming they had an 
important appointment with embassy officials, the two got into a 
                                                 
1  As I will show later, this was not the first terror incident, but perhaps the most     
conspicuous. This study defines ‘terrorism’ as an ideologically inspired form  of 
acquiring or seeking to change or affect policy and political space through    violence.  
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fierce altercation with the security officials.2 Panicking, and his 
patience wearing thin, one of the terrorists who had already 
disembarked from the truck pulled out a pistol and shouting allahu 
akbar (Arabic for God is great), fired shots at the security man before 
hurling a hand grenade inside the basement. His equally agitated 
colleague hurriedly stepped on the gas, ramming through the gates 
and detonating the massive bomb just several meters from the 
intended spot. The neighbouring Ufundi Cooperative, an eight storied 
building was reduced to a pile of rubble. The US embassy itself was 
badly damaged and later demolished. One of the terrorists survived 
the suicide mission and was later arrested. The men, of Arabic 
descent and “purporting to be acting on God’s behalf” were all 
Muslims. For the first time, Kenyans came face to face with what has 
become known as international terrorism.  
 
Although not the first terror attack in Kenya, and also not the last, the 
attack on the 7th of August was the most horrific in the country’s 
history. Much earlier, in the late 70s, Palestinians took hostage a 
jetliner carrying mainly Israeli passengers and demanded the release 
of Palestinian prisoners. Having already found favour with the then 
Ugandan dictator Idi Amin Dada, the hostage takers landed the plane 
in Entebbe, Uganda. Shortly after, with the logistical help of the 
Kenyan government, Israeli commandos staged a covert raid and 
rescued all hostages. This act of perceived complicity between the 
Kenyan and the Israeli government inspired a terror attack in the 
heart of Nairobi, this time targeting the Israeli owned Norfolk Hotel a 
few years later. About sixteen people lost their lives in the first 
‘international terror’ attack on Kenyan soil.  
 
In 2002, as President Moi’s term was coming to an end and the 
country deeply immersed in the presidential campaign, terrorism 
asserted its presence in the region again. In coordinated attacks, two 
men drove a truck loaded with explosives into the reception area of 
Paradise Hotel; a popular Israeli owned hotel, while a second pair 
                                                 
2   Author Samuel Katz (2002) records how guard Benson Okuku Bwaku engaged 
in an altercation with the truck driver, Azzam and his colleague Mohamed Daoud 
Al-Owhali shortly before the blast. Al Owhali survived what was supposed to be a 
suicide mission. He was arrested when he sought treatment for injuries sustained 
from falling debris. Okuku survived too, and still works as a security guard. His 
version of the events that day is recorded at the bomb blast Mausoleum in Nairobi. 
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with shoulder guided missiles, attempted to down an Israeli jetliner 
taking off from Mombasa International Airport and carrying over 250 
passengers. While the later attack missed the intended target by a 
whisker, the former claimed about 14 lives and injured several more. 
Again, terrorists espousing Islamic inspiration claimed responsibility.3 
Not surprising, when terrorists attacked New York on 11th September 
200, those suspected to have masterminded the attacks were linked 
to the Nairobi attacks. Shortly after, Kenya with the help from the 
U.S. government, stepped up its own local efforts in the “war against 
terror”, a government policy that included measures ranging from 
legislative, logistical and political support for the fight against 
international terrorism. 
 
Shortly after, Islam became the inevitable focus of news stories, 
editorials and even editorial cartoons both locally and internationally. 
Years earlier, between the 10th and the 9th century, Islamic traders 
from the Persian Gulf settled along the coast and intermarried with 
the local Bantu people, resulting in the Swahili people. Most of them 
converted to Islam. Swahili, structurally a Bantu Language with large 
borrowings from Arabic, was born; it is currently the most widely 
spoken language in East and Central Africa. Muslim traders 
introduced Islam to the western region between 1870 and 18854. The 
chief Mumia of Nabongo accorded the Swahili traders a warm 
welcome. During an inter-tribal war, the Muslims assisted Chief 
Mumia to overcome his enemies. In return, one Idd day, Chief 
Mumia, his family and officials of his court converted to Islam. 
Henceforth, Islam spread to the surrounding areas of Kakamega, 
Kisumu, Kisii and Bungoma5. Today, Islam is the faith of 
approximately ten percent of Kenyans6.  
 
                                                 
3  This attack was allegedly carried out by Al Qaeda operatives who had recruited 
local Kenyan men for the mission. However, the little known Army of Palestine, 
based in Lebanon claimed responsibility saying the attack was to accentuate ‘the 
voice of the refugee’. The attack was meant to coincide with the 1947 November 
55th anniversary of the partitioning of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state. 
4  For details See Kim, Caleb Chul-soo (2004): Islam among the Swahili in East Africa. 
Nairobi, Kenya: Acton Publishers. 
5  See Mwakimako, Hassan (2007): Mosques in Kenya. Berlin: Schwarz. Oded, 
Arye (2000): Islam and politics in Kenya. Boulder [u.a.: Rienner. 
6 See 2009 census report  
athttp://www.knbs.or.ke/Census%20Results/KNBS%20Brochure.pdf 
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Islam, in its symbols and presence is now almost ubiquitous in both 
public and social spaces. Islamic schools dot the country especially 
at the coast and the northern part of the country. A vibrant media 
comprised of several FM stations such as Iqra FM, Radio Rahma, 
and Frontier FM as well as several print media now narrowcast to 
Muslim faithful in Kenya. Besides, plenty of Islamic banking 
institutions and charities have opened shop in Nairobi and Mombasa 
targeting this growing niche. The Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims 
(SUPKEM), an Islamic organization meant to safeguard the interests 
of Muslims at a national level, forms the link between the faith and 
the government of Kenya. It is comprised of mostly professionals in 
its leadership and is perceived to be liberal and genial, as opposed to 
the more conservative Council of Imams and the Muslim rights 
organization, Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI).  
 
Broadly, this article examines how social space in Kenya, with 
specific reference to aspects of Islam, has changed since the onset 
of religious terrorism in the country. Using Lefebvre’s theory of the 
production of space, which holds that social space is not static but 
produced through practice and representational space, the paper  
reveals how Islam’s social space has been produced and redefined 
through representational moments. In doing so, I specifically focus on 
editorial cartoons in Kenya’s two leading newspapers, The Daily 
Nation and the East African Standard. With this introductory part, the 
next part of the paper looks closely at Lefebvre’s theory of the 
production of space, and how this relates to how editorial cartoons 
represent a particular space. Specifically, comments will be made on 
the extent to which the space occupied by Islam in Kenya is 
represented in editorial cartoons in an epoch of terror related attacks 
linked to Islamist groups. 
The production of Space 
In The Production of Space (originally published in 1974), Lefebvre 
starts from the observation that ‘so great is the sway still held by the 
idea that empty space is prior to whatever ends up filling it’(Lefebvre, 
1991 p.15). Contrary to that, Lefebvre argues that social space does 
not exist on its own but is part of everyday social interactions, and 
works as a network between many spaces, and the subjects who 
inhibit such spaces. To perceive space on its own would be to ignore 
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all the complexities which go into the history of producing space. It is 
a social product which holds historical significance. Furthermore, 
Lefebvre’s theory asserts that, “space is not only produced materially, 
but also through imagination” where the material world is shaped. 
The imagination lends itself through among several ways, the 
deployment of symbols, which in modern times can be seen through 
the media. 
 
For Lefebvre, space is socially constructed and society constructs 
space. Lefebvre argues that space in society is produced through a 
relationship between spatial practice, representations of space and 
representational spaces. Through spatial practice, Lefebvre explains 
that space is given meaning to by the daily, everyday activities which 
play out within that space. In other words, the way space is used 
socially defines how it is perceived and interpreted by those who live 
in this space.  
 
Representations of space refer to how space is constructed by urban 
planners and other dominant figures in society. “It is representations 
of space that act as the material producers – mapping, planning and 
then constructing material space.” (Lefebvre, p.38) Representations 
of space can also be interpreted as the extension of the state’s 
hegemony into the spatial sphere. The way a space is conceived and 
labelled by the state reflects power dynamics.  
 
The third moment in which space is produced is through 
representational spaces or the direct lived space of everyday 
experience as it is represented through images (or editorial 
cartoons). This form of representation is done through the 
imagination and expressed through vernacular language, symbols 
and images. Eugene McCann (1999) gives the example of editorial 
cartoons as one form of representational spaces. McCann goes on to 
argue that images of representational spaces do not have to be 
accurate. Their accuracy or inaccuracy does not diminish the power 
of the image as a representational space. In this study, editorial 
cartoons were seen to have played a dominant role in the production 
of space in relation to Islam and terrorism in Kenya. 
 
While Lefebvre’s theory on space and its production attempts to 
explain the genesis of socially phenomena spatially, it becomes 
inadequate on its own to explain the signs and symbols inherent in 
editorial cartoons, themselves representational spaces. Thus, the 
study incorporates aspects of semiotic thought in the analysis of how 
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the editorial cartoons acted as representational spaces of a 
perceived Islamic social space at a time of increased terrorism. 
Representational Spaces (Editorial Cartoons), Islam and 
Terrorism 
One of the key issues that emerged from the terror attacks in Kenya 
and the United States was the role and effects of mass media 
coverage on terrorism. Specifically, a series of cartoons appearing in 
the local dailies appeared to ‘elicit’ varying passions among readers. 
At one point, the Muslim community swarmed Nairobi Streets 
claiming that some of the cartoons had ‘tried and condemned’ Islam 
of terrorism. Here, one begins to appreciate the genre of editorial 
cartoons as a powerful form of communication and the 
immortalization of key events, just as any effective communication 
does.  
 
Danjoux, (2005) argues that editorial cartoons are effective in their 
ability to reduce complex events into an intelligible clash of 
opposites. By reducing events to a clash of opposites, cartoons 
provide a unique insight into the actors involved. Also, the satirical 
nature of cartoons makes them effective conveyers of the group 
paranoia and revealers of deep-seated suspicion and public mood 
that underpin conflict. It is therefore not surprising that the fears, 
aspirations and prejudices of a people are clearly revealed in the 
content of their Editorial cartoons. Also, cartoons portray a rare ability 
to sum up the public’s impression and opinion of a conflictual 
situation by a simple reductionism of ‘good’ or ‘evil’. Not only is the 
visual metaphor and caricature effective in explaining complicated 
political situations, but are effective in exposing deceit and offering 
criticism of key actors in events. Editorial cartoons have for a long 
time questioned and supported policies, legitimized values and 
illegitimatized other oppositional ‘values’, and more significantly 
‘naturalized’ ideology. As satire, cartoons can also excuse opinions 
too offensive, socially unacceptable or politically dangerous to be 
voiced in conventional discourse, or printed in prose. Further, its 
strength appears to surpass that of the written editorial for the simple 
reason that it is a picture. In the Kenyan scene, the identity of the 
actors was represented using cultural stereotypes. As 
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representational spaces, the editorial cartoons rely heavily on an 
audience’s social and cultural memory and the native understanding 
of symbols to successfully deliver both humour and meaning. In other 
words he or she appropriates and recreates spatial practice as 
understood by his or her audience. Years after the August 8 
bombings and the September 11 attacks, editorial cartoons have 
become effective in the production of space in relation to Islam in 
Kenya. Chronologically, the following selected editorial cartoons 
show how the media, through cartoons, acted as representational 
spaces.  
 
Figure 1: The Standard, Aug. 11, 1998. Reprinted with permission 
 
The Editorial cartoon above was drawn by John Khamirwa7 and 
published in The Standard on 11th August 1998. The cartoon 
attempts to show the forces and actors behind the August attacks in 
Nairobi. From the onset, the bold inscription “in the name of 
god…indeed!” gives us hints of a religious motivation to the attacks. 
The hooded, perhaps skeletal figure, armed with a scythe, draws on 
the image of the grim reaper, a powerful symbol of evil and death 
from the middle ages of the religious space in Europe. This symbol 
was appropriated in Kenya in more forceful form at the high noon of 
                                                 
7 John Khamirwa is The Standard’s editorial cartoonist. The paper is the second best 
selling newspaper in Kenya. The Daily Nation is the first. 
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HIVAIDs campaigns. It is possible that part of the huge stigma that 
accompanied the disease in the 80s and early 90s might have had 
something to do with this image. Not surprising, the sign later 
vanished from AIDS campaigns only to emerge as a fitting metaphor 
of terrorism in the late 90s and early 2000. Behind the grim reaper 
stands the supposedly masterminds of the attacks, curiously 
watching the mediated (binoculars) events at a safe distance while 
hiding behind religiously hinged ideologies. At this point the artist 
questions the identity of the god behind these motivations, drawing a 
religious binarism in the interpretation of these events. Given the 
context in which the editorial cartoon is produced, it is instructive to 
note that a subtle comparison between Islam and other faiths, most 
probably Christianity is implied. The syntagm of religion (implied by 
the words) and terrorism (by the images) are all spatially motivated, 
and likewise reproduce a cultural and social space that feed 
particular myths and stereotypes. The next day on 12th August 1998, 
this construction was developed further.  
 
Figure 2: The Standard, Aug., 12, 1998. Reprinted with permission 
 
The cartoon shows a camel laden with explosives under a scorching 
sun while nonchalantly standing next to a man of “Arabic extraction”, 
who appears deeply engrossed in petitioning “god” for help in killing 
and maiming (the innocent). The epithet of terror etched in the words 
terrorist camp and a bemused mouse completes the picture. The 
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camel is an indexical symbol of the desert life. A man kneeling is 
indexical of supplication and prayer. However, when all the signs are 
taken corporately in a single syntagm, a man on a Persian mat 
praying, a camel beside him, and oriental looks, it becomes obvious 
to the reader that this is a Muslim engaged in supplication. The 
geographical space implied correlates strongly with the one currently 
occupied by Kenyan Muslims in the northern part of the country, and 
where the mode of transport is predominantly the camel. Although 
the denotative message appears to ridicule those who kill in God’s 
name, the connotative message is equally clear: Islam is to blame for 
the senseless (denoted by the idea of killing innocent women and 
children) attacks in Nairobi. The use of ‘women and children’ is 
pivotal in revealing the absurdity and heinousness of this particular 
terror attack, and also the character of terrorism, directed at innocent 
and vulnerable non-combatants. While many may have seen a 
correlation between fundamental Islam and the attacks, few 
journalists had the audacity to give it the treatment Khamirwa gave. 
The cartoon not only ridicules terrorists, but also explicitly 
demarcates the ‘other’ as the enemy, in this case the Muslim. The 
cartoon elicited sharp reactions from Muslims in Kenya. Sheikh Ali 
Shee, the then head of Islamic preachers in Kenya, had this to say 
about the cartoon: "The media have already tried and found Islam as 
the cause of the car bomb blast … without taking into consideration 
the implications of such insinuations” (Ngunjiri, 1998) The 
spokesman of the Supreme council of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM), 
added: 
 
Even before the identities of the terrorist and their motives have been 
determined by local and international investigators now working on the 
case, there have been concerted efforts by some sections of the mass 
media to make it look as if Islam was to blame for the unfortunate event 
(Ngunjiri, 1998). 
 
In the same article cited above, Muslims were reportedly enraged 
following then President Daniel arap Moi's televised remark shortly 
after that the perpetrators of the bomb would not have done the deed 
if they were Christians. The editorial cartoon, it appears, merely 
captured in a symbolic form the dominant discourses at the time and 
the unuttered thoughts among sections of Kenyans; by acting as 
representational space. This discourse was to gain momentum 
following the attacks in New York on September 11th 2001. The lack 
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of sufficient closure following the Nairobi Embassy bombings in 1998 
in which most Kenyans anticipated the arrest and eventual conviction 
of Bin Laden, meant the 8/7 narrative played out in the 9/11 
understanding of events, especially in the Kenyan media. Shortly 
after the 9/11 attacks, the media, perhaps picking on dominant 
international discourse on terrorism, began constructing two binary 
forces, one evil and one good. The same played out in editorial 
cartoons appearing at the time. Below, entitled ‘The War Today’, one 
of these cartoons provides a fitting invitation for the reader to identify 
with one of the sides. 
 
Figure 3: The Daily Nation, Oct. 23, 2001. Reprinted with permission 
 
The piece above drawn by Gado8 constructs an evaluative theme 
that privileges a particular interpretation. Symmetrically balanced on 
the top right corner of the pictorial frame, the two dominant aspects in 
the cartoon are the feuding birds and the planets cast in outer space. 
Planet earth is fore grounded, perhaps symbolizing its interlocked 
fate with the outcome of this cosmic war. A transcendental 
                                                 
8 Gado, whose real name is Godffrey Mwampebwa is the editorial cartoonist for 
The Daily Nation, East and Central Africa’s leading newspaper in terms of 
circulation. 
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interpretation is churned as the stretched heavens witness the fight 
of good versus evil. While the 9/11 terrorists claimed to be fighting on 
god’s behalf, likewise the fight against terror appears to tap on the 
inspiration of a transcendental force. The casting of this war in outer 
space also adds an apocalyptic dimension to it. The cartoon draws 
on a Judeo Christian interpretation, where the dove symbolizes the 
essence of godliness and God’s presence-the very gentleness of the 
Holy Spirit and the olive branch on its beak, drawn from an episode 
in The Biblical epic of the flood, is a now a staid symbol of peace and 
comeliness.  
 
The vulture, a sign mostly linked with widely held notions of 
scavenge and opportunism is a common cultural symbol of evil in 
most of Africa. To a vast majority of Kenyans, the symbolism 
resonates well as the vulture is feared as an indexical sign of death 
and bad omen while the dove was appreciated and domesticated as 
a ‘friend of man’. The horned head of the vulture is an obvious 
exaggeration that accentuates visual monstrosity designed to 
foreground an oppositional Manichean reduction of 9/11 as a conflict 
between good and evil. The thorny twig, deliberately hurled at the 
dove’s neck, apportions the blame on the vulture, which is seen as 
the unprovoked aggressor. It is not lost to the keen observer that 
black, often a sign symbolising evil is contrasted to white, a sign 
embodied by the ‘good’ dove. The resulting syntagm reveals a 
binarism paired along oppositional structural categories of both evil 
and good (a mostly religious interpretation) or alternatively the 
aggressor and peacemaker (a political-military interpretation). The 
paradigmatic interpretation suggests that variously the terrorists were 
seen to be the aggressors, acting with malevolent intent and hence 
the villains. 
 
While the pairing of good versus evil in the media is common in 
virtually all political, social and human interest stories, such binarism 
at the onset legitimized the war against terror as it cast the war 
against terrorism as a God sanctioned operation. However tenuous 
the connotation, at the receiving end must have stood Islam in its 
varied expressions, (especially when the previous editorial cartoons 
are considered) and the consequences, whether directly or indirectly, 
profoundly affected the social space occupied by Islam in Kenya. 
Mahmood Mamdani (2004: 257) in his book Good Muslim, Bad 
Muslim argues that the binarism of good and evil, which was 
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extensively used during the Bush administration, closes the door for 
any kind of negotiation and contains ideological language which 
justifies the use of power and impunity. He argues,  
 
The consequence of bringing home-wherever home may be-the 
language of the war on terror should be clear: it will create a license to 
demonize adversaries as terrorists, clearing the ground for a fight to 
finish, for with terrorists there can be no compromise. The result will be 
to displace attention from issues to loyalties, to criminalize dissent, and 
to invite domestic ruin. Worse still, if the struggle against (political) 
enemies is defined as a struggle against evil, it will turn into a holy war. 
And in holy war, there can be no compromise. Evil cannot be 
converted; it must be eliminated (Mamdani, p.254). 
 
In launching the ‘war on terror’9 shortly after the 9/11 attacks, 
President Bush frequently employed rhetoric that constructed a 
binarism of ‘us’ and ‘them’; cautioning the international community of 
being either ‘with us or against us’ and terming the US response as 
‘crusades.’ In journalism however, such binarism is almost always 
hard to resist in practice. This is because conflict of whatever nature 
is newsworthy, whether in sports, politics or war it is the essence of 
news. And more so when the feuding pair brings out a ‘David and 
Goliath’ confrontation where a strong actor comes against a weak 
foe, or the privileged versus the deprived, and of course, the good 
versus the bad.   
 
                                                 
9 ‘War on Terror’ becomes a problematic term, since terror is not an entity but a tactic. 
War is waged on a country or a defined group, and not on a method of engagement. 
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Figure 4: The Daily Nation, Oct. 25, 2001. Reprinted with permission 
 
Following the onset of the ‘war on terror’ after the invasion of 
Afghanistan by coalition troops, Osama Bin Laden, now the epitome 
of evil was targeted for capture and a price of hundreds of millions of 
dollars was placed on his head. However, as the search dragged and 
hopes of his capture began dimming, the despair found expression in 
editorial cartoons. Above, a mean faced CIA agent is perplexed at the 
many ‘Osama look alikes’ in his search for the enemy. The ‘Lilliputian’ 
makes a long distance call to his superiors mumbling something 
about the mounting difficulty in the search. The difficulty is blamed on 
the facial, cultural and social similarity among men of Middle Eastern 
origin, While this is denotatively true, the underneath ideology 
excuses the lumping of all men of such looks together and further 
legitimizes widespread suspicion of men professing an Islamic 
persuasion, having long beards and those leading similar lifestyles.  
 
While such depiction can be rightly considered to stereotype men of 
Islamic faith, the following cartoon does the same to women of the 
same faith. Published on the 30th of November in The Daily Nation, 
the cartoon mainly dwells on the now fruitless search for Osama. Still 
hot on his heels, a CIA agent (indexical of the US, also a metonymy 
of the West) informs his bosses that no sign of Osama is 
forthcoming. Meanwhile a man dressed as an Islamic woman 
intermingles with other women dressed in similar fashion, while 
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shooting a curious glance at the black suit clad CIA agent. All the 
while, his long beard partly showing underneath and his clumsy mien 
attract suspicious glances from the women. In a backdrop of 
dramatic irony, the ‘Lilliputians’ joke that having run out of options, 
Osama can still suicide bomb himself. While pouring scorn on the 
fruitless search, the cartoon also loops in women, symbolized by the 
burqa clad women as objects of our collective suspicion. In most 
parts of Kenya, the burqa, known by its Swahili term ‘buibui’ often 
has connotations of mystic, secrecy and malevolent intent especially 
among the non Islamic populations. For the average Kenyan growing 
up in the non Islamic parts of the country, mythologies of men gone 
mad or completely disappearing without trace after rendezvous with 
buibui10 clad women still abound. The metaphor taps into an easily 
identifiable cultural notion. 
 
Although according to media reports the search for Osama was in 
the mountainous terrain between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the 
cartoon below, using Arabic architecture (providing connotations of 
Islam) as its background situates the search in an urban space. As a 
representational space, the dominant impression secreted appears 
more to highlight the social space than the physical space portrayed.    
 
                                                 
10 Swahili word for the dress worn by Muslim women meant to cover one from head to 
toe with only a slight opening for the eyes.  
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Figure 5: The Daily Nation, Nov. 30, 2001. Reprinted with permission 
 
Shortly after the US launched the war on terror with the invasion of 
Afghanistan and later Iraq, Kenya was ‘coerced’ into supporting the 
war against terror. Much earlier, in 1998, then President Moi had led 
a street demonstration in Nairobi against terrorism, a first in the 
history of the country by a head of state. In 2001, when New York 
was hit, Kenya’s foreign policy began to take a more proactive role in 
the so called war against terror. As a geographical space considered 
as harbouring active terror cells, and equally on the receiving end of 
numerous terror attacks, Kenya began to fight terror locally. In close 
cooperation with Western Powers, for instance the U.S., - the 
establishment of the National Security Intelligence Service , the Anti-
Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program, the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit 
(ATPU) in1998, a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and the National 
Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) in 2003 were realised. The ATPU 
was provided with broad powers, and was exempt from the standard 
use of due process in the event they suspected an individual of terror 
links. They were allowed to make arbitrary arrests and hold suspects 
incommunicado for up to two weeks. And so, to give it the legal 
platform to work from, the government was again coerced to pass the 
‘suppression of terrorism’ bill. Apart from its provisions, the bill was 
vague and broad in its definition of “terrorism” or a “terrorist” act or 
action. Also, its provisions gave extensive powers  to  the police  and  
customs officers  to  stop  search  and  seize, detain and arrest;  
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making  detention  the  rule  and  bail  the  exception. (Amnesty 
International, 2004). The lack of safeguards and due process in 
decisions to extradite equally raised a furore among civil society 
groups in the country. However, this did not stop the harassment, 
arbitrary arrests and prosecution of hundreds of Kenyan Muslims 
especially in the Coast, North eastern and parts of Nairobi.  
 
The following cartoon (see Figure 6) appeared in The Daily Nation on 
the 15th of December 2001, a few months after 9/11. As a 
representational space, the cartoon captures spatial practice of an 
ordinary Muslim in Kenya following the country’s resolve to contain 
terror locally. Two policemen on a routine patrol possessing a picture 
of a wanted ‘terrorist’ stop a potential suspect. After assaulting and 
thoroughly pounding him to pulp they realize he is not the man they 
wanted. Their gut instincts and reliance on generalizations had failed 
them. One ‘Lilliputian’ suggests suing them, and another retorts 
‘where?’ a veiled attack on the ineffective judicial system in Kenya 
and ridicule on the broad powers vested on the terrorist police. While 
this is an accurate picture of police conduct, the representational and 
spatial practices as elements of the production of space are seen to 
show interdependence in the eventual secreted space. Here, one 
can understand how the ‘war against terror’ (or more accurately the 
apprehension of terror suspects) is partly executed locally; 
haphazard, stereotyped and brutal on those at its receiving end. The 
denotative message is one of a mistaken identity in what may 
perhaps be an honest pursuit of terror suspects. However, the 
connotative message reveals that in the wake of the so called ‘war 
on terror’, perhaps more harm has been meted on the imagined than 
on the real enemy.  
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Figure 6: The Daily Nation, Dec. 24th, 2001. Reprinted with 
permission 
 
The day before Christmas, as is the norm in Kenya’s print media, 
Christmas symbolism is heavily appropriated to capture the 
prevailing yet dominant social and political discourses in the country 
through the use of editorial cartoons.  
 
Almost like a sequel to the cartoon above, on the 24th of December 
2001 the editorial cartoon in the next page was published in The 
Daily Nation. It carries on the framing of the ‘war on terror’ from a 
local perspective, satirizing its methodology that is largely based on 
blunt stereotyping and generalizations. While the narrative of the 
proverbial wise men who visited the baby Jesus draws inspiration 
form the Christian text, the apparel, mien and physical looks of the 
‘wise men’, when placed in the contemporary Kenyan context, tell 
more about Muslims than what is denotatively implied. Although the 
terrorism bill was not made into law in the state that it was originally, 
it paved the way for the justified profiling based on religion in actual 
social space. 
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Figure 7: The Daily Nation, Dec. 24th, 2001. Reprinted with 
permission 
 
It is worth noting that the controversial suppression of the terrorism 
bill also made references to dress as one way in which suspected 
terrorists or their associates could be identified. For instance, a 
particular clause made it an offence for people to dress in such a way 
‘as to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is a member of a declared 
terrorist organization’, (Republic of Kenya, 2003). Needless to say, 
this clause caused particular concern amongst Muslim communities, 
who have their own distinct way of dressing. The bill also granted the 
minister responsible for national security the power to make 
exclusion orders but only against individuals with dual citizenship. 
According to Howell & Lind (2010) this was perceived as directly 
targeting Muslims, many of whom descend from immigrants from 
Somalia, the Arabian Peninsula and South Asia. The editorial cartoon 
above appears to capture the discourse of the possible execution 
and abuse of this piece of this legislation should it become law11. In 
response to the bill, the Kenya National Commission on Human 
Rights, the governmental human rights watchdog, stated ‘[l]aws or 
policies must not target or appear selective by community or group’ 
(KNCHR, 2003: 8). 
                                                 
11 The suppression of terrorism bill was eventually passed into law in august 2012 after 
extensive consultations with stakeholders key among them Muslim rights groups. 
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Conclusion 
Incidences of police profiling and arrests on suspicion of being a 
terrorist were widely reported in Mombasa and other coastal cities. 
The same was reported in North Eastern province and the Somali 
enclave of Eastleigh, Nairobi. In November 2001 over 50 
businessmen in Mombasa were rounded up for alleged links with Al 
Qaeda. Most were however released without charges being 
preferred. Just recently, over 300 youths were arrested in Eastleigh 
in January 2010 and charged with being in the country illegally. It is 
not a coincidence that these spaces are mostly wholly or mostly 
occupied by Muslims. However, while police action appears targeting 
the cultural and material space occupied by Muslims; spatial practice, 
which Lefebvre argues can be empirically determined through history 
and practice, has equally helped in producing the resultant lived 
space. According to the Kenyan authorities, materials used for the 
construction of the 800kg bomb that shook Nairobi was smuggled 
into East Africa disguised as relief aid with the help of some Islamic 
relief agencies (Achieng 1998). Further, with regard to the political 
and social space, of all the countries in the Horn of Africa, Kenya 
boasts the most stable, most effective, and most democratic 
government. As a result, terrorists take the advantage and continue 
to move in and out the country freely, establishing businesses in 
Mombasa, the Islamic dominated places of Nairobi, Lamu and parts 
of North Eastern province like Garissa. Indeed most operate Islamic 
charities, find local brides, rent light aircraft to come and go from 
Somalia, hold meetings, communicate with terror financiers outside 
the country, transfer money, stockpile weapons and engage in 
undetected reconnoitring of possible targets.  
 
Based on the foregoing spatial practice, the nett effect is a growing 
perception of Islam’s complicity with terror. Also, comments by a few 
Islamic leaders appearing to sympathize with terror masterminds 
have not helped matters. Still, Islamic leaders have consistently 
come out to denounce the terrorists as criminals especially when 
Kenyans and targets on Kenyan soil are involved. Despite counter 
claims, Whitaker (2008) argues that there is little evidence that 
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Islamic radicalism has gained much support among Kenyan Muslims 
(Haynes 2005; Rosenau 2005). She comments that the recent 
mobilization of the Muslim community in Kenya is motivated primarily 
by local concerns (mostly political inclusion, economic development, 
etc.), and not by global issues (Seesemann 2005). Further Muslim 
activism should not automatically be interpreted as radicalism. This is 
not to deny that a small number of Kenyans have been involved in 
extremist groups, a fact that Kenyan officials are reluctant to admit. 
On the whole, however, Kenyan Muslims have largely rejected 
militant methods and extremist ideology. 
 
As for the media, being purveyors of news, these ambiguities are 
never fully expressed in the time bound news bulletin, or the space 
bound column or news report. The dominant and easily churned 
frame from the media has been largely replete with generalizations 
and reductionism that has subtly reproduced in the Kenya’s social 
space, an image of Islam as a purveyor and accomplice of terror. And 
as this study illustrates, the editorial cartoons have been sharp, if not 
brutal, in capturing the rapidly changing space, as representational 
spaces. 
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Politics of Islamic Banking: A Hindrance on 
the National Unity of Sudan? 
Ahmed Elhassab Omer 
Abstract: 
Islamic banking in Sudan which has become dominant in the banking sector 
since 1990s, might pose a direct threat to the unity of the country by the end of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) interim period in 2011. The 
anxiety expressed in this paper is based on the feeling that the issue of 
Islamizing the economy is not an unintended policy as thought by the masses. 
It rather, goes hand and foot with the development of the identity crisis, which 
divides the country along the Arabism-Islamized and Africanism-Christian 
dichotomy. The way by which politicians tackled the issue of identity, over the 
last 54 years, has left too many issues still swept under the rug of this 
dichotomy, one of which is the Islamization of the banking sector. These two 
mutually exclusive views have been at the heart of the socioeconomic and 
political turmoil, which underlies the current problems facing the Sudanese 
state.  
 
Key words: Islamic banking, national identity, Arabism, Africanism 
Introduction 
The period around the 1970s saw Muslim communities in the Middle 
East witnessing the appearance and rapid expansion of interest-free 
banks, later known as Islamic banks. Such developments were later 
on initiated in countries outside the Islamic world with sizable 
presence of Muslims. Since then, Islamic banks have become an 
essential component of everyday Muslim business life, and a corner-
stone of Islamization of economic policies. It would be reasonable, 
before heading on, to explain what we mean by Islamizing the 
economy? Generally speaking, the term 'Islamization' refers to ‘the 
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process of restructuring the prevailing socioeconomic set-up in the 
Muslim societies according to Islamic injunctions’ (Igbal, M., 2002, p. 
68). The banking system as the beating heart of the modern 
economy has been the focal point on which the pioneers of Islamic 
banking theory drew their thoughts about what they envisaged as 
Islamic economy. They perceived Islamic banks as institutions that 
provide investment and financing facilities for Muslims who are keen 
in implementing the Islamic law in their business transactions. They 
believe that goals of Islamizing the banking sector, are not of 
materialistic side only, but are based also on the concepts of 
improving the well-being of humans and the overall achievement of a 
good life. Hence, Islamic banking theory tends to emphasize Islamic 
values, socioeconomic justice and a balance between the material 
and spiritual needs of its followers (Khan, M. and Bhatti, M., 2008, 
pp. 7-10) 
 
Islamization of the banking system therefore, indicates a situation 
whereby all the existing banks, nation-wide, should, by law, operate 
under and subscribe to the principles of Islamic law in their business 
transactions. This argument entails four essential points that should 
be observed: 1) prohibition of charging (taking or receiving) interest 
being glossed as Ribā (usury)12. Financial transactions should be 
free from interest, and should also be linked directly or indirectly, to a 
real economic deal. Interest, as a price of capital in conventional 
banks, should then be replaced by the arrangement of profit/loss 
sharing in Islamic banks. Profit/loss sharing demonstrates a case in 
which the investor and the bank will share in the risks and profits 
generated from the deal, an asset or a project13 2) not undertaking 
                                                 
12 Ribā literally, means increase or addition or growth. Technically, it refers to the 
'premium' that must be paid by the borrower to the lender along with the principal 
amount as a condition for the loan or an extension in its maturity. Interest as commonly 
known today is regarded by a consensus of the majority of fuqahā (Islamic jurists) to be 
equivalent to Ribā. (Igbal, Munawar and Molyneux, 2005, pp. 7-11. Also, Khan, M., and 
Bhatti, M., 2008, pp. 20-25). 
13 As stated by the Islamic principles of financing, any positive, fixed or predetermined 
rate of return related to the maturity or amount of principal is prohibited. Instead, the 
principle of profit/loss sharing should be in action. Basically, on profit/loss sharing 
modes of financing, borrowers and lenders should share the rewards of the deal as 
much as the loss incurred out of the deal, if any. The main idea is that borrowing 
households will pay back the principal of their loans along with the portion of their profit 
to the bank. The principle therefore, means that, no person is ever allowed to invest his 
property, in a way that generates profit without exposing him to the risk of loss. Rather, 
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transactions that are considered to be unlawful (harām) by Sharī؛a. 
Financial transactions should not be directed toward economic 
sectors considered unlawful such as investment in business dealing 
with tobacco, gambling activities, drugs, alcoholic beverages, pork 
process and sale industry, and any activity that might be deemed 
harmful to the community or, being not congruent to the Islamic 
values. 3) Prohibition of carrying out operations with unknown 
outcomes because of the risks they might involve. Examples of such 
transactions include, among others, lottery, speculation, and 
gambling associated activities. 4) Finally, Islamic banks are required 
to pay zakāt (a religious tax) as an obligatory duty. The objective of 
paying zakāt is to enhance brotherhood among members of the 
Muslim community and to achieve social development goals13F14 
 
In addition, Islamic banks have one distinct feature, namely, the 
existence of the so-called Sharī؛a Supervisory Board. A Sharī؛a 
Supervisory Board is assigned, in any Islamic bank, the task of 
monitoring work of the bank to ensure that every new transaction that 
seems questionable or doubtful from a Sharī؛a standpoint is 
disallowed or made to comply with the dictates of the Muslim law. 
Membership of the board is drawn from among the ulamā (Muslim 
scholars). The opinions of the board are expressed in forms of 
rulings and verdicts over different banking issues, and they are 
considered binding to the banks, as well as to the clients. The 
rationale underlying the existence of such a board is to act as an 
independent audit unit to assure the shareholders that the bank fully 
complies in its business transactions with the principles of Sharī؛a. 
 
However, the implementation of a financing system based on the 
religious affiliation of the majority of the population who subscribe to 
Islam might not seem reasonable, in a country like Sudan, where the 
non-Muslims, especially in the south of the country and who 
                                                                                                                            
it exposes both parties to the outcome of their deal, be a profit or loss. (Igbal, Munawar 
and Molyneux, 2005, pp. 20-23. Also, Khan, M., and Bhatti, M., 2008, pp. 45-54). 
14 Zakāt is an obligatory financial religious levy on all non-working capital, surplus 
wealth and agricultural income of the Muslims. It is charged at varying rates and can be 
collected by the state and is determined annually (normally based on lunar year). The 
rate of zakāt on commercial merchandise is 2.5% .The assets subject to zakāt must 
meet specific conditions. In particular they should be owned for at least one lunar year. 
According to the majority of Islamic scholars, only tradable assets are subject to zakāt: 
fixed assets are not subject to zakāt. These tradable assets should be valued at their 
cash equivalent. (AAOIFI, 1999, p. 308) 
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constitute a considerable size of the population, may harbour feelings 
of discrimination and suppression of their fundamental rights as 
Sudanese citizens. More seriously, is whether the anticipated system 
of Islamic banking is flexible enough to accommodate the financial 
interests of the non-Muslim citizens, or is, well immunized not to 
violate their rights to access the banking services on the same 
footing with their Muslims counterparts?. For instance, will non-
Muslims be compelled to pay zakāt when banking with Islamic 
banks? 
 
This paper attempts critique the Islamic banking system in Sudan 
using an economic approach as an essential instrument in 
addressing the identity crisis between the Muslim-Arab in the north 
and Christian-African in the south. The paper will try reading the 
politics of Islamic banks not as resultant of two different socio-
political views, rather including also, a new dimension from economic 
perspective. The paper argues that politics of Islamic banking, might 
share responsibility, besides other factors, if the country falls apart by 
the end of the CPA six-year interim period in 201115.  
Emergence and Development of Islamic Banks in Sudan 
Emergence of the Islamic banks in Sudan cannot be read in isolation 
from controversy over the contested identity of the country. Since the 
dawn of independence, the question of identity has been sharply, and 
in the most cases, violently, debated. This question has presented an 
outstanding challenge that, unfortunately, has not yet wisely been 
handled by various Sudanese governments and other regional and 
global players.  
 
The author agrees that Sudan suffers from what Mazrui (1985) called 
multiple marginality and that the country is seen as Africa’s ‘sick 
                                                 
15 Southern Sudan became an independent state on 9th July 2011, in the end of the six-
year interim period of the CPA. Unfortunately, the split of the country into two separate 
parts had been the concern of this paper. It became clear to many observers from the 
onset that the divisive nature of the CPA, combined with the deep mistrust between the 
two signers factions, would only lead to an out-right loss of the national unity of Sudan. 
However, even though, it might not seem easily manageable dissolving the two 
monetary systems over night; many difficulties will be encountered; and this is out 
scope of this paper. 
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man’. Because of that judgment, the author advocates the idea that 
the problem of Sudanese identity has been mismanaged between 
the two hostile factions – northerner and southern elite in a tragic 
manner. Assal (2009) agrees with Mazrui, pointing out that ‘the 
multiple marginality of the Sudan is brutally reflected in the internal 
politics of the Sudan, where its dominant northern elite desires it to 
be Muslim and Arab and its southern elite desires it to be African and 
de-Arabized.’ (Ibid, p. 3) These two contradictory, even mutually 
exclusive visions have been at the very heart of the violent political 
conflict that colored the post independence Sudanese State. Harir 
(1994), maintains that “In the continuous and relentless pursuit of 
making Sudan an appendage to 'something' Arab, African or Islam, 
both parties have failed to build 'something' Sudanese as its 
uniqueness expressed in being Arab and African at the same time, 
required” (Harir 1994, p. 11). However, the political dimension might 
not be the purpose of this article, rather as Assal envisages, the way, 
by which the question of identity was tackled by politicians left many 
issues that were/are still swept under the rug of Muslim-Arabs and 
Christian-Africans dichotomy. The economic arena in general, and 
the banking sector in particular, is taken in this paper as one of the 
areas that require urgent address and fixing if Sudan is to remain 
united. 
 
The first Islamic bank in Sudan emerged in 1975, as a direct result of 
the cooperation between the Arab World and the Islamic Movement 
Faction, the most radical political group, which later, succeeded in 
taking-over power in June 1989. The Islamization of the banking 
sector may be a pointer on Sudan’s earnest quest of championing 
the course of Islam. Sudan is the sole country in the continent, where 
a government sponsored full-flagged Islamic banking system has 
been in action for more than two decades. 
 
The slogan of Islamizing all aspects of Sudanese life had been the 
corner-stone by which Arabian countries were invited to penetrate the 
national economy under the guise of Islamic banking. Historically, 
many reasons worked together to give rise to the emergence of 
Islamic banks in Sudan in the second half of 1970s. Although political 
and economical factors played a role, it had been the religious factor 
which played a key-role in fueling the aspirations of the pioneers who 
were fascinated by idea of the Islamic banks (Abdeen, Yasin Al-Hajj. 
Field Interview, Khartoum, 2007). Politics and religion had been the 
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two factors, which played crucial role to the inception of Islamic 
banks in Sudan. Whereas politics had been used as fuel, religion 
was the vehicle by which idea of Islamic banking transmitted and 
entrenched into the Sudanese financial environment. Having seized 
the opportunity of political reconciliation with the then president 
Nimeri, the Islamic Movement succeeded to move with their Islamic 
slogans and agendas to unprecedented levels  
 
The inception of an Islamic oriented bank – Faisal Islamic Bank of 
Sudan in 1976 – was the political price that Nimeri's regime had to 
offer for reconciliation with the Islamic movement, the most active 
faction against his rule before 1975. The success and viability of 
Faisal Islamic bank paved the way for the establishment of several 
other Islamic banks, notably, Tadamon Islamic Bank of Sudan 
established in November 1981, and the Sudanese Islamic Bank in 
1982. By the year 1985, Al-Baraka Group, the rapidly expanding 
Islamic banking system established a branch in Khartoum. Three 
others followed soon after; the Islamic Bank for the Western Sudan, 
the Islamic Cooperative Bank for Development and Al-Shamal 
Islamic Bank in 1990 (J. Millard Burr and Robert O, Collins, 2006, 
pp.106-107). In less than five years course of operation, Islamic 
banks in Sudan not only proved to be effective, but also took a large 
share of the banking market. Their total ‘paid-up’ capital increased to 
168 million Sudanese pounds compared to 158 million for the fifteen 
non-Islamic banks (Anwar Mohamed, 1987, p.13). It was observable 
that, the rapid expansion of Islamic banks in Sudan was achieved at 
the cost of the conventional banking existence. 
 
Islamization process of the banking system in Sudan had passed 
through four stages, before it reached the apex in 1990: 
 
Stage One: 1982/1983: The Islamic banking system was conceived 
as an idea that firstly fostered by the declaration of the famous 
September Laws, which were adopted by ex-president Nimeri, as 
Islamic Sharī؛a law in 1983. Many observers considered that step of 
applying Sharī؛a law was not taken for the sake of Islam, but to 
rescue the swaying regime of president Nimeri from the definite 
collapse. Among the many aspects of life, directly be affected by 
September law, was the banking sector. Soon afterward, the 
application of the law, a presidential decree was issued declaring 
intention of the regime to adopt a complete interest-free financial 
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system. Accordingly, all operating banks, by then, were oriented to 
assist in the transition from interest-bearing to interest-free banking 
(World Street Journal, 12th December 1984, p.39). Usually, upon 
such big economic turning-point, preparatory measures are 
supposed to be done, before the transition is applied. Surprisingly, 
that had not been the case; because the orientation did not consider 
any transitional measures. Nor did it care about other non-Muslims 
stakeholders who were not necessarily, concerned with Islam 
anyhow, or even Muslims citizens, those who were not in favor of that 
Islamization policies. Another problem associated with that 
presidential decree, was pertaining to the non-availability of the well-
trained cadres, who were supposed to carry out the new policies 
efficiently. As a result, a wave of turmoil in the banking sector was 
observed. Many banks were not able to satisfy the new 
requirements, with their funding abilities being seriously reduced. 
 
Stage Two: 1983/1985: that period was marked by the declaration of 
the so-called September Islamic Law of 1983. In December 1984, the 
government of Sudan under president Nimeri ‘ordered all banks in 
the country to stop paying or charging interest16. A presidential 
degree was issued to make interest payments unenforceable in 
Sudanese Law Courts. That decision affected 27 banks, including 
nine foreign banks17. The Agricultural Banks of Sudan had been the 
first bank to adjust itself shortly after. As a result, many Islamic 
modes of financing were designed to replace the usurious rates. 
Murābaha sale replaced the medium term finance for the bank's 
owned commodities and trucks. In addition, the bank started 
accepting deposits (demand deposits, saving deposits, and 
investment deposits) according to the newly Islamic modes of 
financing. Short-run loans were replaced by agricultural contracts 
under the so-called cost-service18. 
 
Stage Three: 1985/1990: during this period, the Sudan was being 
ruled by a democratically elected government, which happened not 
to be in conformity with the National Islamic Front and its Islamization 
slogans. Because of that a clear fluctuation of Islamic banking 
policies was observed. This included the dissolvability of Sharī؛a 
                                                 
16  Wall Street Journal, op. cit., p.13  
17  Anwar, Mohammad, op. cit., p. 13. 
18 Gism Al-seed, Hago, op. cit 
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Supervisory Board and postponement of its functions. Due to the 
conflicting views of the Sudanese political parties during that period 
on the issue of Sharī؛a law, a partial implementation of Islamic 
banking principles was made, while the whole issue of Islamizing the 
banking sector was made open for further debate. In September 
1995, the Minister of Finance and the National Economy, introduced 
what came to be known the 'Law of Compensatory Rate' under which 
the banks were allowed to deal in compensatory rates, and of 
determining the a rate of compensation for credits balances, debts 
balances, saving accounts and loans. The compensatory rate was 
considered by the National Islamic Front a real interest rate 
concealed in a new terminology.19 
 
Stage Four: 1990/2005: this period of time represents the biggest 
leap of Islamic banking development in Sudan ever happened, when 
a comprehensive Islamization of the economy was set up. That was 
in early 1990s, one year later, after the National Islamic Front 
attained power through a military coup. A series of decisions 
concerning Islamic banking were taken to make it in conformity with 
Sharī؛a, following the declaration by the new government leaders to 
make Sharī؛a the sole source of law and legislation in the country. 
Based on the ministerial decision No. 69/1990, related to the 
abolition of usurious deals in the state circles, a Higher Sharī؛a 
Supervisory Board for Banking and Financial Institutions (HSSBBFI) 
was formed from a number of Sharī؛a specialist scholars (Gism Al-
saed Hajoo, Field interview Khartoum, 2007)20. To officiate the new 
modes of finance, the Sharī؛a board, was assignedtasked by the 
Central Bank of Sudan (CBOS), the duty offor drafting verdicts, 
‘fatwās’, advising banks, and replying questions from the public, on 
                                                 
19  Elhassan, Sabir Mohammad: The Management of Monetary Policy within the 
Experience of the Sudanese Islamic Banking, p. 12 
20 Sharī؛a Supervisory Boards (SSBs) are “in-house religious advisers and they 
issue a report to the users of financial statements, which certifies that the bank has 
adhered to Islamic principles” (Karim, 1990, p.34). In addition, they undertake other 
duties like providing advices and give fatwas (verdicts) to the banks in non-Islamic 
clear transactions. In Sudan, the central bank has formed what is called: higher 
Sharī؛a Supervisory Board for Banks and Financial Institutions (HSSBBFI) 
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the legal difficulties associated with workability of these new modes 
of Islamic financing (Ibid). You have not exhausted the 4 stages, only 
2! 
Sudanese Islamic banks and non-Muslims 
Islamic banks are those banks, which follow Islamic Sharī؛a in their 
business transactions. Abolishing interest from their dealings is the 
fundamental principle on which Islamic banks are based. Islam’s 
strict ban on dealing with interest seems to have social roots. Mirza 
and Baydoun (2000, p. 36) argue that the use of Ribā (usury) violates 
the principle of social justice, which is very important in Islam, 
because it leads to rewarding people without them making an effort. 
Those who lend money on interest do not make an effort, nor do they 
participate in the risks of the project financed, and such behavior is 
rejected by the teaching of Islam. Talip and Phay (1998, p. 65) 
suggest that the most apparent reason for the ban of Ribā is to 
‘enforce the spirit of brotherhood between Muslims’. 
 
If such argument of social justice, and the enhancement of 
brotherhood, were the theoretical and moral basis of Islamic banking 
industry, then why did non-Muslims Sudanese citizens resist and 
oppose it? The answer to this question may be related to the 
question of identity and the way it has been reflected in the economic 
field. The totally biased socio-economic policies carried out by Ingāz 
government, during the first days in power, under the radical slogan 
‘al-mashro al-hadāri’ (Civilizational Project) had left no options for 
non-Muslims Sudanese citizens. The Civilizational Project was the 
socio-economic engineering program designed by the Islamic 
Movement, for to restructuring the Sudanese community, as to bring 
it back to the pristine era of the Islamic state. of the Prophet 
Mohammad. Under that project, the entire aspects of life were 
subdued to radical changes, in favor of the Arab-Islamic identity, 
which deliberately intended, to excluding exclude other cultural 
components of the Sudanese social fabrics.  
 
The divisive identity politics launched by the regime in the early 
1990s; in all aspects of life, and the holy war as perceived by the 
regime (jihād) as perceived by the regime (it is imperative to give the 
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full meaning of jihad in footnote and how it is used in a narrow sense 
for ‘holy’ war if at all there is anything holy in the Sudan political 
calculations by the state) against the southerner rebel movement and 
the Christian Sudanese citizens in the north, had coloured their 
relation and feelings of national belongingness, with a thick fog of 
suspicion21. Southerners elite and other Christians in the north 
looked at the Islamic banks with suspicious eyes, and perceived 
them with much doubt. It was an aspect of the identity game politics, 
which the regime, as they saw guess it, was striving to impose on 
them by virtue of force and coercion. So it was nothing, but an Arab-
Muslim device, used by the regime to crowd them out economically 
after they had been crowded out culturally and politically. In one of 
his weekly broadcasting speech John Grang, the leader of the rebel 
movement in the South SPLM/SPLA, said:  
 
The junta in Khartoum has decided to impose an Islamic identity over 
the whole country! The state is an object that can neither be Muslim, 
nor be Christian, and that is why, we in SPLM/LA refuse giving the state 
a religious identity! The state is a human created object that has no 
religion! Have you ever seen a state going to the mosque on Friday or 
to the church on Sunday? Has someone of you ever heard about a 
state gone to Mekka for pilgrimage? It is human beings who do that, not 
the state! Let us differentiate between the personal religiosity and the 
state, because it is the only way by which we can keep up our country 
united. 
 
Therefore, all political and financial institutions that resulted out from 
the Civilizational Project, in all aspects of life, and particularly, the 
banking sector, were considered as devices, designed to favor an 
                                                 
21 Jihād literally is an Arabic derivative of the word “jahd” which basically means 
strive struggle, and endeavor. In Islam, such struggle is of two types; one is internal 
and the other is external. However, both of them have the same purpose that is to 
change a situation, which seems as not in conformity with God will, or not in 
conformity with nature as such; and thus, may cause unrest or disturbance for the 
Muslims nation. (Encyclopedia of Islam: ). In the context of this paper, the term 
jihād has a political and religious connotation of the “holy war” in the Sudanese 
government circles. A war that is based on, and fueled by religious manipulation 
agenda. It has been used by the 1989 government of Sudan to demonstrate an 
allegation of taking up arms in defense of Islam and Sudanese nation against the 
secular-oriented rebel movement 'Sudanese People Liberation Movement/Army' 
(SPLM/SPLA), during the period 1989-2005.  
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Arab-Islamic identity at the cost of other Sudanese components. The 
resultant output of that sentiment, was a real doubt that rights of 
Christians and other non-Muslims are conserved within the new 
banking system. Such a doubt, towards Islamic banks was not felt 
out of nothing; many aspects of Islamic banks could make Christians 
and other non-Muslim clients feel doubtful. Their suspicion was 
confounded when they recognized that the new banking system, 
might not position them in the same footing with Muslim citizens, with 
whom they are sharing the same space. Below is an account on 
some of the aspects that made the non-Muslim citizens to reject 
Islamic banks. 
 
1. Prohibition of charging interest  
 
While the prohibition of Ribā is binding on Muslims, the same cannot 
be said of non-Muslims, who are allowed to deal with interest-based 
institutions. Thus, imposing interest-free banking means depriving all 
non-Muslims from revenue gains they could, otherwise, be 
generating. Moreover, in the Sudan, the non-Muslims are not allowed 
to access funds from any interest-based institution while the national 
banks are by law, not allowed to serve their demands. In essence the 
economic fate of the non-Muslims had been sealed by Islamic banks. 
In addition, while interest-based banks provide people with 
consumption loans as well as overdraft facilities, Islamic banks do 
not recognize such loans, or facilities. Provisions of consumption 
loans and overdraft facilities, in any form in an Islamic banking set-
up, for those who may need it are outlawed. Moreover, no bank 
is/was permitted to work on an interest-based system in the northern 
part or even in the south before the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) of January 2005. In this way, during the entire 
period extended between 1989 and 2005, a considerable size of the 
population was deprived from enjoying an important civil right of 
rational choice. In fact, it was a clear constitutional violation, since 
citizenship is the only constitutional criteria by which rights and duties 
are determined. However, according to that course of action taken by 
the Sudanese state, constitutionality of citizenship was nothing more 
than a nominal written clause, that could easily, be dropped a side, 
whenever it goes against the Arab-Muslim identity. Because of that 
many Christians southern citizens were feeling economically 
marginalized, which boosted up their political and cultural grievance 
to unprecedented levels. It should be pointed out that, whereas the 
BIGSAS Working Papers 2/2012: Trends, Discourses and Representations in Religions in Africa    [50] 
 
regulations of the CBOS forbid conventional banks to operate in the 
North, it nevertheless, allowed Islamic banks to operate in the South. 
Available statistics reveals that, eight Islamic banks with 18 branches 
were operating in the South; before the Government of Southern 
Sudan required them to turn their operations interest-based or 
otherwise stop their operations in the region (Annual Report 2007, 
Central Bank of Sudan, p. 50)22 These banks, however, refused to 
comply and had to close their businessshop in the region. The action 
was in fact a clear signal that the two banking system arranged under 
the CPA, was undergoing serious intricacies. 
 
2. Religious-based shareholding 
 
According to the recognized nature of Sudan as a multi-cultural, 
multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual country, it 
has been confirmed that religion shall not be used as a divisive 
factor23. Based on this, eligibility for public office, public service, 
including the presidency and the enjoyment of all rights and duties 
shall be based on citizenship and not on religion, belief or customs24. 
In spite of the clear emphasis by the CPA that religion should not be 
taken as a basis for political, cultural and economical entitlement, 
however, Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan limits, by law, the rights of 
share-holding's ownership and exchange to Muslim citizens only. It 
has been stated by the principal law of the bank that ‘all shares of the 
bank are nominal; owned and exchanged by Muslims.’25  
                                                 
22 It deserved mentioning that in 2007, the Ivory Bank’s branch in the south has 
opened an Islamic window, alongside the conventional system (Annual Report 
2007, the Central Bank of Sudan, p. 50). It is a paradox, that such a rational view is 
not at all, possible in the north. 
23 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 5th January 2005, Chapter 1, Part B, article 
6.1 
24 Ibid., 6.2 
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Accordingly, non-Muslim citizens are not entitled to hold a share in 
the bank as a public limited company. 
 
3. Prohibition of unlawful transactions 
 
Islamic banks are by Sharī؛a law, not permitted getting into any 
transaction that violates Islamic principles. The umbrella of such 
transactions covers a wide array of business, which is forbidden 
according to Islamic context. All business that are deemed unlawful 
and the related activities, like manufacture, transportation and sale of 
all sort of alcohol beverage, tobacco, night clubs and all activities of 
unknown outcome; like lottery businesses all of them are not eligible 
for getting Islamic financing opportunities. (Awad, Mohammed 
Hashim, an interview, in Khartoum, 2007)25F26. If all these businesses 
were permissible to non-Muslim citizens before the introduction of 
Islamic banking system, so the kind of resentment generated with the  
Sharī؛a based banks was rather somewhat expected. Before signing 
the CPA it was not permissible in the southern region for one to 
undertake any investment on such taboo businesses.  
 
 
4. Payment of zakāt 
 
Conceptually, zakāt is supposed to be a major instrument for 
providing social security, eradicating poverty, curbing excessive 
economic disparities, and stimulating economic activity by 
transferring substantial purchasing power from the haves to the 
have-nots. Although zakāt is obligatory for all Muslims, there is 
controversy in the Islamic literature as to whether Islamic businesses 
are obliged to pay this tax, or whether it is obligatory only for 
individuals. Gambling (is this a name of an author?) and Karim 
(1991, p. 103) have argued that zakāt levied on individuals who are 
Muslims individuals and that entities are not liable to it. The Islamic 
                                                                                                                            
25 Documentation of Sudan Experience in the Field of Islamic Banks and Financial 
Institutions, Part 2 (Laws associated with the experience), Central Bank of Sudan, 
Khartoum, 2006, p. 70 
26 He was the Prof. Chair of Economics, Faculty of Economics, U of K, a 
permanent member of the (HSSBBFI), since it has been initiated in 2nd of March 
1992. 
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Fiqh Academy, in its first zakāt conference held in Kuwait in 1984, 
reached the conclusion that businesses are not required to pay 
zakāt, unless such a requirement is imposed by law or agreed on by 
their shareholders (Shihaddeh, 1987, p. 32). In Sudan, all the banks 
operating in the country before the CPA were required, by law, to pay 
zakāt. The computation of zakāt is however, inclusive for all clients 
regardless of their religious affiliation. Hence, many Christian clients 
who deal with Islamic banks and pay zakāt feel that they are obliged 
by force of law, to pay a religious tax, which they are not entitled to 
by Islam itself. In addition, the way by which zakāt funds are 
channeled to the designated recipients is somehow ambiguous and 
segregative. Many Christians are not eligible to receive zakāt funding 
except when they are recently converted to Islam under the name 
(Al-Muā`lafatu qulūbahum) – those hearts have been (recently) 
reconciled to the truth of Islam. Only then they deserve being given 
zakāt to make them feeling the brotherhood and solidarity of the 
Muslim community. So while Christians are forced to pay zakāt, they 
are not allowed to enjoy one cent out of it. Some observers believe 
that many of those funds did not find its way even to the targeted 
groups of the Muslims community. The regime was accused by using 
the fund of zakāt to fuel the holy war (jihād) against Christian 
southern citizens during their revolt against the government in 
Khartoum (J. Millard Burr and Robert, O. Collins, 2006, pp. 106-107). 
However, such allegation may need more investigation. The 
concluding remark of this point is that, non-Muslims became victims 
twice, namely they are forced to pay zakāt, and that their money may 
be used to fight against them. 
 
 
5. Sharī؛a Supervisory Board Membership 
 
All banks that were operating in Sudan, before the signing of the 
CPA, were required by law to have a Sharī؛a Supervisory Board. The 
board has the duty of examining the bank’s transactions to ascertain 
if there is any breach of Sharī؛a rules. It assures the investors about 
congruence of Islamic banks performance with Islamic laws and 
principles. In addition to that, the board advices the banks, on some 
transactions those seem to be of ambiguous nature, (Haniffa, R. 
2005, p. 15). Membership to Higher Sharī؛a Supervisory Board of the 
CBOS has been confined to Sharī؛a specialists and to professionals 
who are knowledgeable on the field of Islamic law and banking 
business. It is composed of 10-persons; none of them was/is a 
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Christian. Every individual bank has been required to establish its 
own three to four member Sharī؛a boards, whom are usually 
nominated by the bank's board of directors. It should be noted that 
within the 26 banks operating in the country in 2008, none of their 
Sharī؛a Board posts, was filled by a Christian citizen. The Christians 
are still being excluded by definition of law to satisfy conditions of 
such task. The investigation I did, on the membership of Sharī؛a 
Supervisory boards in 24 banks out of 26 banks operating in Sudan 
in 2008, gave astonishing results. Out of 100 people who represent 
the population size of all the boards, none of them is a southerner or 
a Christian. The membership is totally confined to the knowledgeable 
Sharī؛a scholars.  
The Issue of Banking System at the Heart of the CPA 
It was not surprising then, the economic identity, so to say, was a 
conflicting point, while negotiating the CPA in 2005. Discussions on 
wealth sharing agreement, reflects, the parties conflicts over the 
contested identity (Emerik Rogier, 2006, p. 38). The hard line 
followed by the rebels, reflects their anxiety over the best way to 
promote unity on an equal and fair economic footing. Accordingly, the 
rebels movement (SPLM/A) claims that it is now, necessary, to 
correct past historical mistakes, of which the banking sector was the 
utmost priority. Therefore, the restructuring of the banking system 
was at the heart of the wealth sharing agreement for its imperative 
function and its key role in supporting the political stability and the 
national unity of the country. However, instead of reaching one 
unitary banking system, the two parties agreed to establish two 
different banking systems. It was clear that the insistence of the 
National Congress Party (NCP) to keep up the Islamic identity of the 
banking system drove SPLAM/A negotiators to counteract it, and 
clamoured for a secular or conventional banking system. The 
pragmatic negotiation tactics of the two hostile factions resulted in a 
sharp divisive identity politics upon which the option of the two 
different banking systems has been integrated in the CPA. 
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Two-Headed Banking System 
The two factions– NCP and SPLM/A – agreed to establish dual 
banking systems, albeit not ones that are fully separated as SPLM/A 
had hoped (Ibid, p. 40). It has been agreed that conventional banking 
facilities are urgently needed in Southern Sudan. Therefore, the view 
was to establish, during the -interim period, the Bank of Southern 
Sudan (Dau, Stephen Dhieu, 2006, pp. 2-3). Demonstrating more 
suspicion, SPLM/A, insist restructuring; during the interim period, the 
CBOS inasmuch to reflect the duality of the banking system in the 
country. CBOS shall therefore, use and develop two sets of banking 
instruments, one is Islamic and the other is conventional, to regulate 
and supervise the implementation of a single monetary policy 
through: 1) an Islamic window in Northern part of the country under a 
deputy Governor of CBOS using Islamic financing instrument to 
implement the national monetary policy in Northern Sudan, and 2) 
the Bank of Southern Sudan headed by a deputy governor of CBOS 
to manage the conventional window using conventional instruments 
in implementing the national monetary policy in Southern Sudan27 
 
Unfortunately, four years after signing the CPA and now approaching 
the deadline of the interim period, it has been clearly proved that 
theories are always failed by practical realities. The noble objective 
upon which the dual banking system had been proposed – to 
promote the fragile national unity – has been aborted. Instead of, at 
least having a peaceful co-existence, and harmonious co-operation, 
the opposite scenario has been encountered. The gap between the 
two systems has widened, with no spark of hope, in the corridor of 
the national unity. Each of the parties started developing an exclusive 
and independent economical identity. The decision taken by the 
Government of Southern Sudan to chase out the branches of the 
Islamic banks that were operating in the South for their failure to 
convert to conventional system, left no doubts that two independent 
economic identities were taking shape in the country. It has been the 
anxiety of the author that, the huge technical difficulties associated 
with such kind of hybrid financial system will finally lead to the 
appearance of two different banking systems. 
 
                                                 
27 Agreement on Wealth Sharing, Naivasha, Kenya: Wednesday, January 7th, 2004. 
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In the end, what has been hoped by the CPA to be the way out of 
such divisive economical identity appeared the most fragile part of 
the CPA. The two headed banking system, instead of serving as a 
lubricant to promote the national unity, turned out to become a 
divisive factor, which will tear-up the already withering national unity. 
As the paper shows, the arrangement of a dual separated system is 
not relevant to enhance the missing ring of the national unity; it will 
rather accelerate it to fall apart. It will in fact, serve as a dividing 
instrument, if much concern is not given to re-correct it. 
The way forward 
The debate over identity question represents an outstanding 
challenge for all Sudanese intellectual elite, those who are seeking a 
safe harbor to the issue of national unity. One may opine that 
economic identity is one aspect of the macro identity crisis that has 
come very late, yet, contributed a lot to the chronic nature of the 
crisis. The approach suggested in this paper looks to the identity 
politics by adding a new dimension based on economic perspective. 
The economic aspect has not been given much care in the identity 
debate. It is time to consider this aspect if we seriously seek an 
inclusive solution to the problem of identity. The CPA was the first 
endeavor ever tried to include the economic aspect of identity to 
readdress it, but the outcome has not been promising so far. This 
could mainly be attributed to the paradox of Arabism-Islamized and 
Africanism-secularized dichotomy in which the CPA has been 
trapped. Even though, it might not be fair to rule out that the dual 
banking system was the wrong option, I believe, it is one step in the 
right direction, if applied properly. Therefore, for the system to be 
more meaningful in resolving the identity crisis, this paper proposes 
that the dual banking system must be allowed to function 
simultaneously all through the country. The banking system should 
be a unified system, with two different windows (conventional and 
Islamic) both of them operate simultaneously to satisfy the needs of 
all citizens regardless of religious affiliation. 
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Faith versus Reason: The Place of Religion 
in the Socialization Process as Depicted in 
two Kiswahili Novels: Kufa Kuzikana and 
Unaitwa Nani? 
Magdaline Wafula 
Abstract: 
This paper focuses on the role of Christian religion in the socialization of the 
youth in East African communities as represented in two Kiswahili novels; Kufa 
Kuzikana (True Friendship) and Unaitwa Nani? (What is Your Name?). From a 
Postmodern perspective, one can argue that in the present era where 
reflectivity is of paramount importance, the younger generation is more inclined 
towards a logical as opposed to a theological approach in tackling socio-
political and economic challenges. Reflexivity, a tendency to positively question 
reality, is opposed to passive acceptance of socio-cultural establishments as 
the absolute norm. Drawing on critical review of the two novels, this paper 
examines how young people shift away their gaze from the theological 
approach in tackling socio-political and economic challenges to advocating 
logical discourse in their dealings on daily basis. In this sense, the hegemonic 
control of Christianity is challenged as new options become the norm 
especially by the younger generation in the contemporary society.  
 
Key terms: Missocializing agent, postmodernism, reflexivity, implied author, 
focalization and narrative voice  
Introduction 
Colonialism in Africa took not only the form of political dominance 
over the colonized people but also exerted considerable influence 
over their cultural and religious beliefs (Ngugi, 1986; Mlacha, 
1988:45-46). Ngugi wa Thiong’o observes that it was not easy to 
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differentiate between the missionary and the British administrator. 
This is because the missionaries were charged with the conversion 
of Africans to Christianity as well as being responsible for their basic 
education to equip them for the service of their colonial master. It is 
at mission schools that Africans were encouraged to embrace the 
white man’s culture. They had to denounce their African ‘traditional’ 
values such as rites of passage, traditional forms of medication, 
naming systems among many others. They were encouraged to drop 
their African names but instead to take pride in the ‘Christian’ names 
acquired after conversion. African names remained as family names; 
for instance, people began calling themselves, John Kamau, James 
Onyango, Mary Wafula, etc. This trend has continued to date, albeit 
with some critical reassessment by some leading African 
personalities such as Jomo Kenyatta, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Wangari 
Maathai, Raila Odinga, Koigi wa Wamwere (in Kenya), Kwame 
Nkrumah and Kofi Anan (in Ghana), Namdi Azikiwe, Wole Sonyinka 
and Chinua Achebe (in Nigeria). 
 
However, today some African Christians prefer to retain their 
indigenous or tribal names even after baptism. They argue that their 
African names are loaded with meaning and reflect their African 
identity.  This in itself is a pointer to a generational shift in the attitude 
to the   Christian faith. Christian doctrine is seen as a camouflage of 
Western culture. Ngugi wa Thiong’o has championed this drift by 
abandoning the name ‘James’ preferring to use only his African name 
‘Ngugi wa Thiong’o’ (Theodore Pelton, 1993; Shelton, 1978:12-13). 
He contends that although colonial establishment and administration 
were important in the change of social groups in Africa, they mainly 
strived to effect social and cultural changes in the individual. 
Alterations in the African’s personality, the Europeans naively felt, 
could easily be made through missionary activity and education. 
Christian activity was often less “Christian” than European and thus, 
unlike Islam, tended to bring widespread overt change to Africa. 
 
Consequently, Western formal education and Christianity became the 
basic means of socializing young people in most of the colonized 
African countries. Even to date when African states have achieved 
political independence, the trend still lingers on. For instance, most 
national and provincial (now county) schools in Kenya are associated 
with certain Christian denominations. This is because different 
missionary groups tended to concentrate their activities in specific 
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geographical regions. For example, in Nyanza region we have 
Maseno School (Anglican Church); Central Kenya is associated with 
Alliance High School (Presbyterians), while Western region has St 
Peters Mumias (Roman Catholics) and Friends School Kamusinga 
(Friends Church).Although the government oversees the running of 
these schools by supplying them with teachers and other subsidies, 
the respective denominations still have an influence on the spiritual 
matters. For example, they insist on having a representative of the 
church in the Board of Governors or even have a chaplaincy in the 
school. 
 
Consistent with critical postmodern perspective, it is argued that the 
dominant culture tries to remain dominant by imposing and 
universalizing its own culture through indoctrination and ideological 
manipulation. It does this most effectively through ideological 
hegemonic control of educational institutions, the mass media, and 
through religion and other cultural agents - a subtle process of 
incorporating persons into particular patterns of belief and behaviour 
(Nicol, 2008:4-5). These realities are well captured in the Kiswahili 
novel especially from the 1970s to the present (Mlacha, 1988). 
 
African writers use literature as a means of addressing social ills 
(Mazrui & Syambo (1992). Elena Bertoncini (2009:2) affirms that 
Kiswahili literature has tended to develop in parallel with the changes 
in the East African society.  Therefore, Kiswahili novelists have 
always used their works as a platform to engage with socio-political 
and economic issues in their society. For instance, the influence of 
religion as a socializing agent in East Africa was and still is so great 
that many Kiswahili literary works have featured it as a theme in its 
own right. Alamin Mazrui (2007: 37-38) observes that most of the 
earlier Kiswahili literary writings pitted Christianity against Indigenous 
African religions, as in Samuel Sehoza’s Mwaka Katika Minyororo (A 
Year in Chains, 1921). 
 
Religion as a theme is not just prevalent in the earlier Kiswahili 
literary works. A quick survey of some of the contemporary Kiswahili 
novels reveals that Christianity is portrayed as one of the catalysts of 
social conflicts in post-colonial Africa. This is well captured in 
Kezilahabi’s Rosa Mistika (1979), John Habwe’s Paradiso (Paradise, 
2005) as well as of Wamitila’s Nguvu ya Sala (Power of Prayer, 
1999). In all these works, Christianity is portrayed as a 
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“missocializing” agent especially when the youth are unable to cope 
with challenges outside the home environment where Christian 
values are upheld. Could this scenario be an indication of the waning 
power of missionary religions as socializing agents in the postmodern 
era? 
 
I argue that the younger generation is tending towards a logical 
approach in tackling social issues as opposed to faith. Examples to 
support my argument will be drawn from two Kiswahili novels; Kufa 
Kuzikana (Walibora, 2003) and Unaitwa Nani? (Wamitila, 2008). 
These novels vividly capture how the older and younger generations 
are coping with socio-political and economic challenges prevalent in 
the present society. Kufa Kuzikana is authored by Ken Walibora while 
Kenneth Wadi Wamitila is the writer of Unaitwa Nani? 
 
Kennedy Walibora and Kenneth Wamitila are among the upcoming 
Kiswahili novelists only marched by their predecessors like Said 
Khamis, Kezilahabi and Shafi Adam Shafi who belong to the older 
generation (Bertoncini, 2009). Ernest Waititu (2005) describes 
Walibora as one of the best Kiswahili writers and broadcasters in 
Kenya. Wamitila’s Nguvu ya Sala (The Power of Prayer) (2001) and 
Musaleo (2005) have won the Jomo Kenyatta Prize for Literature. In 
2006, Wamitila was also awarded by the Institute of Kiswahili 
Research (TUKI) (now TATAKI) as the best East African Kiswahili 
literature scholar (Wamitila, 2006). Walibora’s Ndoto ya Amerika (The 
American Dream) won the 2003 Jomo Kenyatta Prize for Literature 
(in the children category). 
A Summary of the Novels  
The story in Kufa Kuzikana takes place in a fictional country, 
Kiwachema, where two antagonist ethnic groups, the Wakorosho and 
the Wakanju live next to each other in Korosho district. Two young 
characters (Akida a Mkanju and Tom a Mkorosho) are faced with the 
challenge of negative ethnicity28 that almost breaks their friendship 
but they withstand it. The story is mainly narrated by a homodiegetic 
                                                 
28 Negative ethnicity here refers to the tendency to discriminate an individual on 
racial or ethnic grounds. This is what is commonly referred to as tribalism in Kenya. 
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narrative voice (Akida) who is also a character in the story. He relates 
how he travels by bus from his village to Tandika the capital city of 
Kiwachema. He is to be rewarded by the Minister for Education as 
one of the three best primary school leavers of the country. While in 
the city, he hopes to stay at Tim’s place for a short time. However, 
when an ethnic clash suddenly breaks out in Baraki his village, he is 
unable return home.  
 
The government chooses not to give any news about the massacres 
in the media, pretending that all is well. Neither of the two friends has 
any news of his family until Tim’s sister Tamari, after a narrow escape 
from death, manages to reach her brother’s place. After looking in 
vain for their relatives in the mortuary and in hospital, they decide to 
ask for help from Tom, a young and influential man from their village. 
They call at his luxurious residence when he has just learnt that his 
father has been killed in the ethnic clashes. In spite of the risk, Tom 
decides to bury his father in accordance with his customs. Akida 
volunteers to join him and his four bodyguards in this dangerous 
journey. Akida takes this chance to go to his home only to find that it 
has been burnt down. When he returns to the others, he finds Tom’s 
body lying in the mud. He was stabbed by Korosho policemen. Tom’s 
colleagues and his bodyguards did not lift a finger to protect him. 
Akida does not want to return to town before burying Tom’s body 
although the others urge him to leave at once. He remains with his 
friend only to discover that he is not dead after all. With great 
difficulties he carries him to the hospital and stays with him until Tom 
slowly recovers. In the meantime, Tim has lost his job because his 
uncle accuses him for siding with the Wakanju. 
 
Akida finds Tim living with Tamari in a slum in utmost poverty and is 
invited to settle with them, living on casual labours like Tim. One day, 
Akida strikes a Korosho man who boasts of having killed hundreds of 
Wakanju. Convinced that he had killed the man, Akida flees to 
another region where a local farmer hires him as his servant. 
Nevertheless, three years later he returns to the capital city and gives 
himself up to the police for the murder he thinks he committed. After 
the trial he is released because the man did not die, he was only 
injured. Tim reveals to Akida that his own father (Mzee Zablon) 
indeed killed Akida’s father. Akida weeps bitterly but he comes to 
terms with it and is ready to stay with Tim. However, the relatives of 
the man he injured try to take their revenge and Akida has a narrow 
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escape disguised as a woman. In the end, Tom, who has moved to 
Canada, arranges for Akida to join him there. 
 
Unaitwa Nani?  has an interesting plot in the sense that it is 
subdivided in two sections on gender basis. Both sections begin with 
the question ‘Unaitwa Nani?’ We are then presented with 
unconscious nameless characters in a hospital.  When they come to 
their senses, they can only recall their gender. What follows 
thereafter is a chronology of episodes that are entertaining, 
saddening and thought provoking since they involve the two 
characters’ efforts to understand themselves as well as their society.  
 
The first section features stories about a woman who in a way 
represents various female characters who suffer under patriarchal 
systems. Different episodes are narrated from the point of view of 
this female character. On regaining consciousness, the woman is 
shocked to see several men gazing and making fun of her naked 
body.  She is disgusted but in spite of her efforts to respond to them 
she is unable to utter a single word. When she is asked to mention 
her name, all she says is ‘mwanamke’ (woman). They insist that she 
should give a name that reveals her real identity for example as Mr 
X’s daughter or wife. The section ends with several episodes 
featuring female characters that are oppressed on account of their 
gender. Notably, the younger female characters are determined to 
combat social structures that are oppressive to the female folk. 
Acquisition of Western form of education becomes the key to their 
freedom.  
 
The second section is narrated from the perspective of a male 
character who also speaks for various male voices. Male characters 
are equally victims of the female characters who have found leverage 
in the institutions of marriage and religion. However, like their female 
counterparts, young characters break loose of the oppressive 
establishments in their society. Kaminda (a pastor’s son), is tricked 
into marriage by Sasi. Apparently, Sasi is out to revenge on pastor’s 
children after Katiwa (another pastor’s son) abandoned her after 
impregnating her. Seemingly, Kaminda is unable to handle marriage 
issues due to poor socialization by his Christian father.29 There is 
                                                 
29 Unaitwa Nani? pp.161-176 
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also the story of Wamae, a young man who fakes lameness in a 
‘Christian’ crusade in order to obtain money to start a business30.In 
both novels, the authors are engaged with social-cultural, political 
and economic challenges facing the present Kenyan society. Some 
of the themes that cut across the two novels include: hypocrisy on 
the part of the religious leaders, corruption, demerits of the free 
market economy and oppressive cultural practices such as wife 
inheritance and forced early marriages for girls.  
 
In this paper I foreground religion as a socializing agent as depicted 
in the novels. In both novels, the Christian faith is predominant. For 
instance. In Unaitwa Nani?  only one episode (Vuta n’kuvute)31 refers 
to a Muslim teacher who abuses his pupil.  However, several 
episodes as we shall see later refer to Christian pastors who misuse 
their position. They are unable to serve as role models to the 
younger generation. The older members of society who are entrusted 
with the duty of socializing the youth fall way below the expected 
moral standards. As a result, the youth turn to education and their 
talents as the way out of their social challenges. Seen against the 
postmodern era in which the depicted communities live, it can be 
argued that religion as a socializing agent may be losing power or 
need a revision if it is to be relevant in the contemporary society.  
Postmodernism 
As a basis of my discussion, I shall highlight some fundamental 
viewpoints about the postmodern ideas which in my opinion attempt 
to explain the tendency to drift from religion to reason or rationality in 
the contemporary society.  Simon Malpas observes that the term 
‘postmodernism’ tends to be used in critical writing in two key ways: 
either as ‘postmodernism’ or ‘Postmodernity’ (Malpas (2005:9). 
Generally, postmodernism has tended to focus on questions of style 
and artistic representation, and Postmodernity has been employed to 
designate a specific cultural context or historical epoch. However, as 
                                                 
30 Unaitwa Nani? p.183  
31 Unatiwa Nani? P.82 
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Simon has rightly noted, a clear cut distinction between 
postmodernism as a style and postmodernity as a period is 
impossible. The social context in which a literary work is produced 
and read has a bearing on the litrary devices that the author deploys. 
 
According to Anthony Giddens (2001:680) for instance, asserts that 
postmodernism describes a historical era marked with major changes 
affecting the global society due to a set of economic, social, and 
political forces that circulate across continents and national 
boundaries. It is an ideology that challenges the idealistic and 
universalistic tendencies of its predecessor, modernism, which are 
dissolving with the changing world. Bran Nicol (2008:2) also affirms 
that postmodernism is characterised by fluidity in social concepts, 
reflexivity of social members and a diversity and plurality of systems 
that give human beings a chance to choose the most suitable one. 
Nicol (2008:4-5) further points out that postmodernism is an attitude 
that underscores our culture and refers to a heightened degree of 
self-consciousness, indicating that our experience of reality has 
changed. Reality is no longer something that we take for granted, but 
is something that we suspect is continually organised and 
constructed for us by the apparatus of the mass media and the global 
capitalist economy.  
 
Subsquently,  the suspicion of the ‘created reality’ is what propels the 
postmodern men and women to actively engage in its recreation. 
People (especially the youth) in the twenty-first century no longer 
accept the present establishments as the ideal but rather as 
provisional structures that need continuous reassessment in the ever 
changing society. This is the kind of society that is depicted in Kufa 
Kuzikana and Unaitwa Nani? 
 
In the two novels, the authors depict intergenerational conflicts 
involving the older and younger members of society emanating from 
their varied outlook on various social issues. For instance, while the 
older generation appears to be passive and conservative towards on 
the established social structures, the younger generation is reflexive; 
it is inclined towards self reflection and self referral (Steve, 1988). It 
actively re-evaluates the cultural heritage handed down to it by the 
parent generation. Various cultural practices, Christian religion 
included, have come under strong criticism by the younger 
generation which is more inclined to reason as opposed to faith. 
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David Kinnaman observes that for the younger generation, the lines 
between right and wrong, between truth and error, between Christian 
influences and cultural accommodation is increasingly blurred 
(Kinnaman, 2011:12). In the present internet era, the youth can 
readily access information thus making them more informed and 
more critical of their social environment. As Erdmute Alber (2008:3) 
informs us, the youth in contemporary societies are no longer 
passive in their societies. They are actively involved in the social 
structures that affect their daily life. It is on this premise that we see 
some young characters challenging Christianity as a valid socializing 
institution as represented in the two novels.  
Christianity in Kufa Kuzikana and Unaitwa Nani? 
For the white missionaries, Christian religion was seen as a means of 
enlightenment and moral uprightness to the Africans who were 
considered to be uncivilized. It was part of modernization and 
consequently, an ideal form of life (Shelton, 1978:13). However, in 
the postmodern era the “authenticity” of the Christian faith is 
increasingly being challenged. This is especially so when those who 
are entrusted with its propagation fall short of the moral standards 
that they purport to advance. In Kufa Kuzikana and Unaitwa Nani? 
Christian leaders are represented as hypocrites who manipulate their 
congregation for their own interests. Mere profession of the Christian 
faith is therefore not a surety of morality in the contemporary society.  
 
In Kufa Kuzikana (Walibora, 2003), Christianity is less appealing to 
the youth as a moralizing agent. This can be inferred from the 
behaviour of characters like Akida, Jerumani and Tim, Jerumani, a 
young man who had won a scholarship to pursue a Bachelor’s 
degree in engineering in Germany scoffs at Akida’s suggestion that 
religion is a plausible means of revolutionizingl their society. He 
accuses Christian leaders like John Njalala for fuelling ethnic clashes 
by inciting their congregations to attack each other and even 
supplying weapons used in the clashes in Baraki (Kufa Kuzikana, 
156, 160). Moreover, the same pastor pleads guilty in a court where 
he is accused of sexually abusing young girls (Kufa Kuzikana,189). 
Akida is shocked that the pastor could be accused of such an 
offence. However, Jerumani is not surprised and he cites the 
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Rwandan genocide which to him clearly reveals how Christian 
leaders were partisan in the ethnic clashes (Kufa Kuzikana156). This 
scenario is similar to what happened in Kenya where during the Post-
Election Violence in 2008, the Church was silent about the contested 
presidential results and burning of members of an ethnic group in a 
church in Eldoret town.  
 
When we consider that literary works are cultural artefacts of a given 
community, it is no surprise that the author draws his themes from his 
own experiences. Elena Bertoncini (1989: 2) notes that Kiswahili 
literature has tended to develop in parallel with the socio-political and 
economic changes in East Africa. Kufa Kuzikana vividly captures the 
political mood that characterized the Kenyan society in the early 
1990s during the onset of multiparty politics. The novel was 
published in 2003 meaning that it could have been written between 
1992 and 2002. At this point in time, multiparty system was taking 
root in Kenya and the single party system was declining in power. 
The ruling party known as Kenya African Union (KANU) had become 
very unpopular after being in power since Kenya’s independence in 
1963. This appeared to suggest that all those who had benefited 
from the KANU regime feared losing their economic and political 
grips in the country. Therefore, to safeguard their interests, they 
resorted to ethnic manipulation by exploiting the existing latent social 
and economic cleavages between citizens from different ethnic 
groups.  In 1992 and 2002 respectively, Kenya experienced major 
ethnic clashes following the country’s general elections. Therefore, in 
view of the historical context of the novel, it can be understood why 
ethnicity features as a major theme in the novel. 
 
The fictional country of Kiwachema can easily be associated with 
Kenya; the birth place of the author. Some of the places mentioned in 
the novel have a bearing with actual features and roads in the 
country. A case in point is River Kibisi which is located in the western 
part of Kenya while Lumumba, Mandela and Nkrumah are names 
given to some of the roads in Nairobi; the capital city of Kenya. 
These names also depict great African luminaries whose political 
ideals were to form the basis of African renaissance. 
 
Therefore, a reader who is conversant with the geography and 
history of Kenya can easily figure out that the fictional city of Tandika 
represents Nairobi, the capital city of Kenya (KK.31). During this 
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period in the Kenyan history, Christian principles were put on the 
scale. Communities from varied ethnic backgrounds who lived 
together were faced with the challenge of either submitting to ethnic 
loyalty or religious allegiance. As captured in the novel, some 
Christian leaders reclined to ethnic prejudice and attacked fellow 
Christians. Furthermore, the failure by a section of the Church to 
marshal support against the new constitution during the 2010 
referendum may also be indicative of the declining fortunes of the 
Church in postmodern era.   Could we say that these are indicators 
that Christianity (the predominant faith of the majority of Kenyans) is 
losing the moral ground to guide the masses given that grand 
corruption are abound perpetuated by leaders who bear Christian 
names? 
 
Within the framework of narrative theory, narrative voice and 
focalization are the key narrative strategies that reveal the ideology 
of the implied author in a literary text. Narrative voice designates the 
agent that tells the story and focalization refers to the angle from 
which the story is related (Rimmon-Kenan, 2002.88). These two 
strategies are usually lodged in the narrator who may or may not be 
part of the narrated story in the form of character(s). In most cases 
the main character is the one that reveals the implied author’s 
ideology in a narrative text. However, sometimes minor or incidental 
characters may communicate this ideology (Uspensky, 1973:8-9). 
 
The implied author is a textual entity that is an ‘implied version’ of the 
real author who establishes the norms of the narrative (Booth 
1961:67-71). For Jacob Lothe (2000:19), the implied author is 
practically a synonym for the ideological value system that a text, 
indirectly and by combining all its resources, presents and 
represents. In Kufa Kuzikana, Akida the protagonist, Jerumani and 
Tim are characters in which the implied author’s stance on 
Christianity is lodged. These young characters are opposed to the 
idea that religion can enhance moral standards in their society. They 
have lost confidence in their ‘Christian’ elders whom they regard to 
be corrupt and immoral. Through Jerumani, the author suggests that 
Kiwachemans need a change of heart and traditions to realize true 
social revolution. This view finds expression in the following excerpt: 
 
Hii nchi yetu inahitaji mapinduzi,” (Jerumani)alisema… “Sio mapinduzi 
ya serikali. Hata kidogo. Tunachohitaji ni mapinduzi ya mioyo. 
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Mapinduzi ya ada na mila. Mapinduzi ya mitazamo, misimamo na 
mikabala.” (154)32 
 
Tim too acknowledges that mere profession of the Christianity faith 
may not be the solution to the socio-political and economic problems 
in their society. This is indeed in line with the teachings of Jesus. 
Those who merely call Him Lord shall not inherit the Kingdom of God 
(Matthew 7:21). Like Akida, Tim is disappointed that Pastor Njalala 
does not live what he preaches in his sermons. This is well captured 
in the following conversation:  
 
Na Kasisi John, mtu wa Mungu alifanya makosa anayodaiwa kufanya 
kweli?”“Hii dunia  ina maajabu.Umdhaniaye  siye kumbe ndiye …Sitaki 
kuizungumzia mada hiyo (dini) kwa sasa…nimeacha dini hadi niwapate 
watu wanaoishi kulingana na wanavyohubiri…”(199-201)33 
 
Evidently, Christianity no longer appeals to the younger generation 
especially because some of the ‘Christian’ leaders are not moral 
models. The same scenario is depicted in Unaitwa Nani (UN 
hereafter)? In this novel, several episodes featuring hypocritical 
“Christian” leaders out to manipulate believers for selfish gains 
abound. Through characters such as Kaminda’s father (UN.165), the 
implied author shows that Christianity is no longer valued. Kaminda’s 
father is portrayed as a hypocritical pastor.  Pastoring is to him a 
source of income rather than a calling. Moreover, Kaminda, his only 
child who appears to embrace his Christian doctrine is poorly 
socialized to cope with the challenges outside the home environment 
(UN.161).  He is easily tricked into marriage by Sasi. Sasi is out to 
revenge on pastor’s children since Katiwa (another pastor’s son) 
abandoned her after impregnating her (UN.165, 175). The same 
pastor is reported to be intimately involved with a member of the 
church choir (UN.151-3). 
                                                 
32Kiwachema people need a revolution. Not a revolution in the government but in 
their attitude. They need to change their customs and traditions as well their 
worldviews, perspectives and positions on issues. 
33 Is it true that Pastor John Njalala, a man of God, is guilty of what he is accused 
of? This world is full of wonders. He whom you least expect turns out to be the 
guilty one…I have resolved to abandon religion until I come across people who live 
out what they preach. 
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The impression that one gets from these episodes is that some of the 
Christian leaders are wanting morally. One therefore wonders if they 
can be relied on to inculcate good morals in the younger generation. 
Such observations confirm Erving Goffman’s (1990)34 assertion that 
in society people act within an overall frame of reference. This frame 
of reference works like a theatrical play in which everyone has taken 
a part within the scene. In this perspective, the scene works only 
when people keep faith with their part and avoid acting in ways which 
may contradict what has been accepted as one’s part. Thus in the 
perspective of the young people as depicted in the novels, the 
Christian leadership messes up their role-playing – a situation which 
is unacceptable especially to the youth of the twenty-first century 
because it breaks up the scene.   
 
To some extent this reveals the weaknesses of Christianity as 
propagated by the white missionaries. They presented the clergy as 
a ‘holier than thou’ category; a concept that was foreign to the African 
belief system. In the African religious beliefs, the obligation to uphold 
good deeds fell on each individual and reward and punishment, 
though may have effects on subsequent offspring, is often meted in 
real time here on earth on the offenders (Mbiti, 1989).This is 
illustrated in the episode of Mizimu ya Marehemu.35 In the story, 
Nyalgondho, a male character miraculously becomes rich after 
marrying a mysterious woman from the lake. However, when he 
mistreats the woman later on, she vanishes with all the accumulated 
wealth leaving him impoverished. Here we witness recompense for 
the offender in the here and now. 
 
It can also be argued that the money economy and the struggle to 
make a living characteristic of the contemporary society could 
account for these dissonances between telling people to uphold high 
moral standards and being moral. This is implied in the episode of 
the unfaithful pastor captured in Siasa ya Soko Huria.36  Christianity 
is portrayed as a money making business for making money. It is no 
                                                 
34 Erving Goffman, The presentation of Self in Everyday Life. 1990, Anchor Books, 
ew York. 
35 The Spirits of the Dead. Unaitwa Nani?,  p.72. 
36 The Politics of the Free Market. Unaitwa Nani?  p.145. 
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surprise that the pastor resorts to threats of hell fire for those who do 
not buy his religion (UN.162). However, with time, the ‘hell fire’ tactics 
lose power as people realize that the Christian religion offers no 
practical solution to their day to day challenges. See the following 
excerpt: 
 
Akawatishia kuwa huo moto usemwao si wa kuyapasha moto maungo 
yao… Wakamwambia kuwa shida za maisha yao ni moto wa kutosha. 
Kuna moto mwingine mkali kuliko tanuri la maisha ambako 
wametumbukia? Mhubiri akawa analemewa (UN.162).37 
 
Here the implied author insinuates that while Biblical teachings pacify 
the deprived with a false hope in the future, the poor also see that 
there is such a huge dissonance between what the clergy say and 
what they actually do. Hence one wonders if hell fire is losing power 
to scare or is hell demystified?  
 
The efficacy of Christian doctrines in bringing about morality in highly 
unequal societies like the one portrayed in Unaitwa Nani? is highly 
challenged. We see characters who have amassed resources with 
no fear of retribution while those without them would do anything to 
better their lives. What is the place of Biblical teachings that 
discourage covetousness and seeking first the kingdom of God?38  
 
In the episode entitled Utamlaumu? 39, some Christian leaders are 
portrayed as liars who use Biblical narratives to manipulate people 
for material gains. Benny Hinn; a famous television evangelist is cited 
as one of the religious leaders who conduct crusades in which 
people receive miraculous healing. However, when a character by 
the name Wamae fakes healing, doubt is cast on the authenticity of 
some of the Biblical narratives.  The implied author seems to justify 
Wamae as an innovative young man. He ceases the opportunity to 
overcome the economic challenges brought about by the politics of a 
liberal market in the present society. 
 
In such circumstances one is bound to question the validity of 
Western religion in the first place. Is Christianity a kind of trade that 
                                                 
37 He threatened them with hell fire if they do not repent. But they told him that the 
problems they were facing were already hell for them. 
38 Matthew 6:33 
39 Literally translated as “Will You Blame Him”? Unaitwa Nani?p.177 
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was and is still used by its crusaders to impoverish those who blindly 
buy into it? They see the need to convince the poor who suffer from 
myriad social and health problems and their desire to get quick 
solutions as a fertile ground for their gimmicks. Consequently, stage-
managed miracles are organized to hoodwink the poor and deprive 
them of even the little resource they may have. The begging question 
is why do people buy into such gimmicks?  Are they fulfilling the 
prophecy that those who have will be given more while those who 
lack will lose even the little that they have?40  
 
As a matter of fact, the hollowness of some of the works of Church 
leaders resonates with actual events in East Africa and elsewhere. 
For example, the Kanungu massacre in Uganda, the failure by some 
pastors to resurrect their colleagues who had died in a road accident 
(2011) and the end of the world prophecy that did not materialize by 
a USA based Church leader in 2011. When events do not happen as 
predicted, what will stop the congregation from feeling cheated, 
disillusioned and to lose hope in their religious leaders?  
 
In the postmodern era, the younger generation in particular is 
reverting to the use of reason and exploiting their talents to tackle 
socio-economic problems. Young (female) characters in Unaitwa 
Nani? (Mwanamka or Pandora (UN.62), Nyakor (UN.72) and 
Kamene (UN.89) strive to overcome cultural inhibitions based on 
gender. They are opposed to the traditional practices such as forced 
marriages and wife inheritance. Instead, they have embraced 
modern culture like the Western form of education as an avenue for 
their emancipation. 
 
Young men like Pipo use their talents to acquire capital and venture 
into the world of business as illustrated in the story; Kichwa cha Lori 
41. Subsequently, in the twenty-first century characterized with 
globalization in all spheres of life, religious crusaders may have to 
devise better ways to persuade especially the youth into buying into 
their religion. As Kinnaman (2011:91) points out, the impulses toward 
creativity and cultural engagement are some of the defining 
characteristics of the young generation today. They want to re-
                                                 
40 For to everyone who has, more shall be given, and he will have abundance; but 
from the one who does not have, even what he does have shall be taken away ( 
Matthew 25:29) 
41 The Head of a Lorry. Unaitwa Nani? p.194 
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imagine, re-create, rethink, and be entrepreneurs, innovators and 
starters. 
 
Kinnaman thus suggests that the Church needs new architects to 
design interconnected approaches to faith transference. To rethink its 
assumptions and come up with new forms of catechism and 
confirmations that will utilize the potentials of the young generation. 
This is the only way to produce young people of deep abiding faith 
(Kinnaman 2011: 12-13). Hence for Christianity to stand the test of 
time, the younger generation should be given a chance to participate 
in the establishment of Church structures to enhance the 
transference of faith from generation to generation. Moreover, the 
elders should walk the talk and not the other way round. 
Conclusion 
From the examples cited in the two novels, one notices an 
intergenerational conflict between the younger generation and the 
older one on their outlook on religion as a feasible means of solving 
social problems. The younger generation is inclined to a more  
pragmatic approach based on logic rather than relying on divine 
intervention. They differ from the older generation which seems to 
take the Christian doctrine passively. Indeed the youth in both the 
novels question the efficacy of some cultural practices and traditions 
including Christianity in tackling real life challenges in the 
contemporary society. 
 
Probably it is high time Africans went back to their roots to reflexively 
and reflectively consider their traditional systems to cope with their 
daily challenges.  While globalization inevitably brings in myriad 
alternatives, one has no choice but to appreciate the past. We need 
to look to our past, sieve out what is noble and synthesize it with the 
decent from other cultures and weave out homemade structures that 
are more adapted to our own environment. This is the only way faith 
and reason will emancipate Africans from global dominance and 
exploitation by the global giants. Religion does not necessarily 
negate reason as demonstrated by young characters like Tim and 
Jerumani. The unknown, as much as it could be in the hands of the 
divine creator, it is equally in the hands of the created. Human beings 
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are made in the creator’s image and likeness to be a co-creators in 
making the world a better place (Genesis, 1:26). 
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Stock taking in a Transnational Islamic 
movement: Accounting for growth of 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya 
Halkano Abdi Wario 
Abstract: 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat, a transnational apolitical lay missionary movement is 
undoubtedly one of the most widespread Muslim groups in the contemporary 
world (Masud 2000; Sikand 2002, 2006). Conservative estimates put the 
number of active members of this movement in millions and note of its 
presence in almost all countries of the world (Marloes 2005; Moosa 2000; Tozy 
2000; Marc 2000). The rapid growth of the movement has been attributed to its 
apolitical stand, its focus on individual and collective re-spiritualization, its 
ability to mobilize ordinary Muslims as active preachers and its strategies to 
build its growth on religious mobility and border crossing that guarantees its 
germination in fertile Muslim areas. This paper focuses on one of the least 
observed feature of the transnational movement: self-appraisals and reviews. It 
explores the theme of growth from the perspective of the Tablīghīs themselves. 
Hence, it asks, how do the Tablīghīs evaluate their growth? What mechanism 
do they put in place to sustain exponential rise in membership? What 
institutional and individual structures bolster their competitiveness, relevance 
and resilience in highly diverse Muslim societies? Is the stock taking done 
collectively, individually or regionally? How often do they meet to evaluate past 
activities and plan for the future one? It is only by exploring these themes can 
one state with certainty and account for growth of the globalizing but highly 
reclusive Muslim movement. The paper is based on extensive ethnographic 
field research done between April 2009 to January 2012 among the Tablīghīs in 
Kenya, a country that has over the years emerged as the nexus of the lay 
movement in East and Central Africa. 
 
Key words:  Tablīghī Jamāʿat, Kenya, ahwāl, evaluation 
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Tablīghī Jamāʿat: A historical background 
The fall of the Mughal Empire and the establishment of the British 
colonialism in India in the 19th Century had unprecedented impact on 
reform movements in the Indian subcontinent (Haq 1973). The loss 
of political dominance by the minority Muslims triggers a wave of 
religious revivalism that manifested itself in Islamic revivalism and 
extensive investment in madrasa education. Chief among the 
emerging centres of Islamic learning and revivalism was Darul Uloom 
Deoband in the town of Deoband in north India (Sikand 2002). Here, 
led by prominent scholars of the time such as Muhammad Qasim 
Nanotvi, Muhammad Yaqub Nanautawi, Shah Rafi al-Din, Sayyid 
Muhammad Abid, Zulfiqar Ali, Fadhl al-Rahman 'Usmani and Rashid 
Ahmad Gangohi, Deobandi madrasas trained a number of Muslims 
scholars that were to impact on revivalism in the later years. Tablīghī 
Jamāʽat grew out of such an environment of religious reform. It was 
founded by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas, a Deoband educated Muslim 
scholar in 1927 in Mewat, near New Delhi. Mewatis or Meos, were by 
then, characterized by religious illiteracy and non-observance of 
Islamically ordained duties such as prayers, fasting and zakat. The 
movement was also established as a counter to Hindu reform 
movements such as Arya Samaj that targeted to ‘revert’ the nominal 
Meos back to Hindu religion. (Haq 1972) Ilyas mobilize ordinary 
Meos in small groups to travel within their own regions and major 
centres of Islamic learning as lay missionaries. The essence of such 
travels, as envisioned by the founders, was not primarily to preach 
but to inculcate religious observance and discipline among the lay 
missionaries. In the heightened days of socio-political activism in the 
British India that ignite religious and ethnic rivalries, the Tablīghī 
Jamāʿat , unlike movements such as the Jamāʿat -e-Islami, stayed 
clear of political discourses and agitations. This strategy allowed the 
movement to focus on individual and collective re-spiritualization of 
everyday life, to build consensus and return to the fundamentals of 
the faith in spite of political and sectarian divisions and mitigated 
backlash from state actors bent on proscribing politically influential 
movements. This strategy, would in the later expansion of the 
movement, allow for its establishment and growth in East Africa, 
Arabian Peninsula, South East Asia and the United Kingdom.  
 
Central to the ideology of the Jamaat is the role of travel as the most 
effective tool of personal reform. (Masud 2000) The main teachings 
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of the movement are summarized under six principles: One, article of 
faith (shahada); two, five daily ritual prayers (salat); three, knowledge 
(ilm) and remembrance of God (dhikr); four, respect for every Muslim 
(ikram-I Muslim); five, emendation of intention and sincerity (ikhlas-i 
niyat) and six, spare time (tafriq-i waqt). (Sikand 2002) The last 
principle is the hallmark of the movement. It is also known as khuruj fi 
sabillilah (going out for the sake of God) and involves volunteers 
sparing time and resources to travel away from home for different 
durations such as 3 days, 10 days, 40 days, 4 months and even a 
year. Members are expected to set aside at least 3 days every 
month, 40 days every year and 4 months in a lifetime for the sole 
purpose of missionary journeys.42 
Notes on Data collection 
The data used in the paper are sourced primarily from field work 
done Kenya in April, 2009, August-October 2009, April-August 2010 
and December 2011- February 2012. Ethnographic data were 
collected through attendance of transnational Tablīghī gatherings in 
Nairobi, Isiolo and Moyale, formal and informal interviews with 
members of the movement and religious leaders and followers drawn 
from mainstream Salafi and Sufi traditions. Observations and field 
notes from travel experiences with Tablīghīs enriched the research.43  
Tablīghī Topography in Kenya 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat came into Kenya in 1956, largely through contacts 
with Kenya’s Asian Muslim communities from Indian Subcontinent.44 
                                                 
42 Personal interviews with Mohammed Aero (2009), Abdi Rashid 
(2010), Mzee Sule (2011) in Moyale.  
43 In total 35 face to face interviews were conducted in the period stated above of 
which about 7 were focus group interviews.  The respondents included novices, 
active leaders Tablīghī s and members and local and national non- Tablīghī 
religious leaders. The author also attended eight national gatherings of Tablīghī s in 
different parts of Kenya as well as 10 day travel with the missionary group. Most 
interviews were conducted in Swahili and Borana.  
44 Naushad, a sermon at Bait ul Maal, Nairobi, 18.04.2009.  Mercantile Indian 
Ocean trade brought traders of various origins to the coast of East Africa. Among 
early settlers included Indians of various religious persuasions (Salvadori 1984, 
2000). British Colonial administration also brought large Indians of diverse religious 
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(Hasani 1967) It has immense presence in most parts of Kenya 
especially in Northern Kenya, the Coast, Nairobi and major towns in 
Central and Western Kenya. The North is home to Cushitic speakers 
of Borana, Gabbra, Burji, Garre and Somali. Among the Borana 
community of Isiolo and Moyale, the Jamāʿat has a history of about 
15 years.45 Of Kenya’s 40 million people, slightly more than 11% are 
Muslims (Population and Housing Census Report 2009). Kenyan 
Muslims are a diverse group with varying doctrinal and sectarian 
affiliations. Large sections ascribed to moderate Sunni traditions with 
strong affiliation to Shafiʾi School of jurisprudence. Members of 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat constitute a minority missionary group but with high 
visibility in Muslim public spaces due to frequent itinerary and 
upsurge in membership. 
 
Distinctive and pragmatic ‘faith bureaucracy’ accounts for the 
success of self-organization and growth of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in 
most parts of the world. Kenya is not an exception. Deitrich Reetz 
(2008) observes that despite the fact that Tablīghīs forcefully assert 
that the movement has no specialized organization or administration 
and that it is purely lay and voluntary, its internal administration is 
strong and robust and highly hierarchical. Reetz describes many 
features that resemble functioning of a bureaucracy with clear in- and 
out-group distinction. While the movement knows no formal 
membership it is marked by a distinct internal culture, which 
influences all members and their mutual relations. 
 
The country’s national administrative council referred to as Kenya 
Shūrā divided the country into three major zones called ḥalqas, 
namely: Nairobi, Mombasa and Garissa ḥalqas. The ḥalqas are 
named after the central and most populous town in the zone. Kenya 
Shūrā is composed of about a dozen senior Tablīghīs largely drawn 
from Kenyan Muslims of Asian origin but also selected committed 
                                                                                                                            
persuasions as indentured railway labourers to construct Kenya-Uganda Railway 
from Mombasa to the shores of Lake Victoria at the turn of 20th Century. A number 
of the labourers went back home while others made Kenya their home. 
Subsequent migration increased the population of this diasporic and 
heterogeneous community. The Kenyans of Asian origin are relatively wealthy due 
to trade. Various Muslim communities are represented within them including 
Ismailis, Ithna Asharis, Memmons, and Ahmadis among others. It is among the 
Sunni groups from the Kenyan Asian community that the Tablighi Jamaat found a 
viable connection.  
45 Hussein Dima, personal interview Isiolo, 14.04.2009 
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members of the movement from other communities. Each ḥalqa is 
further subdivided into sub-ḥalqa. All the three major ḥalqas have 
about 10 sub-ḥalqas.46 Three or four qarias constitute a sub-ḥalqa. A 
qaria is composed of four to five mosque jurisdictions. Tablīghīs who 
frequent a specific local mosque organized themselves into a 
mosque-based unit that regularly meet, preach, recruit members, 
receive foreign and local lay preachers and consult on matters of 
faith. These mosque-based units also called maqamis are the 
cornerstone of the re-territorialization strategy, occupation of sacred 
spaces and resilience of the movement in the country. At the lowest 
level of the Tablīghī bureaucracy is the household unit where the 
ethos of the movement are re-enacted and inculcated through 
regularly text reading and consultative meetings. In essence, an 
adherent is expected to bring the movement home and revive the 
adherence to the faith by his family members. 
 
                                                 
46 Isiolo and Waso sub-ḥalqas fall under the Nairobi ḥalqa which is also the 
largest and most active ḥalqa in Kenya. Moyale and Marsabit sub-ḥalqas fall 
under Garissa ḥalqa. 
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Figure 8: Tablīghī territorial and administrative structure 
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Map 1: A map of Kenya showing the three Tablīghī zones of 
operation  
 
At each level an amir (leader) heads a unit on rotational base. The 
amir is selected from among the regular Tablīghīs in an area. The 
level of commitment and organizational skills are some of the 
requirements that boost one’s rise in the leadership structure of the 
movement. A man is considered as the amir of his household. A 
travelling group also has an amir as the head. He is often selected by 
a regional or local consultative council to lead based on his vast 
travels and knowledge of Tablīghī practices. 
 
In each ḥalqa and sub-ḥalqa the Tablīghīs have designated mosques 
that serves as coordination centre for movement’s events and regular 
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activities. Such a centre is called markaz. Baitul Maal is the Nairobi 
ḥalqa markaz and the national headquarters of the movement. 
Masjid Ali is Mombasa ḥalqa markaz while Masjid Quba is Garissa 
ḥalqa’s administrative seat. In areas where the Tablīghīs do not 
possess their own sacred space, a ‘Tablighi-friendly’ mosque is 
identified and utilized as an operational base. Mosques not only 
serve as venues to preach and recruit new members but also act as 
seat for consultative meetings (shūrā), spaces for congregational 
gatherings (ijtimāʿ and jor), places for reception and accommodation 
of visiting fellow lay preachers and classes to teach and learn about 
various Tablīghī practices in customized educational programmes 
(taʿlīm).  
Evaluating Tabligh: Ahwāl Giving as Progress Review  
The highly structured ‘faith bureaucracy’ described above accounts 
for smooth flow of directives and a clear chain of command among 
these lay preachers in Kenya. However it reveals little if any concrete 
data as to how the movement grew and continuously strategizes to 
evaluate the past events and activities, coordinate present 
programmes and plan future undertaking. A glimpse into the 
movement self-appraisal mechanism undoubtedly shed a clear 
picture on this under-researched theme of the transnational 
movement. The questions worth asking are: how do the Tablīghīs 
appraise their activities? Are such evaluative measures oral or 
written? Are they done on individual or collective basis? Does each 
level of Tablīghī bureaucracy evaluate activities within its jurisdiction? 
What are the variables that are used in the evaluation process? How 
do such evaluative measures impact on the commitment of individual 
Tablīghī to the various mobility related practices that has bearing on 
their finance? The case studies below and the subsequent analysis 
shall be used to explore the theme of growth and self-evaluation of 
the movement. 
 
Tablīghī practices can roughly be divided into individual (amal ifradi) 
and collective (amal ijtimāʿ) deeds. Individuals are expected to carry 
out the following daily practices without supervision, namely, recite at 
least a juzu (1/30th part of the Quran), recite at least 300 adhkar 
(sing. dhikr) (supplication for remembrance of God), greet a certain 
BIGSAS Working Papers 2/2012: Trends, Discourses and Representations in Religions in Africa    [86] 
 
number of individuals with proper Islamic pleasantries, visit a few 
fellow Tablīghīs, do supplementary recommended prayers aside from 
obligatory prayers and read some texts from Tablīghī prescribed 
books such as Faza’il-e-A’amaal and Muntakhab Ahadith for 
guidance. In sum, a committed Tablīghī is expected to set aside 2 ½ 
to 8 hours daily for uninterrupted amal ifradi. Aside from that, a 
Tablīghī who is also often an integral member of mosque-based 
maqami unit is expected to attend on daily basis a consultative forum 
(shūrā fil masjid). He is also expected to accompany fellow Tablīghīs 
from his mosque in a weekly neighbourhood missionary patrol called 
jowla between Asr (late afternoon prayer) and Maghrib (early evening 
prayer). The excursion often gathers local Muslims to attend evening 
prayers at the mosque. After jowla, the local maqami team motivates 
the mosque attendants to volunteer to be part of a preaching team to 
be sent to other areas. A Tablīghī also participates in a collective 
weekly practice called fikrudīn, an evaluative session that brings 
maqami units from a number of mosques in an area to a central 
mosque so as to gauge the success of the previous week’s activities, 
plan the present activities and set target for the coming week. 
Collectively a maqami team is expected to inculcate the culture of 
text readings in the local mosque. The reading and discussions are 
called taʿlīm fil masjid. As a collectivity, the members of a maqami 
team conducts visits (ziarat) to religious elites (ūlama), fellow inactive 
Tablīghīs and pay courtesy calls to barber shops, meat shops, 
markets, schools and hospitals. They are also expected to organize 
panch amal monthly 3 day excursions (khuruj shahri) for local 
missionary purpose. On quarterly, semi-annual and annual basis, 
they are expected to organize teams to attend local, regional, zonal 
and national three days congregational gatherings called jors and 
ijtimāʿs. At home, each Tablīghī is expected to initiate daily 
consultative forum (shūrā fil bayt) and text reading (taʿlīm fil bayt). 
 
The maqami team, the most fundamental unit of Tablīghī Jamāʿat at 
the grassroot level, is expected to contest for sacred space use and 
own it by conducting corpus of practices called panch amal. 
Implementation of (five practices) is believed to make the local 
mosque gain the noble characteristics of the sacred spaces of the 
pristine Islam. These practices, some already mentioned, include 
mashwera (consultative meetings), taʿlīm (text reading and religious 
instructions), jowla (neighbourhood missionary patrol), fikrudīn 
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(deliberations on faith matters) and khuruj shahri (3 days monthly 
missionary excursions). 
 
The question is, with all these expectations and obligations, how 
does such lay missionary movement take stock of its progress and 
challenges? The obligations required of an individual Tablīghī tasks 
him in various capacities, namely, as individual, as a family man, as a 
member of a mosque-based maqami team, and a member of local, 
regional and national Tablīghī Jamāʿat. To facilitate detailed 
evaluation at various levels, Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya has 
immensely invested in culture of individual and collective appraisal 
and report mechanism called ahwāl giving. Ahwāl can be given 
formally in maqami, qaria, sub-ḥalqa, ḥalqa and national ḥalqa levels 
or informally between individual Tablīghīs. 
 
A maqami team is expected to hand in written or oral report of its 
activities every week in the weekly gatherings (fikrudīn) that bring a 
number of maqami teams from a number of local mosques. The team 
also picks the set targets for coming week. A maqami team, in sense, 
attempts to give an ‘accurate’ report of how many people attend its 
daily shūrā, bi-weekly taʿlīm, weekly jowla, how many volunteered for 
various travel durations, how many members conduct home-based 
family consultative meetings and text reading and even how many 
members set aside 2 ½ hours on daily basis. The sum of the maqami 
reports in a sub-ḥalqa is discussed in monthly sub-ḥalqa shūrā sent 
to the markaz shūrā of the ḥalqa in Nairobi, Mombasa or Garissa. 
Quarterly or semi-annually, the markaz shūrā consults with various 
sub-ḥalqas and identify a mosque in which to conduct zonal 
congregational gathering of jor. Jor is held on rotational basis in all 
areas of the ḥalqa. For three days, the Tablīghīs and non-Tablīghīs, 
attend preaching and learning sessions that ends with recruitment 
drive to constitute as many travel teams as possible. Months before 
jors and ijtimāʿs, each sub-ḥalqa is given targets to mobilize and 
bring to the gatherings in terms of 40 days and 4 months teams from 
their area. Often the jor does not end without a specific time set aside 
to discuss the ahwāl of each sub-ḥalqa. Figure 1 is a summary of 
such session at Isiolo jor in 2009. Annually, a few days before 
national ijtimāʿs are held, representatives of each ḥalqa and sub-
ḥalqa attend a consultative shūrā for qudamah (senior regulars) and 
they submit the details cumulative progress of their ḥalqas orally in 
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front of others and national Kenya shūrā  members.47 This is done 
from a standard form distributed among the amirs. A sample of these 
reports, also called karguzari.48 Karguzari plays an important role of 
informing, educating and updating each other on current challenges 
and development. The reports from the three ḥalqas are summarized 
and a representative of the Kenya chapter of Tablīghī Jamāʿat 
presents it in an annual gathering of country representatives at the 
auspicious headquarters of the movement in Nizamuddin, New Delhi, 
India. 
 
Ahwāl giving session, especially the formal congregational type, is a 
tense environment. Barbara Metcalf notes that at the conclusion of a 
tour, participants report back, orally or in writing, their experiences to 
the mosque-based group (local, regional, or national) from which 
they set out. Ahwāl  giving’ in ijtimāʿ and jor  is a sort of peer review 
session in which the representatives of masjids, sub-ḥalqas and 
ḥalqas participating in the event attempt to give a true account of 
daʿwa  activities in areas under their jurisdiction. Members of unit 
giving ahwāl at any moment are expected not only to be truthful but 
also avail extra information about how they conduct certain 
recommended deeds and practices. The sessions are often chaired 
by invited members of national consultative council, the Kenya 
Shūrā. These evaluators are thorough in their interrogation of the 
local and regional amirs appointed to orally submit the reports. The 
sessions depending on nature of the congregational gathering may 
be attended by fifty to three thousand Tablīghīs and non-Tablīghīs. 
New directives are often given. The members are encouraged to do 
better. Past efforts though not belittled are often summed up as not 
enough. The members are motivated to believe that they have 
greater potential to do much better and to take the revivalism of the 
faith to greater heights. In the following section, two case studies 
have been chosen to highlight the practice of karguzari. In the first 
progress report was submitted by a representative of Waso sub-
halqa in a joint Isiolo-Meru-Waso sub-halqa jor. The second report 
                                                 
47 In April 2010, I attended the national qudamah shūrā. Approximately 300 
persons gathered at Baitul Maal for the meeting. Representatives from various 
sub-ḥalqas such as Waso, Isiolo, Moyale, Marsabit, Wajir, Garissa, Tana River, 
Kisumu, Nakuru, Kajiado, Mombasa, Malindi, Kwale, and Nairobi are among the 
congregation. Few representatives from Tanzania and Uganda presented 
karguzari of their country ḥalqas. The two day meeting coming days before the 
national ijtimais discussed logistics and other necessary preparations.   
48 Barbara Metcalf ‘Travellers’ Tales in Tablighi Jamāʿat   
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was a cumulative summary of the national progress report indicating 
how each of the three halqas of Mombasa, Nairobi and Garissa 
performed. 
Case Study I: Ahwāl Giving at Isiolo Jor  
From 10th – 12th April 2009, I attended 3 days Isiolo jor. The total 
number of attendants was approximately 500 hundred. There were 
Sudanese, Indian, Swahili speaking group from the Coast, Somali 
speaking group from North Eastern, groups from Merti, Kinna, Garba 
Tulla, Sericho, Meru, Nairobi and Isiolo (the host). The congregation 
was held at Isiolo Jamia Mosque. Adjacent to the mosque is the 
prominent educational institution called Al Falah Islamic Educational 
Complex. It has a modern Islamic school and a health unit. Missing 
from the gathering were the prominent sheikhs of the mosque and 
the ūlama from Al Falah. Presumably the sheikhs do not necessarily 
share the zeal and methods used by the movement as appropriate 
daʿwa techniques. The visiting Tablīghīs were accommodated at the 
Centre. They cooked, ate and slept at the Centre and attended the 
jor programme at the mosque. The classrooms were utilized for this 
purpose. The accommodation was arranged on basis of the places of 
the origin of the group, for instance, Merti, Kinna, Meru, India, Sudan, 
Coast, North Eastern and so on. Each group contributed towards the 
khidma (catering) and harasa (security) and other collective duties. 
Each group had its own amir. About 5 leading Kenya shūrā members 
were in attendance. For three days, after the five daily prayers, 
sermons (bayans) were delivered given by the visiting Sudanese, 
Indian, Swahili and Somali travelling groups. Translations were done 
rotationally by a group of local Tablīghīs into Borana. Every morning 
session had language-based learning circles for taʿlīm. In the taʿlīm, 
apart from preaching on the need to volunteering for daʿwa, the 
congregants listened to selected hadith and Quranic verses from 
Faza’il-e-A’amaal and Muntakhab Ahadith, taught the six 
fundamentals of the movement and made to spontaneously group 
themselves in bands of 2 to 3 persons to recite short verses of the 
Quran. The session ended with a recruitment drive to form travelling 
groups. 
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The ahwāl giving session was held on the afternoon of 11th April 
2009. This was done shortly after the Asr prayers. Representatives of 
Waso, Isiolo, and Meru sub-ḥalqa that falls under Nairobi ḥalqa 
submitted their karguzari reports from a standardized form. The 
representatives were taken to task why certain practices were not 
performed, for instance, house-hold taʿlīm in Isiolo. Meru 
representative was particularly asked why very few people 
volunteered to travel for Tablīghī missionary tours. Waso 
representative was asked to account for falling number of Tablīghī 
volunteers in the area. The karguzari report covered the period from 
October 2007 to May 2009. The form contains set of parameters to 
gauge success or failure of each unit and give approximate picture of 
the organizational strength, weaknesses and potentialities.  In a 
sense, with periodical reviews of their practices, the adherents in an 
area make a personal effort to reach targets, own the process and 
commit themselves to the objective of reforming the self and the 
others to a different level. The categories for review can be roughly 
classified into six namely: Ulama; Brothers (active Tablīghīs); Ladies 
(women); Mosques; Household: and Jamāʿat (a travelling group). 
The first three are about human beings while the last three are of 
institutional nature. The form is roughly subdivided into two sections. 
The upper sections deals with details of commitment to the 
recommended travel regimes such as I year, 4 months, 40 days, 10 
days by ūlama, brothers and women and also the statistical details 
on number of mosques (masajid and musala) in the area. The 
second part has 19 entries and each of the entry is subjected to 
review on basis of its previous status (past), present situation and 
intentional expectations (future). Below is a replica of the Waso sub-
ḥalqa karguzari report. 
 
 State/Area: Waso Sub-ḥalqa  
Date: Since October 2007-May 2009 
 
Ulama who have 
spent 1 year  
-
- 
No. of Active  -- 
Ulama who have 
spent 4 months 
and 40 days  
1
0 
No. of Active  6 
No. of 4 month 
brothers  
1
2
9 
No. of Active  4
8 
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No. of 40 days 
brothers only  
5
1
9 
No. of Active  2
0
7 
No. of ladies 
who have 
spent 40 days  
-
- 
No. of ladies who 
have spent 40 days 
with Tartīb  
-- 
Ladies who 
have spent 10 
days  
-
- 
Ladies who have 
spent 3 days  
-- 
No. of ladies 
spending 3 
days with 
Tarteeb  
-
- 
No. of places for 
Ladies weekly taʿlīm  
-- 
No. of Masajid + 
Musala  
76 
 ITEMS  Prev
ious  
Pres
ent 
Inten
tion 
1. Masajid with 5 A’maal 26 29 37 
2. Masajid with some 
A’maal  
19 15 43 
3. No. of Masajid doing 
daily Abadi of the Masjid  
3 -- 7 
4.  3 days Jamāʿat  per 
month  
11 8 30 
5. Brothers spending 2 ½ 
Hrs Daily  
47 23 63 
6. No. of Houses doing 
daily taʿlīm with muzakra  
of six siffat 
33 16 77 
7.  No. of brothers 
spending 4 months 
yearly  
14 6 40 
8. Brothers spending 10 
days monthly  
-- -- 3 
9. Brothers spending 8 
hours daily  
-- -- 3 
10. No. of 4 months 
Jamāʿat s 
5 6 11 
11. No. of 4 months 
Jamāʿat s on foot 
5 6 13 
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12. No. of 40 days 
Jamāʿat s  
34 24 37 
13. No. of 40 days 
Jamāʿat s on foot 
29 21 34 
14. Jamāʿat s sent to other 
countries  
2 5 7 
15. 40 days Jamāʿat s with 
ladies  
-- -- 1 
16. 10 days Jamāʿat s with 
ladies  
-- -- 1 
17. 3 days Jamāʿat s with 
ladies 
-- -- 1 
18. Brothers who have 
spent two months in  
Bangle Wali Masjid 
(Nizamuddin) 
-- -- 3 
19. No. of remote locations 
and karguzari of the  
efforts in these 
locations  
-- -- 1 
Table 1: Waso area karguzari report  
Analysis 
Though the movement recruits ordinary Muslims for preaching tours, 
the participation of the religious scholars is highly appreciated even if 
minimal. It was one of the first categories under review in the report. 
The number of women (denoted as ladies in the form) who spent 10 
days and 3 days masturat tours are also noted. Mosques form 
central sacred space for enactment of reform agenda as envisioned 
in the Tablīghī ethos and hence the importance of its exact number, 
location and nature of its custodians for its future and present 
success. The Tablighis are among the few Islamic groups who have a 
consistently accurate number of all the mosques in Kenya. In each 
local mosque they attend, members are asked to formulate maqami 
units to carry out some recommended communal practices. 
 
The Tablīghī Jamāʿat envisages that all mosques adopted what they 
call panch amaal (five practices). These practices strengthen the 
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bond of network between the Tablīghīs and also build their religious 
capital. Hence the first three items on the second section of the 
report were on in how many mosques that all the five practices are 
carried out, how many uphold some practices and how many 
exercise the daily daʿwa effort within such as daʿwa, taʿlīm and 
istiqbāl. Commitments of ordinary Tablīghīs were also gauged as an 
indicator of the performance of the movement in the area. The 
regulars are expected to set aside time for individualized activities 
such as few hours for dhikr and Quran reading and communal 
practices approved by the movement like spending 40 days and 4 
months on missionary tours within and outside the country.  
 
The core target of Tablīghī self reform is household unit and hence its 
review. It is believed that the practices learnt by a Tablīghī man at the 
local mosque and on travel can have a lasting impact once the 
household-based practices such as text readings on the core 
teachings of the movement are firmly established. The evaluation 
places emphasis on the means of transport used by the Tablīghīs on 
missionary journeys, for instance bus or other motorized means or on 
foot. Missionary travel on foot (paidal Jamāʿat) is especially revered 
as it involves not only greater sacrifice and risks but also closer in 
experience to the idea of travel for faith as done during the pristine 
period of Islam. Tablīghīs in Kenya are increasingly encouraged to 
visit the Bangle Wali Masjid in Nizamuddin, India for advanced 
training on ways of the movement. 
Case Study II: Purana Saathi Jor, 29th December 2011-1st 
January 2012 
The Tablīghīs in Kenya have two national gatherings. One is held in 
early May and the other in late December. The former is open to all 
Tablīghīs and non-Tablīghīs from Kenya and neighbouring countries 
and the latter is open mainly to the active members of the movement 
from all parts of Kenya. The former attracts up to 15,000 people while 
the latter is attended by about 3000-4000 persons. The former is 
called ijtimāʿ al-aam (general congregational gathering) while the 
latter is called purana saathi jor/majma jor/qudamah jor (specialized 
gatherings for active Tablīghīs). 
 
BIGSAS Working Papers 2/2012: Trends, Discourses and Representations in Religions in Africa    [94] 
 
I arrived on the 29th December shortly before the Maghrib prayers. 
Each attendee was required to report to the istiqbāl (reception) tent 
to register. Details about name, place of origin, mosque of origin, the 
highest number of travel days or months volunteered in the past, 
expected number of days or months to be volunteered at the end of 
the gathering and remarks were entered into a big black register 
book. I was number 807 on the register. The atmosphere was more 
cordial and animated. Most of the congregants are regular 
acquaintance due to missionary travels and such conventions. The 
bayan and taʿlīm, just like in the general ijtimāʿ, took into 
consideration linguistic diversity and had translation circles for the 
Borana, the Somali, the Amharic, the Swahili, the Arabic and the 
Baganda Tablīghīs. 
 
The evaluation session was held on the 31st December, first by 
Mombasa ḥalqa started then Garissa ḥalqa and finally Nairobi ḥalqa. 
It is important to note that prior to giving of ahwāl, an invited scholar 
give motivational talk in Urdu about the need for accuracy and 
importance of such reports in the consolidation of faith revivalism. 
The speeches were translated into Swahili by one of the local Muslim 
of Asian descent. The invited speakers play down any tendency of 
inter-ḥalqa rivalry and emphasized that such reports are not for 
record keeping but a basis for setting better targets for tangible 
progress. 
 
Each of the ḥalqa representatives gave cumulative summary of 
Tablīghī activities and achievements for the period between May-
December 2012. Apart from general summary, the ḥalqa 
representative was asked to invite a representative from one of the 
mosque within his jurisdiction to give more detailed grassroot ahwāl 
report. Both the general and grassroot reports from each ḥalqa were 
subjected to rigorous interrogations by a band of invited ‘elders’ of 
the movement from the Indian subcontinent. The speakers were at 
times asked to clarify how they go about some of the Tablīghī 
practices and advices and new directives were given on the best way 
to go about it. It is important to note that a number of congregants 
took notes of the statistical data and new directives for their own 
record keeping and implementation upon return. Finally, the reports 
from the three ḥalqas are summarized into one form by the members 
of the national consultative council as indicated below. The table 
below is a replica of the original. It was slightly modified for better 
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analysis. While all the rows are as in the original, the column on 
totals is my analytical addition. 
 
Purana Saathi Jor  
 
 Karguzari Halqa:-Kenya 
Purana Saathi  
Jor Date:- Dec. 2011 
Items 
Nairobi 
ḥalqa 
Mombasa 
ḥalqa 
Garissa 
ḥalqa 
Total 
1. No. of 4 months brothers 550 324 546 1420 
2 No. of 4 months active 
brothers 
280 151 290 721 
3 No. of (only) 40 days 
brothers 
1710 841 1321 3872 
4 No. of 40 days active 
brothers 
740 331 435 1506 
5 No. of Ulama having spent 
1 year 
8 5 2 15 
6 No. of active 1 year spent 
Ulama 
6 5 2 13 
7 No. of Ulama having spent 
4 months /40days 
60 27 39 126 
8 No. of active 
4months/40days spent 
Ulama 
35 12 22 69 
9 No. of Shab guzari 
place(weekly programme)  
3 2 5 10 
10 No. of places having 
Hayatus sahaba taʿlīm 
3 2 5 10 
11 No. of ladies having spent 
40 days  
20 14 02 36 
12 No. of ladies having spent 
10 days  
84 70 39 193 
13 No. of places having ladies 
weekly taʿlīm 
7 25 18 50 
14 No. of ladies spending 40 
days with Tartīb 
- - 2 2 
15 No. of ladies spending 3 
days with Tartīb 
11 - 18 29 
16 No. of dwellings (villages, 
towns etc.) 
- - - - 
17 No. of zones (collection of 
about 20 dwellings) 
- - - - 
18 No. of Masajid  1071 1400 1200 3671 
19 No. of Masjids with 5 
A‘maals 
80 57 129 226 
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20 No. of Masjids with some 
A‘maals 
145 159 135 439 
21 No. of average 3 days 
Jamāʿat s per month 
130 56 71 257 
22 No. of brothers participating 
in 2 ½ hrs efforts daily 
350 174 170 694 
23 No. of  masajid doing daily 
efforts with abadi 
(dwt,istq,tlm) 
3 - - 3 
24 No. of houses doing daily 
taʿlīm 
360 202 215 777 
25 No. of houses doing daily 
taʿlīm and six siffat  
120 - 146 266 
26 No. of brothers spending 4 
months yearly 
52 24 107 183 
27 No. of brothers spending 10 
days monthly  
5 2 12 19 
28 No. of brothers spending 8 
hrs daily  
1 2 11 14 
29 No. of 4 months Jamāʿat s  13 10 46 69 
30 No. of 4 months Jamāʿat s 
on foot 
5 9 38 52 
31 No of 40 days Jamāʿat s  46 40 77 163 
32 No of 40 days Jamāʿat s on 
foot 
20 38 56 114 
33 No. of Masjids who sent 
complete Jamāʿat  in the 
country 
4M-
40D 
10 
4M-40D- 4M-
40D- 
4M- 
40D1
0 
34 No. of Masjids who sent 
complete Jamāʿat  to 
abroad 
4M-
40D- 
4M-40D- 4M-
40D- 
4M4
0D- 
35 No. of Jamāʿat s sent to 
foreign 
10 3  9 22 
36 No. of 10 days Jamāʿat s 
with ladies  
- 3 2 5 
37 No. of 40 days Jamāʿat s 
with ladies 
- - - - 
38 No. of 10 days Jamāʿat s 
with ladies to foreign 
- - - - 
39 No. of 3 days Jamāʿat s 
with ladies  
5 10 9 24 
40 No. of brothers who gave 2 
months at Nizamuddin  
1 1 - 2 
41 No. of localities where work started  - 9 12 21 
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Table 2: Kenya country Karguzari report  
Analysis 
Participation of ūlama, religious scholars, though encouraged is so 
far insignificant. Tablīghīs take great care not to mobilize Ulama for 
their daʿwa travels as they do with ordinary people.49 Because the 
ūlama are in charge of management of mosques and religious 
schools, they are respected as custodians of knowledge. The ūlama 
are to be acknowledged and their support sought. However when 
they opt to take part in the travels with them, they are highly 
appreciated and honoured as men of knowledge. Their travels with 
ordinary Tablīghīs guarantee the movement legitimacy and a sense 
of religious orthodoxy in the public sphere. Tablīghīs hence take 
great pride and interests to document and evaluate the participation 
of these scholars in the regular appraisal sessions. As with other 
evaluative measures, they divide the participation of the ūlama into 
stipulated categories of travel periods and their regularity in these 
travels, namely, how many have spent 1 year, 4 months and 40 days 
and how many are active participants in these travels. In total 141 
religious scholars partook in Tablīghī travels with Garissa, Mombasa 
and Nairobi ḥalqas contributing 29 %, 23%, and 48% respectively.  
 
5292 Kenyan Tablīghīs participated in 40 days and 4 months travels 
during the evaluation period. Of this, 2227 are active Tablīghīs. Of 
the three ḥalqas in Kenya, Mombasa has the smallest number of 
Tablīghīs volunteering for 40 days and 4 months travels. 694 
Tablīghīs and 14 Tablīghīs spend 2 ½ hours and 8 hours daily on 
movement’s individualized practices. There are 183 and 19 active 
Tablīghīs spending 4 months yearly and 10 days monthly on 
preaching tours. Only two Tablīghīs, one from Mombasa and Nairobi 
ḥalqa respectively, spent 2 months at Nizamuddin centre during the 
evaluation period under focus. However at the end of the jor, I met at 
least five Tablīghīs from Moyale and Waso sub-ḥalqas who were 
about to leave for 2-4 months stay at the Nizamuddin global 
headquarters.229 women have so far spent 10 and 40 days on 
Tablīghī travels. Garissa had the lowest entry with 41. There are 
about 50 places in Kenya where weekly taʿlīm for women are held. 
                                                 
49 No tashkeel only ziarat 
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While no women travel team has been sent to foreign countries for 
daʿwa, 24 teams were sent locally for 3 days missionary tours. The 
report depicts a gradual growth in popularity of women Jamāʿat s in 
Nairobi and Garissa ḥalqas. 
 
According to the report, out of 3671 mosques in Kenya, 226 have 
mosque-based maqami units that carry out all the panch amal such 
as taʿlīm, jowla, fikrudīn, khuruj shahri, and shūrā. Mombasa ḥalqa 
has the lowest number of Tablighi-affiliated mosques despite the 
large number of mosques in the zone. 439 mosques have Tablīghī 
teams that execute partial panch amal.  There 777 household that 
conduct taʿlīm session on daily basis, of which 306 are from Nairobi 
ḥalqa. 226 households have taʿlīm combined with teaching on the six 
fundamentals of the movement. No household in the Mombasa ḥalqa 
carry out the latter.  
 
During the period under evaluation, 121 groups were dispatched for 
4 months missionary tours. If each group is, on average, composed 
of 12 individuals, then 1452 persons undertook this kind of travel. 
227 groups were dispatched for 40 days preaching tours. This means 
approximately 3324 persons volunteered for the stipulated tours 
within the country. While there were no new areas of growth in 
Nairobi ḥalqa, Mombasa and Garissa ḥalqas registered 9 and 12 
places respectively.  
 
This statistical data helps the national and regional Tablīghī units to 
plan on how to boost dwindling numbers of active members and 
consolidate gains made over time. The national shūrā subjects the 
cumulative data to detailed analysis, compare with previous records 
and set targets for each of the three ḥalqas in the coming period. The 
practice of allocating quotas for each zone is called takaza. The 
leaders from each ḥalqa redistribute targets for the next six to one 
year to respective constituent sub-ḥalqas, qarias and mosque-based 
maqami unit. This loose flow of information, directives and targets in 
combination with thorough peer-to-peer collective evaluation 
accounts for the phenomenal growth of the movement in Kenya. 
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Conclusion  
Every human organization is interested in its growth and expansion. 
Because organizations are interested in growth, they are also 
interested in evaluation of their programmes. Organizations appraise 
their past activities, execute present plan and set targets to be 
achieved in the future. Some reviews of past activities and future 
plans may be done formally or informally and may be public or open 
only to core members. Religious movements are not an exception. 
Scholars who study transnational social and religious movements are 
fascinated by not only the bureaucratic structures that these 
organizations construct but also the means through which 
establishment and consolidation is gained in increasing globalizing 
world. However unless due attention is given to the way the 
members of the organizations and movements evaluate their past, 
present and future activities, most studies about their growth remain 
shallow. Tablīghī Jamāʿat, one of the fastest growing lay Muslim 
missionary movement in the world, has invested immensely not only 
in religious bureaucracy ran by bands of committed members but 
also an elaborate oral and written mechanism for review of its 
activities. However, its phenomenal growth in East and Central Africa 
has gone unnoticed due its avoidance of publicity, doctrinal debates 
and socio-political activism, its focus on spiritual matters and its 
popularity among the ordinary Muslims rather than religious scholars. 
Tablīghīs look to the past, precisely to the world of pristine Islam for 
guidance and revivalism but they also pragmatically appropriate 
modern evaluative measures for the success of its programme and 
consolidation of its growth. 
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Pilgrimage at Islamic Sufi Shrines in North 
Eastern Ethiopia  
Meron Zeleke 
Abstract: 
According to the dominant academic discourse in post 1991 Ethiopia, the shift 
of the political structure at the macro level is believed to have had a trickling 
down effect on the nature of social relationships between members of the 
different ethnic and religious groups in the country. The effect is described 
mostly as a type of relationship characterized by growing tensions and conflicts 
represented either as inter-ethnic and/or inter-religious conflict (Abbink 1998; 
Afewerik 2009). Religious identification and religious practices at the region 
under discussion as to be presented in this paper are starkly different from the 
dominant discourse on the escalation of interfaith tension often described as 
one of the major characteristic features of post 1991 Ethiopia (Medhane 2003). 
This paper presents a case of pilgrimage at an Islamic shrine in Northern 
Ethiopia a case, which contradicts with the main discourse of tightening of 
Ethno-religious boundaries in post 1991 Ethiopia. It addresses the factors that 
facilitate this act of crossing a religious boundary.  
Key words: Pilgrimage, Sufi, Religious boundary, Saint Veneration 
Introduction 
At the very first glance the contemporary religious practices 
commonly practiced at the Islamic Sufi shrines in North Eastern 
Ethiopia gives for an outsider an impression of blurred and thinned 
out religious boundaries. The presence of Christians, Muslims, spirit 
possession cult adepts and adherents of Oromo traditional belief as 
pilgrims in the biannual pilgrimages to the Islamic Sufi shrine – which 
otherwise is defined as an Islamic shrine– poses to one the question 
of how the adherents and leaders of the shrine make meanings and 
account for this act of crossing the seemingly dense religious 
boundary? Growing up in the political environment of post-1991 
Ethiopia where the multiculturalism that is generated by ethnic 
federalism has made ethnicity the main organizing principle in 
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forming, framing, and contesting different identity and resource 
claims in the country (Vaughan 2003; Turton 2006), the author’s 
experience during the biannual pilgrimages at the shrine of Teru Sina 
during the PhD research field work (between November 2008 and 
March 2010) was a ‘category crashing’ one50.  
 
The first encounters during the biannual pilgrimages to the shrine, 
corroborated by the findings of the study afterward, challenge the 
dominant thesis of the social bordering process in two ways. First, it 
challenges the definition of the social situation of the country by the 
ruling Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
primarily as ‘ethnic’, which starkly contrasts with local realities such 
as in Teru Sina. Many of the people coming to attend the different 
religious rituals at the shrine, apparently an Islamic institution located 
in the Oromo nationality zone of the Amhara national regional state, , 
are mostly Christian Amharas coming from the districts of Ephrata-
Gidim and Ansokiya-Gemza both situated in the northern Shewa 
zone. This double boundary-crossing at the shrine - ethnic and 
religious - thus poses a formidable empirical challenge to the 
representation of the Ethiopian social landscape primarily as ethnic. 
Secondly, the continued vitality of integrative social institutions such 
as the Sufi shrines in post 1991 Ethiopia also challenges the 
detractors of ethnic federalism who accent the hardening of ethnic 
and religious boundaries and escalation of inter-ethnic and inter-
religious tension throughout the country.  The article  explores and 
explains how pilgrims from different religious background come 
together to an Islamic shrine and how the different actors at the 
shrine (the pilgrims and religious leaders) define crossing the 
religious boundary and hencechallenges this dominant thesis of the 
social boundary forming process drawing on the field encounters and 
drawing on fieldwork data. 
 
Academic works on pilgrimage have argued that pilgrimage needs to 
be understood as a double boundary-crossing phenomenon whereby 
pilgrims tend to not only cross religious but also ethnic boundaries 
(Levine 1974, Pankhurst 1994; Gibbs 1997). Such works draw on the 
widely received Turnerian paradigm of ‘communitas’ which 
                                                 
50 In his book Amhara traditions of Knowledge: spirit mediums and their clients, the 
Norwegian anthropologist Harold Aspen used the expression of category crashing 
experience to describe the “odd” and dramatic field experiences that challenge our 
“normal” expectations. 
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emphasizes the argument that pilgrimages blur the diverse religious 
and ethnic boundaries of adherents and create a sense of 
communality among the pilgrims (Turner 1995). This paper aims to 
contend this analysis by emphasizing the need to seriously engage 
with the agency of local actors not only in terms of emphasizing 
“crossing” religious boundary but also in relation to the questions of 
how they conceive these boundaries in the first place and how they 
account for the act which appears, at least from the outside, as 
crossing a boundary. As such, this article calls for a 
phenomenological approach that moves beyond the mere description 
of the social interaction as a ‘mechanical mixing’ between Christians, 
possession cult adherents, and Muslims or as a ‘thinning out’ 
(loosening) of religious boundaries. It analyzes the cultural worlds of 
interlocutors who insist on emphasizing the salience of the religious 
boundary despite the pervasive crossing of it. It also seeks to 
discuss, on the basis of emic accounts, the factors which account for 
the participation of pilgrims of diverse religious backgrounds. While 
addressing this, the paper identifies factors which facilitate the 
attraction of pilgrims from different religious backgrounds despite the 
dominant bordering processes generated by the new political order in 
Ethiopia, i.e., institutionalization of identity in the form of ethnic 
federalism. Before moving to the main arguments, brief background 
information on Sufism in the region and cursory information about the 
shrine will be presented to readers.  
The Sufi Shrine of Teru Sina and the Biannual Pilgrimages 
The name Ye shaykoch madad (place of the shaykhs) in north 
eastern and north central Ethiopia refers to a number of Sufi shrines 
established between the eighteenth and the twentieth century on the 
region. North central Ethiopia, especially the area around Wallo, is 
well known for the presence of numerous Islamic shrines that have 
central place in the history of the emergence and dissemination of 
Islam in the region and in Ethiopia. The shrines in fact played a 
crucial role in serving as first centers of Islamic learning that attracted 
students from different parts of Ethiopia and other neighboring 
countries such as Djibouti, Somalia and today’s Eritrea. Scholars 
have debated the origin and nature of Sufism in Ethiopia. Sufism was 
first introduced to Ethiopia from Yemen in the 16thcentury; the oldest 
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and the most widespread Sufi order in Ethiopia being the Qadiriyya. 
The Qadiriyya order was first introduced to Harar and then spread 
throughout the country. Other Sufi orders in Ethiopia include the 
Tijaniyya, the Shadhiliyya, the Sammaniyya and the Mirghaniyya 
(Muhammad 1994). Trimingham (1952) has mentioned the type of 
Sufism in Northeast Africa was “vulgarized” to suit into local realities. 
He has explained this phenomenon as, 
 
Thaumaturgy is exulted at the expense of theosophy; mystical 
exercises degenerated into orgiastic dances; no real apprenticeship is 
required before initiation; initiation is simplified to the taking of a solemn 
oath of allegiance to the shaykhs; less rigorous discipline from the 
neophytes; dhikr song and dance are exercised immodestly to produce 
psycho-social effects, and the local shaykhs of the order are venerated 
to a degree little short of deification. (Trimingham 1952:233-234), 
 
Yet Hussein Ahmed, the foremost scholar on regional histories of 
Ethiopian Islam, has painted Sufism in Ethiopia in a more positive 
light, even though he too recognized the ‘bizarre’ form it has taken in 
some areas and among some followers (Hussein 2001: 70). 
According to him, 
 
Under the repressive political structure of Christian hegemony, Islam in 
Ethiopia was indebted to Sufi centers for its very survival: it was the 
expansion of the Sufi orders, the various centers of local pilgrimage 
which recruited converts to Islam, and laid the basis for the emergence 
of viable and prosperous Muslim communities in the countryside and 
towns of Ethiopian interior. ( Hussein 2001:71). 
 
Sufi centers of learning in different parts of the country such as the 
one of shaykh Muhammad Shafi in Wallo (Jamma Negus); shaykh 
Abadir of Harar, and shaykh Hussein of Bale have played an 
important role as centers of Islamic learning (Østebo 2011). As such, 
the shrines of these famous shaykhs serve as nodes in a local 
network, creating congregating points for Islamic education and for 
other spiritual rituals. 
 
The shrine of Teru Sina is one of these ye shaykoch madads founded 
by shaykh Siraj Muhammad Awel who belonged to the Qadiriyya 
order, the dominant Sufi order around Wallo and Shewa located in 
north eastern part of Ethiopia. Shaykh Siraj Muhammad Awel was 
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born around 1875 at Dana, a place well known in the history of 
Sufism in Ethiopia. Siraj studied in famous Islamic schools in Wallo 
and Shewa and established his own Islamic learning center (zawiya) 
of Teru Sina around 1949 to provide Islamic education for students 
coming from the countries of the Horn of Africa, such as Somalia, 
Djibouti and Eritrea, as well as for those darsas (students) from 
different parts of Ethiopia. 
 
Before the establishment of the shrine at Teru Sina, the area was a 
hot spot for ethnic conflict and land disputes between the two 
neighbouring ethnic groups; the Oromo and the Amhara. Governors 
in the area have tried at different times to end the conflicts using 
various measures ranging from harsh penalties to co-opting local 
religious leaders as a way of convincing the local community to come 
to terms. In a pragmatic move towards succeeding in ending the 
deadly conflicts of early 1930s and mid-1940s, local government 
officials approached Siraj who had earned a reputation for his 
extraordinary spiritual power of performing miracles and healing51 
and used him as a mediator between two conflicting groups. He 
collaborated with government officials in the attempts to end the 
protracted inter-ethnic conflicts of the 1930s in Mekdessa, and later 
on in Teru Sina in the 1950s. Shaykh Siraj’s settlement at the hot 
spot of the deadly conflict and the amicable relations that he 
established with the local government officials had opened up a new 
horizon to his relationship with the Ethiopian state. Shaykh Siraj had 
managed to forge ties with the imperial family as much by his own 
efforts as it was a reflection of the political weakness of the imperial 
regime in the immediate post-liberation period throughout the 1930s 
and 1940s. Haile Selassie became emperor in 1930 after a 
protracted power struggle; not least a formidable challenge from the 
Mammadoch dynasty of Wallo to which Lij Iyasu, the grandson of 
Emperor Menelik II, belonged. Emperor Haile Selassie was barely 
five years in power when he was ousted by the Italians in 1936. The 
military support that he got from the British during the Second World 
War enabled him to regain his throne. But this came with a British 
political baggage. The British sought to reduce Ethiopia to a 
protectorate after liberation from the Italians in 1941 until the end of 
                                                 
51 After his initiation as a Sufi shaykh in 1924 informants account narrates his 
religious piety, his life as a Sufi mystic , his large scale prosleytization missions and 
that he has performed number of miracles. 
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the Second World War in 1945 (Erlich 2010). A politically insecure 
imperial regime thus had every incentive to work with and through 
traditional authorities to re-establish its own legitimacy, more so in 
regions such as Wallo where memories of political resistance against 
his rule were still fresh.  
 
The alliance between the Christian Emperor Haile Selassie and a 
Muslim shaykh by the time sounds anomalous, given the former's 
orthodox background and the underlying Christian authenticity 
discourse. The imperial regime of Haile Selassie claims a decent 
from Solomonic dynasty and it was a regime where by the church 
and state were closely intertwined (Erlich 2010). Emperor Haile 
Selassie had similar strong ties with some Sufi shaykhs in different 
parts of Ethiopia (Østebo 2011). In this favorable political context 
shaykh Siraj had sought to expand his base. The network that 
shaykh Siraj built with the Ethiopian state and his reputation as a 
religious leader had enabled him to be rewarded in different forms 
as; in land grants, sponsorship of his pilgrimage to Mecca, 
sponsorship of his construction of number of mosques, etc. 
 
Shaykh Siraj died in 1972. In recognition of the closer political ties he 
made with the imperial family and local government officials, shaykh 
Siraj was given a state funeral. A dori (sanctuary) was built within the 
compound of the zawiya (local Islamic learning center) where his 
body still lies. Many of his adherents present that upon his death, his 
soul ascended to heaven while his spirit remained in Teru Sina where 
he has continued to be the guardian of the local community. Hence, 
informants mention that by going to this tomb, they visit shaykh Siraj 
in person. After his death thousands of pilgrims started flocking to his 
dory at the shrine of Teru, as a visit to his shrine is believed to reward 
one with a baraka (locally often defined as grace). 
 
The tradition of making pilgrimages to visit a living or dead Sufi is a 
widely spread practices among the Sufis around the world such as in 
Asia (Werbner 2003) and in Africa (Gellner 1983; Lewis 1999). In 
Ethiopia, pilgrimage to holy places in general is so extensive that 
Levine called it one of the ‘pan-Ethiopian traits’ (Levine 1974:50). 
Like the Sufi shrines in different parts of the world, pilgrimage is one 
of the religious rituals associated with Sufi shrines in Ethiopia such 
as shrines in eastern Ethiopia (Gibb 1998; Desplat 2005); western 
Ethiopia (Ishihara 2009); northern Ethiopia (Kelkilachew 1997), and 
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in southern Ethiopia (Braukämper 2004). Pilgrimage to the shrine of 
Sufi shaykhs, on the other hand, is unanimously condemned as 
bida’h by Islamic reform movements around the globe (Werbner 
2003). Notwithstanding the controversy surrounding the orthodoxy of 
the pilgrimage to the shrines of Sufi shaykhs as a legitimate Islamic 
religious practice, it is continued to be widely practiced at Sufi 
centers throughout Ethiopia. 
 
There are biannual pilgrimages to the shrine of Teru Sina held on 
August 15th and October 15th every year. Pilgrims of diverse socio 
economic profile attend the biannual pilgrimage to the shrine of Teru 
Sina.  
 
Picture 1: Pilgrims singing on their way to the Shrine (Photo: Meron 
Zeleke) 
 
Despite the location of the shrine of Teru Sina in Oromo Nationality 
Zone, the majority of the pilgrims, over seventy percent, were 
Amhara. Similarly, regarding the religious profile of the pilgrim’s, sixty 
five percent of them were Ethiopian Orthodox Christians and the rest 
were Muslims and traditional believers. The record on the ethno 
religious profile of the pilgrims at the contemporary shrine of Teru 
Sina contradicts with the main discourse of the narrowing down of 
the religious and ethnic boundary in post 1991 Ethiopia mentioned in 
the introductory note above. The majority of adherents of this Islamic 
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shrine are mostly Ethiopian Orthodox Christians. Close to two 
thousand pilgrims came to the shrine on the night of October 14, 
2009. These were from different parts of Ethiopia and few were from 
the diaspora mainly from Jeddah and Qatar. The ethnic and religious 
composition of the pilgrims was quiet diverse. The following table 
presents the socio- economic profile of two hundred pilgrims 
randomly picked on October 14, 2009 
 
 
 
Ethnicity Religious profile of 
Pilgrims 
Age Professional 
Background   
Place of  
Origin 
Amhara               67 EOC   68 < 20                 8 Farmers 46 Kara Kore            
Oromo 24 Muslims 20 20-30         27 Business Men      29 Majate                 
Argobba       7 Traditional 12 30-45          25 Unemployed 19 Teru Sina                                                 
Gurage 2   > 45           40 Diaspora 9 Addis 
Ababa        
      College Student   3 Ataye                   
      Doctor                
(neurologist)              
1 KSA                 
      Lawyers 2 Dana                      
      Agricultural           
   officer      
1 Desse                    
        Welidya                 
        Adama                   
        Kara Kore            
Table 3: Profile of Male Pilgrims (Source: Author ’s field Note) 
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Ethnic 
background 
Religious  
background 
Age Profession Place  
of Origin 
Amhara         72 Orthodox      62 < 20               9 Housewives      42 Kara Kore         
Oromo           19 Muslims        28 20 - 30      29 Spirit Mediums    18 Majate             
Argobba           9 Traditional     20 30-45            30 Traders                17 Addis Abeba    
    Above 45     32 Diaspora                7 Teru Sina           
      High school 
Student  
6 Ataye            
      College 
Student   
4 KSA                  
      Teachers                    4 Desse                  
      Health officer   1 Weldiya             
      Secretary          1  
Table 4: Profile of Female Pilgrims (Source, field Note) 
 
In addition to the biannual pilgrimages, religious rituals regularly 
taking place at the shrine such as the weekly zar hadra (zar spirit 
appeasement sessions), the weekly wadaja (group prayer) ritual, the 
annual ritual of Telema (annual thanks giving ritual for harvest 
season) and the annual Atete rituals are all attended by people from 
different ethnic and religious backgrounds. This creates a sense of 
confusion for external observers and forces one to raise a legitimate 
question on what accounts for such element of attraction between 
adherents of different religious traditions. The following section 
presents the emic account on the factors that are described as 
facilitating such boundary crossing religious practices.  
Conceptual Compatibility as a pull factor to the Islamic shrines  
In the context of ever hardening of religious and ethnic boundaries in 
contemporary Ethiopia, extensive religious syncretism and profound 
local socio-cultural integration appears anomalous. In the following 
sections based on the emic accounts the factors that explain this 
‘anomaly’, i.e., conceptual compatibility will be discussed. 
 
During the informal talks and interviews conducted with most 
Christian and spirit possession cult adherents of shaykh Siraj, a 
common pattern of justification for their presence at an Islamic shrine 
has been observed. Emic accounts contest the very idea of crossing 
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a religious boundary, for in their perspective there is a fundamental 
similarity at the conceptual level – the notion of sainthood and the 
intercessory role of saints between humans and 
Igziabiher/God/Allah. The recurrent theme and that which is shared 
among Orthodox Christians; the leaders of the shrine, adherents of 
the spirit possession cult, and Sufi Muslims is the concept of holy 
men. They often tend to over emphasize the points of similarity or 
some crosscutting concepts in the different religious traditions. 
According to Rogers (1983), the foremost authority in popularizing 
compatibility as a factor in diffusion of innovation, compatibility is 
described as one of the characteristic features of innovation. In his 
theory of diffusion of innovation, Rogers (1983) has stated five 
characteristic features of innovation that are said to greatly shape the 
overall degree of acceptability or rejection of a certain innovation in a 
given society. These are relative advantage; compatibility; 
complexity; tribaility, and observability. 
 
Compatibility according to Rogers (1983:223) is the degree to which 
an innovation is perceived as consistent with the existing values, past 
experiences, and needs of potential adopters. An idea that is more 
compatible is less uncertain to the potential adopter. An innovation 
can be compatible or incompatible with socio cultural values and 
beliefs; with previously introduced ideas, or with client needs of 
innovations. According to Rogers, the greater the compatibility the 
faster its adoption becomes. I draw on Rogers’s idea of compatibility 
and expand it further while applying it in the field of religious 
syncretism. The notion of compatibility that I refer to in making sense 
of religious syncretism at the shrine of Teru Sina also relates to the 
major works in the study of syncretism such as the notion of 
‘tolerable variation’(Stewart 2004: 265); commonality (Droogers 
2008:49), or the finding of one’s own in the other (Schenk 1989). 
Leopold and Jensen (2004: 93) emphasize the point that 
‘compatibility between foreign beliefs is just as good a starting point 
for syncretism’. Following the lead of these authors, I argue that 
conceptual compatibility across religious boundaries is one of the 
major factors that have shaped the process of religious syncretism at 
the shrine of Teru Sina in general and participation in different rituals 
as the biannual pilgrimage in particular. 
 
Concepts such as saint veneration, saint intercession, belief in the 
extraordinary spiritual power of saints and their power in performing 
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miracles are cross cutting notions that exist in the different religious 
traditions in Teru Sina. Veneration of saints is a common religious 
practice among the Sufi Muslims in various parts of the world 
(Baldock 2004). This is one of the major contentious issues between 
Sufis and members of Islamic reform movements that question the 
orthodoxy of this religious practice, for whom it is an aspect of, shirk 
(polytheism). Veneration of saints is a common religious practice 
among Orthodox Christians, (Anderson 2007). Saint veneration is in 
fact one of the major contentions between the Ethiopian Orthodox 
Church and the various Protestant denominations in the country 
(Tibebe 2009). Many Christian interlocutors who come to the shrine 
of Teru Sina at different occasions during the biannual pilgrimage, for 
the weekly wadaja (group prayer), healing and other rituals put 
emphasis on the ‘compatible concepts ‘existing both at the EOC and 
Sufi Islam. The strong tradition of venerating saints in the Ethiopian 
Orthodox Church goes to the extent of dedicating each day of the 
month to different saints venerated at the churches. 
 
This cross cutting concept of saint veneration comes over and over 
again in the various narratives provided by Christian interlocutors. In 
the following sections, two examples will be provided to show the 
centrality of saint veneration among Sufi Muslims and Orthodox 
Christians. One of the key interlocutors, Mebratu Baye, is a deacon 
at the Ethiopian Orthodox Church of Majate Medihanialem. He 
described his participation in religious rituals at the Islamic shrine of 
Teru Sina despite his Christian background in the following manner: 
 
There is nothing wrong in coming to Teru Sina for the weekly group 
prayer or to attend the biannual pilgrimage. I am a Christian. I am even 
a deacon [At this stage Mebratu proudly pointed at his identification 
card which states that he works at the Church]. The Muslims at Teru 
Sina also have their own qidusan (saints) like us the Orthodox 
Christians. They call them wali which in Amharic means qidusan. Wali 
is an Arabic term. Arabic is the holy language of the Muslims just like 
Geez is for us, Orthodox Christians. Thus, to come to the place of the 
qidusan is not wrong at all. What will be wrong is going to the pentes’ 
(Protestants‟) churches. Unlike the pentes, the Muslims here at Teru 
Sina know and revere the qidusan. On the other hand, the pentes, who 
claim to be Christians, do not know anything about the qidusan. But 
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today we also have new Christians (pentes52) and new Muslims (the 
wahhabiyas or pentes of the Muslim) respectively53. The old Muslims 
know the qidusan. So they are like us the Orthodox Christians. 
(Mebratu Baye. September 17, 2009; Teru Sina). 
 
In Mebratu’s parlance, the conceptual link is maintained without 
collapsing the religious boundary between the ‘old Christianity’ and 
the ‘old Islam’. Mebratu’s negative reference to the Protestants 
(pentes), on the other hand, suggests the greater salience of an 
intra-religious boundary, i.e., between Orthodox Christians and 
Protestants, than between Orthodox Christians and Sufi Muslims. 
Mebratu also referred to the intra-Muslim religious boundary and he 
likened the ‘Wahhabiyas’ (Salafis) with the Pente (Protestants). 
Interestingly, this is not considered by the reformers as something 
derogatory. In an interview conducted with Dr Jeylan Geleta, the 
defacto leader of the Salafiyya movement in Ethiopia, he also 
referred to the same distinction between pentes and the Orthodox 
Church while explaining the boundary between Sufi and Salafi 
versions of Islam. He even felt more comfortable with the comparison 
with the pentes than the derogatory term Wahhabiyas, ‘we are like 
the pentes’, was how he explained to me about the reformist 
missions of the Salafis in general.  
 
Another Muslim pilgrim shares the Christian interlocutor Mebratus 
account presented above. He also mentioned the similarity regarding 
the practice of venerating saints between Sufis and Orthodox 
Christians as follows:  
 
The Orthodox and we, the suffaya, venerate saints. We are cultured 
people who pay due respect to those who have dedicated their lives to 
their respective religion. We are obliged to do so for Allah himself has 
                                                 
52 Pente is a word locally used interchangeably with “Pentecostal”. It is used as a 
derogatory term by Orthodox Christians as a gloss to the various denominations of the 
Protestant Churches. The three major Protestant denominations in Ethiopia are 
MekaneIyesus (Lutheran); Qale Hiwot (established by the Sudan Interior Mission, 
international, interdenominational Christian mission organization), and Mulu Wengel 
(Full Gospel), an independent Pentecostal Church (Tibebeu 2009). 
53 In the study area and in most parts of Ethiopia, there is a great tendency of 
referring to all the different Islamic reformist movements as Wahhabiyas that rather 
has a derogatory connotation of hinting at extremism.  It does not as such reflect 
on the doctrinal differences between wahhabism and the Salafiyya Islamic 
reformist movements founded in Saudi Arabia and Egypt respectively.  
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privileged those people who served him with his baraka. They have 
been granted baraka to perform karama (miracle) to heal the sick, to 
bless others, to preach, to live their whole life as pious individuals. 
These are qualities that only few measure up to. As such, they need to 
be revered and respected. The Wahhabiyas and the Christian petnes 
are sirat yalelachew (undisciplined) people who treat everyone the 
same as if they were equal. The wahabiyas are uncultured as the 
pentes of the Christians who do not pay respect to their saints and holy 
figures (Bakri Arba. September 13, 2009; Teru Sina).  
 
Bakris understanding of monotheism echoes Orthodox Christians’ 
notion, which, despite the critic by the reformers – Pentes and Salafis 
– is not deviation from Orthodoxy but is recognition and affirmation of 
the sacredness of God/Allah; access to which is not as ‘easy’ as the 
reformers would put it. 
 
To sum up, the cult of Saint Mary and a myriad of saints by the 
followers of the Orthodox Church have softened the apparent 
religious boundary between Islam and Christianity at the Islamic 
shrine of Teru Sina and in the wider region of Wallo/North Shewa. 
While participating in the Sufi shrine rituals the Orthodox Christians 
do not feel crossing a religious boundary for this entails only a switch 
of personal references for instance, from Saint Mary to shaykh Siraj. 
The pilgrimage to the shrine is described by many Christians as part 
of venerating saints. In doing so, they selectively draw on a repertoire 
of the Orthodox Church tradition which recognizes saints and saint 
veneration. On the other hand, crossing an intra-religious boundary – 
such as reformers visiting the shrine – is rather considered as an act 
of crossing the religious boundary because of the strong emphasis 
they put on monotheism by the reformer, which is conceptually 
incompatible with saint veneration, less with saint intercession. 
Although both Muslims and Christians draw on the compatible 
concept of saint veneration and intercession in sense-making of the 
religious participation across the religious boundary none of them 
mentioned even a single time that it is an act of crossing a religious 
boundary.  
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Conclusion 
As the discussion in this paper clearly shows there is inconsistency 
between the dominant discourse on the tightening of religious and 
ethnic boundary in post 1991 Ethiopia and the lived reality at 
grassroots level which rather shows the fuzziness of religious 
boundaries in northeastern Ethiopia. 
Academic discourses surrounding pilgrimage and how pilgrimages 
enhance senses of commuitas among pilgrims mainly limits their 
arguments to the functionalist explanation without engaging much 
with the local accounts of maintaining differences a gap this paper 
has anticipated to contribute to. However, in discussing the 
multifaceted elements related to pilgrimage as issues of boundary 
crossing the local account needs to be equally represented in order 
to get a clear and holistic perspective of what crossing the religious 
boundary in a given context entails.  As it has been stated in the 
introductory remarks of the paper, studies dealing with pilgrimage 
should go beyond giving a descriptive account of the ritual. The 
context and the local meanings attached to the practices vary 
tremendously and such variation can be understood only if due 
attention is given to emic accounts. This allows us to simultaneously 
engage with boundary - crossing and boundary maintenance in local 
terms. The discussion in this paper has clearly shown how 
conceptual compatibility is emphasized by pilgrims as being a factor 
facilitating the participation at the biannual pilgrimage at the Islamic 
shrine and other religious rituals hosted at the shrine.  
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The Fragmented Entity: Conflict and the 
Emerging Faces of Jos 
Timothy O. Baiyewu 
Abstract: 
The spate of bombing in Jos is quite worrisome to average Nigerian residents 
in Jos and its environs. The seeming unending cycle of explosions that destroy 
human lives mostly in worship centers, market place, and relaxation centres 
have consequential effects. The reasons for this ugly situation in a metropolitan 
city that was for decades an epitome of beauty, hospitality, commerce, peace 
and tourism have attracted divergent analyses. This paper argues that the 
conflict in Jos is ethno-religious. The Hausa/Fulani extractions who contest 
ownership of Jos, particularly Jos North, with the indigenous tribes of Afizere, 
Anaguta and Berom are predominantly Muslims while the later tribes are 
largely Christians. The seeming inseparability of the ethnic identity struggle and 
the religious leanings of the two opposing actors have consequentially played 
out in the relocation of many victims of the lingering conflict. The unending 
cycle of conflict in Jos and its emerging dimensions greatly influence the 
changing pattern of human settlement as residents relocate to safe havens 
where residents practice the same religion. The paper posits that the emergent 
settlement pattern in Jos has a wide range of implications on the future trend of 
conflict in the entire Plateau State. By extension, the conflict is consequential 
on the political, economic and social development of the state and increases 
human agony that impedes the wellbeing of victims and the general public.   
 
Key words: ethno-religious conflicts, Jos, indigenes, settlers 
Introduction 
The bomb blasts which occurred on the 24th of December, 2010 at 
three strategic places around Sacred Heart Catholic Church, Gada 
Biu and Angwan Rukuba areas remain a worrying indicator of the 
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new dimensions ethno-religious conflicts have attained in Jos, 
Nigeria (Shobayo 2010). The blasts, in fact demonstrated a seeming 
affinity with the mode of operations by Muslim extremists in the Arab 
world of Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, often operating under 
the banner of fundamentalist groups such as Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and 
Al-Shabaab. Initiated by suicide bombers, the blasts marked yet 
another level of ethno-religious violence in Jos in particular and 
Nigeria in general. One quite easily tends to compare the blasts in 
Jos with the anti-Christian terrorist attack by an Al-Qaeda group on 
worshippers in Our Lady of Salvation Catholic Church, Baghdad, Iraq 
which killed 58 people on the 31st of October, 2010, and the 
murderous terrorist attack of 31st December of the same year that 
was carried out on worshippers in a Coptic Orthodox Church, All 
Saints Church in Alexandria, Egypt. While the above examples of 
suicide bombing do not explain conflict engendered by indigen-settler 
sour relationship, the Jos conflict presents a situation where owners 
of the land and migrants once lived next to each others’ doors, 
exchanged gifts and ideas but were later fragmented by ethnic and 
religious boundaries that exist among them. Most residents of Jos 
live along ethno-religious grouping. Yet some live along religious 
grouping. Some Yoruba Muslims, for example, feel safer to live in 
Hausa-Fulani dominated areas of Jos, but many of them (the Yoruba 
Muslims) live among the owners of the land who are predominantly 
Christians. 
 
The conflict in Jos over the years has remained visibly ethno-
religious. It has often been mainly between the Christian dominated 
ethnic groups- Berom, Afizere, and Anaguta, and the predominantly 
Muslim Hausa and Fulani groups. Although Aapengnuo (2010) and 
Kwaja (2011) see the conflict in Jos as ethnic identity problem that is 
often used to open up structural deficiencies in governance, it is 
difficult to separate Islam from the Hausa and Fulani groups who are 
predominantly Muslims; neither can Christianity be separated from 
the Berom, Afizere, and Anaguta indigenous groups that are 
predominantly Christians. More so, the destruction of churches and 
Mosques, and the relocation of people within Jos along ethnic and 
religious cleavages are evident. The actors are polarized along 
ethnic and religious differences. Other tribes include the Yoruba, 
Igbo, Urhobo, Hausa-Fulani and other migrant communities. 
Mohammed (2011) in his x-ray of the frosty relationship between the 
Hausa and Fulani groups, and the Berom, Anaguta, and the Afizere 
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acknowledges the presence of the latter in the caves and on the hills, 
and their initial failure to take part in the mining business in their 
environment. This seeming pre-existence of the Berom, Afizere, and 
Anaguta in the mining environment called Jos before the business 
adventure and later settlement of the Hausa and Fulani groups in 
same area has often been used to determine the ownership status of 
the predominantly Christian tribes in Jos.  In agreement with Slocum-
Bradley (2008:1) that people naturally form some perceptions of 
themselves and others’ and also express “the construction of a 
certain perception of one’s own group and that of the ‘other’” helps 
our understanding of the creation of a ‘indigene’ - ‘non-indigene’ 
demarcation between the ‘people of the caves and the hills’ and the 
Tin mining traders of Hausa and Fulani extractions. Such age long 
distinction which Abimbola and Alao (2009:153) describe as “fixed 
and unchanging notions of ethnic identity or indigeneity” has been 
deepened by the indigeneity policies of the Nigerian government 
(Human Rights Watch, April 25, 2006; January 27, 2011). Of all the 
tribes that met the earliest occupiers-Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere of 
the mining area, the Hausa’s and Fulani’s more seeming resilience in 
the quest for identity in their new found abode of living and survival 
seems to be echoed by their incessant conflicts with the other three 
tribes who seem to have more access to the instruments of 
governance and who are more favoured by other tribes in the State. 
Conflicts between the former and the latter are usually understood 
along ethno-religious line due to the overlapping between the ethnic 
and religious identities of the groups in question. 
 
Ethno-religious conflicts remain a marked feature of Nigeria, a 
country where ethnic, religious, political, economic and ideological 
cleavages have constantly shaped policy formulation, decision 
making, access to political and economic opportunities, and 
interpersonal relationships. Conflicts usually arise from differences in 
needs, aspirations and ideas that abound among individuals and 
groups. Ethnicity and religion are examples. If properly managed, 
conflicts can influence some positive change. Gunther Schlee 
(2008:4) argues that ethnicity is a recurrent factor that stirs up conflict 
through cultural differences. Conflict is necessary for growth and 
social change. Research has shown that violent conflict, in spite of its 
destructive and painful outcome can lead to some form of adjustment 
mechanism on the parts of the actors in terms of policy and decision 
making (Lewis Coser, 1957). The emerging faces of incessant ethno-
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religious conflict in Jos present a city that is fragmented along ethnic, 
religious and economic structures. If conflict truly can bring about 
social change, its perceived benefits are yet to be in sight in the case 
of Jos. The main concern of this paper is to bring to the fore the 
emerging cleavage settlement pattern of Jos and the implications it is 
likely to bring on the people, the city, the State, and the unity of the 
Nigerian state. 
 
Map 2: Map of Jos showing different administrative divisions 
Jos in Retrospect 
As a heterogeneous settlement, the ethno-religious conflict in Jos 
has placed the city among the most deadly trouble spots on the 
Nigerian map. Recent happenings have shown that some form of 
harsh argument that may ensue in public between people of 
opposing faiths could lead to stabbing, shooting and burning of 
properties, catching innocent people, traders and workers from 
different backgrounds unawares. This perhaps stems from 
accumulated agonies of previous violent conflicts and tendency for 
vengeance. As a ‘melting pot’ where people of different origin, colour 
or race have found solace in commerce and peaceful settlement, the 
city has remained a test case for the ‘one Nigeria’ question. Mining 
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and other trading activities that attracted a lot of people from various 
parts of Nigeria have turned out to be a blessing in disguise for a city 
that was known as ‘home of peace and tourism’. The work of 
Leonard Plotnicov (1967), Shadrach Best (2007), Sen Luka 
Zangabadt (1983), Billy Dudley (1968), Samuel Nwabara (1963), Sati 
Fwatshak (2010) and the Plateau State website capture much about 
the historical antecedents, geographical location and features, ethno-
religious composition, and commerce and political development of 
Jos, which between its inception in about 1920 and 2001 had 
metamorphosed from one of the most healthiest and safest places in 
Africa to a cosmopolitan city that is recently threatened by political 
intrigues and ethno-religious violence. Most historical accounts on 
Jos are written by insiders, but Manu Isah’s (2010), an outsider 
seems contentious. Isah avers history supports that all the tribes on 
the Jos Plateau are emigrants from various geographical locations, 
but he lacks historical document to substantiate this claim.  
 
The seeming cordial relationship between the ‘natives’ and the 
‘settlers’ got affected at the wake of violence of September 7, 2001 
(Ezekiel Gomos, 2011). As a resident of Jos for over two decades, 
oral evidence gathered from some of the children and grand children 
of some key actors indicate that there was some form of cordiality 
through exchange for desired property between the ‘natives’ and the 
‘settlers’. The willingness and the good spirit with which farmlands 
were sold by the former to the latter underscore the hospitality of the 
former. B. W. Hodder’s (1959) work on tin mining in Jos reveals that 
mining activities might have begun in Jos then known as Bauchi 
Plateau earlier than 1884 when European travelers and traders found 
that straws of tin were being used by the Hausa in their brass work 
and that there was smelting and trading of tin around Kano extending 
to the Nile, Tripoli and Ashanti. Hodder (1959) further reveals that the 
mineral survey of Northern Nigeria by the colonial government from 
1904 to 1909 confirmed tin mining activities and also proved the 
large deposit of tin over a wide area of the Plateau.  By 1943 Tin 
mining had reached its peak of production which was put at 15,842 
tons but which dropped to 1,264 tons by 1984 (Michael Alexander 
1990). Natasha Cooper (n.d.) seemingly attributes this decline to the 
substitution of tin for rubber and other products that do not corrode in 
the international market. The decline forced the locals to go back to 
their farms while the migrants decided to settle on the Jos Plateau 
and took up other commercial activities. Most of the migrant traders 
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occupied great part of what is today known as Jos North. They 
settled along ethnic cleavages. The Igbos are predominant in Apata 
and West of Mines areas, the Yoruba occupy vast area of Nasarawa 
Gwong, Eto Baba and part of Dilimi areas, while the majority of 
Hausa settlers are found along Bauchi road, Dilimi, Gangare, and 
Rikos areas of the city. 
 
As a civil servant resident in Jos, observations reveal that the Hausa-
Fulani have to a great extent enjoyed freedom of religious worship, 
association, economic and social activities. The establishment of 
Jama’atu Izalatul Bidi’ah Wa Iqamatu Sunnah (JIBWIS), an Islamic 
sect by Sheikh Isma’ila Idris in Jos in 1978 has made Islam more 
socially visible in the city. They have created for themselves some 
market niches that have made them more formidable in the economic 
sphere of Jos. They trade on textile materials, foodstuff, jewelries, 
wrist watches to name a few. The Yoruba trade on textiles and plastic 
material. They are also in to commercial transport business, furniture 
works, auto repairs to mention a few, while auto spare parts, 
electronics and drug sales have remained largely the preserve of the 
Igbos. The indigenes are predominantly government civil servants. 
They also engage in mason and other lucrative businesses. It is 
important at this juncture to examine how the above socio-economic 
and religious freedom and interaction among various people in Jos 
has developed into aggressive struggle for identity and violent 
conflicts. 
Ethno-Religious Identity Struggle and the Peculiarity of Jos 
Ethnic identity struggle is a common phenomenon in most developed 
and developing pluralistic societies. Some countries outside Africa 
that readily come to mind are Albania, Bulgaria, Afghanistan and 
China, Serbia and other countries in the Balkans. In Africa, Burundi, 
Rwanda, the Congos, Mauritania, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire have 
continued to have their share of the negative effects of ethnic identity 
struggles.  In Nigeria, the phenomenon is widespread and is often 
associated with religion; ‘indigene’ and ‘outsider’, which in Hausa 
language means ‘dan gida’ da ‘dan ci rani’; in Yoruba language, the 
indigent-settler concept is referred to as ‘omo’le’ ati ‘at’ohunrinwa’. In 
fact, a person’s ethnic identity has great influence on the safety of his 
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or her life and property, upward mobility in the work place, access to 
political, social and economic opportunities. Viewed from physical 
evidence and group conceptions, ethnicity is the idea of common 
place of origin, kinship, distinctiveness or uniqueness of cultural 
traits. John and Jean Comaroff (2009) observe that this tendency has 
refused to recede even with globalization and transmigration of 
people, objects and ideas, and that it has assumed a commodity with 
its copy rights law in such a way that a culture and its cultural 
products are highly protected by its people by enactment of law and 
other human strategies. One may be right to assume here that 
ethnicity is a social identity formation which when protected or 
commodificated by a group in disfavour of another may trigger up 
conflict of latent or violent nature. 
 
Every human society, homogeneous or heterogeneous, consists of 
individuals or groups with varying degree of identity, and unequal 
natural elements. Conflict emanating from their interaction is 
unavoidable especially when there is discordance in interest and 
ideas. Similarly such interaction over time, especially when it involves 
host and migrant, will enable the groups to be more conscious of 
their differences which can considerably fuel conflicts (Karin Norman 
2004). Norman avers that the dynamics of identity can generate 
group distinctions such as ‘exclusion’ versus ‘inclusion’, ‘us’ versus 
‘them’, ‘original inhabitants’ versus ‘sojourners’. While we cannot rule 
out the relative size and abundant opportunities of a group against 
others as a great indicator for conflicts, distance that exists among 
various groups, or the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ can further polarize groups 
and deepen conflicts. Although the largest group is more likely to 
demonstrate more opportunities and strength over others in 
resources and size as is the case in Jos, colonialism in Africa, 
apartheid in South Africa, and Tutsi minority in Rwanda have proved 
otherwise. Such social construction and the interaction of various 
constructed communities is captured by Benedict Anderson (1983) 
who sees a nation or community as a social construction resulting 
from the mental mind of people but holds that an imagined 
community differs from an actual community because members of 
such imagined community tend to retain the mental image of their 
similarity in their minds as against other communities in the 
nationhood. Anderson asserts that such construction is a product of 
modernity which has its political, social, and economic advantages. 
However, the conflict in Jos presents a vivid picture of the weakness 
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of such an imagined structure.  Although latent conflict over 
hegemony persists among the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom as well, 
the trio has latently and confrontationally aligned themselves against 
the resilience of the predominantly Muslim Hausa-Fulani for identity 
recognition. This has constantly diminished the peace that the city is 
known for. 
 
The peculiarity of Jos ethno-religious identity struggle is the 
resilience of the predominantly Muslim Hausa-Fulani migrants’ quest 
for recognition and right of indigeneship of Jos. Jude Onwuamanam 
(2010) captures the resilience of the Hausa-Fulani Muslim migrants 
in Jos as he avers ‘the desire of the largely Hausa/Fulani settler 
community to be accorded full rights as indigenes of Plateau State’. 
The natives of Jos likened this situation to a friend who is invited to 
table but holds up the hand of the host in order to eat to his 
satisfaction before the host could eat. The Nigerian constitution in 
sec 23(3) (a) and 135(3) seems to support the indigenous status of 
an individual or group, thereby promoting discrimination against non 
members of an indigenous community. While the natives of Jos seem 
to draw strength from the position of the constitution, the 
Hausa/Fulani migrants also feel empowered by 27(1) of 1960 
constitution which is incorporated in sec 42 of 1999 constitution. The 
complicity of the 1999 constitution can be seen in 42(3) which 
reinstate discrimination on the grounds of place of origin and ethnic 
strain. This legal ambiguity is, to a large extent, exploited by 
stakeholders in various tiers of government in Nigeria to 
systematically preserve privileges and opportunities for indigent sons 
and daughters. Basically in Nigeria, every state, local government, 
ward and ethnic community determines who its indigenes are. This is 
done in a sense, to systematically edge out the ‘outsiders’ from job 
opportunities and other welfare facilities that are either inadequate or 
not readily available but which are regarded as exclusive preserves 
of the sons and daughters of the community. This scenario can make 
one to ask where the spirit of Nigerian nationalism of the 1940s and 
1950s has gone to. The spate of ethnic conflicts and demands in 
Nigeria, particularly the case of Jos are examples of where, in the 
words of Yasemin Soya (1994:13) ‘cultural identity of citizens’, and its 
recognition and protection seem to have overwhelming claims above 
nationalism. In this case, the identity and rights of the ‘indigenes’ of 
Jos seem to be entrenched and protected against probable influence 
of the ‘settlers’ in the spheres of life. 
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Femi Omotoso (2000) and Samuel Oguche (2008) independently 
express their opinions over the entrenchment of distinctions on the 
grounds of ethnic affiliation and place of origin in the Nigerian 
constitution. They also bear their minds on its inadequacies in taking 
care of the anxiety, rights and privileges of Nigerians outside their 
respective home of origin, and non implementation of some sections 
and clauses that promote peace and integration of citizens. The 
inadequacies in the constitution seem to trigger off ethno-religious 
conflicts and mayhem. Similarly, Olusegun Osoba and Yusuf Bala 
Usman (1976) express concern that no matter the length of time you 
spend as a resident in a town or village or state which is not your 
place of origin, you cannot enjoy the right of full participation in the 
political, social and other spheres of that geographical space. While 
identity protection remains a marked feature of interaction and 
citizenship in almost every community in Nigeria, the abuse of the 
hospitality of the ‘natives’ of Jos by the Hausa-Fulani ‘settlers’ should 
not be overlooked. 
 
The Hausa-Fulani seeming political intrigues to wrest Jos from the 
hands of the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta, started first with the 
creation of Jos North Local Government during Ibrahim Babangida 
Military regime in 1991, and then through the appointment of a 
Muslim Military administrator for the state who in turn appointed a 
Muslim Care-taker chairman for the newly created local government 
council. Jos East Local Government was later carved out of Jos 
South, while Jos North is largely populated by the Migrant 
Hausa/Fulani. Second, the absence of local elections in the local 
government since 2002 has shut the Hausa/Fulani migrants from 
taking control of its administration which can be achieved through 
elections. The migrant community often assures governorship 
aspirants of various political parties of their electoral votes. This is 
often done with a long list of demands by the migrant Hausa-Fulani 
which the governorship aspirants are expected to meet. This includes 
identity recognition, local elections to be conducted in Jos North local 
government, and the creation of an Emirate council. There seemed 
to be indications that the crises that have made a lot of Christian 
Landlords to sell up their houses located in the Migrant Hausa-Fulani 
dominated areas was one of the master-strategies employed to 
expand the Hausa-Fulani frontier in Jos North Local Government. 
Although there are no demographic data to substantiate the claim 
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that the destitute children popularly called Almajiri in Nigeria are used 
for infiltrating Jos to increase migrant Hausa-Fulani population, the 
increasing number of Hausa-Fulani youths used as instruments for 
attacking Christians is glaring. It is very glaring that the Hausa-Fulani 
community employs various intrigues because the constitution does 
not adequately address the “indigene-settler” question. The 
expressions of some Nigerians over the indigeneity concept in the 
constitution have laid bare their irrelevance to current realities being 
faced by many Nigerians including the Hausa-Fulani migrants 
outside their respective towns of origin. If Awolowo’s (1947) 
description of the Nigerian state as a mere geographical expression 
or what Anderson (2006:7) calls ‘imagined community’ is to be 
understood in the light of the identity question, indigeneity remains a 
biological concept which only assumes socio-political meaning. It 
then implies that the original inhabitants of a geographical entity shall 
ever remain indigenes or native sons and daughters of that place 
while the settlers remain non indigenes. How do the Hausa-Fulani 
settlers respond to this unending struggle for identity? 
 
Basically, people of different civilizations have different worldviews 
which seem to be more fundamental than some form of acquired 
socio-political thoughts or construction. The Hausa-Fulani migrants’ 
somewhat worldview about human relationship with God; migration, 
integration and neighborliness seem to play out in their approach to 
their unending struggle for indigenship of Jos. In this regard, Moses 
Ochonu (2008:5) examines the Islamisation of the Hausa-Fulani and 
concludes that the post-Jihad identity of the Hausa-Fulani ‘became 
synonymous with assimilation into an Islamic consciousness that was 
packaged, consecrated, and policed by the Jihad leaders and the 
inheritors of their authority’. The term sabon gari aptly captures the 
Hausa-Fulani conception of human migration and integration. Sabon 
Gari is a new settlement predominantly occupied by settlers in cities 
and towns. In the southern and eastern parts of Nigeria, it is 
predominantly occupied by Hausa-Fulani settlers and this 
considerably alienates their integration into their host community. 
They are also associated with Almajiri phenomenon. Emanating from 
the Arabic al-muhajirin (the emigrant), it depicts Prophet 
Mohammed’s migration from Mecca to Medina. Originally in Hausa 
land, the almajiri are male children of ages seven to eighteen who 
are being taught the Quran by wrote by Quranic teachers but who 
are allowed to stray along the streets begging for food, money and 
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cloth. In Nigeria, it has become a syndrome synonymous with 
destitute, street beggars regardless of age or gender, aggressive and 
violent jobless males who easily succumb to political thuggery and 
religious violence. There are insinuations that their sabon gari 
settlement often serves as a conduit pipe through which the almajiri 
breed and infiltrate the streets of their host community for arms 
begin. Marriage of their daughters to their Christian neighbours is 
restricted on religious ground. Such culture has not really helped to 
dissolve some form of primordial difference that abound between the 
Hausa-Fulani and their host community. By this dispensation, one 
may be right to suggest a slogan: Jos the home of crisis, where the 
‘indigens’ and the ‘settlers’ make life unbearable for themselves. This 
unending struggle for identity requires us to examine its effect on the 
settlement pattern of residents of Jos. How have the people faired 
within the dynamic nature of the crisis ridden city of Jos? 
The Changing Faces 
Contrary to what Jos used to be before the outbreak of the violence 
of September 7, 2001, when the relationship between the ‘indigens’ 
and the ‘settlers’ was relatively peaceful and friendly, and when the 
city had comparatively low violent cases, the cosmopolitan city has 
assumed a worrying situation. Before now, the positive attributes of 
simplicity, hospitality and relatively violent-free and tourist sites which 
nature has bestowed on the city probably earned it ‘the home of 
peace and tourism’ but these have been lost to ethno-religious 
conflicts and mayhem. Debra Fieguth says Jos has turned to a city 
that had been known for its peaceful atmosphere, but where trust has 
been replaced by anger and fear on both sides. The identity 
difference which seems to polarise the people of Jos probably drew 
the attention of Olusegun Obasanjo and Akin Mabogunje (1992) who 
emphasise the inability of the Nigerian constitutional provisions to 
cement or modify ethnic, regional preferences and geographical 
dichotomies that the colonial government constructed as what is 
today called Nigeria. 
 
The victory of Samaila Mohammed, a Hausa-Fulani at the 
chairmanship election in Jos North local government council in 1991 
and the appointment in 1994 of Aminu Mato of Hausa-Fulani 
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extraction seemed to have brewed the subsequent violent conflicts in 
Jos (Ostein 2009, Gwamna 2010). Between 1994 and 2011, Jos has 
witnessed numerous major crises. The crises have led to the death 
of at least ten thousand people and about eight hundred thousand 
internally displaced (Global IDP Project 2005). The state witnesses 
an alarming upsurge in the level of violence and displacement. In 
Global IDP 2005 report, the total number of people displaced by the 
2004 Jos crisis was put at a range between 40,000 to 258,000. While 
some traced back their ancestral roots in various parts of Nigeria and 
have failed or refused to integrate back into local communities in 
Plateau state, others did come back but reintegrated along ethno-
religious line.  
 
Today, human settlement pattern in Jos is pocket-like, largely on 
ethnic and religious affiliations. The dangerous trend in the crises in 
Jos which gave rise to speculation that the Yoruba migrant Muslims 
have become one of the targets of the Hausa-Fulani migrants have 
made the former to find peaceful settlement among their Christian 
brothers and sisters. Most residents of Jos live in segregation. 
Persons or groups with particular traits are spatially located in close 
proximity to others who share similar traits and are separated from 
others who do not share those traits. The ethno-religious conflict and 
residential segregation in Jos remind us of similar conflict and 
settlement pattern in Northern Ireland. While the Jos case presents 
an inter-ethno-religious segregation, that of the Northern Ireland 
presents an intra-religious segregation. The works of Singleton 
(1981, 1985), Wilson (1989), and Coulter (1994) amplify cases of 
ethno-religious residential segregation in Northern Ireland made 
possible by ethno-religiously motivated terrorism. 
 
The 2010 Christmas Eve bomb blasts, which resulted into a bloody 
crisis, had its negative impact on the pattern of settlement in Jos city. 
There are strong indications that the attack on the Igbo traders on 
Dilimi Street during the crisis forced the Igbo merchants to relocate 
their businesses to satellite markets in the predominantly Christian 
settlements in Gada Biu, West of Mines, Apata, and Gyel-Bukuru. 
The Igbo community in Jos claimed it lost forty members to Saturday, 
January 8, 2011 mayhem while several others were missing (Taye 
Obateru and Chris Ochayi 2011). Similarly, the crisis had forced the 
Christian traders in Bukuru market to relocate to Gyel-Bukuru market 
that is in a predominantly Christian area (Yiro Abari). Besides the 
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pattern of business relocation, Christian primary and secondary 
school teachers who are posted to schools sited in the Hausa-Fulani 
dominated areas have always expressed fear of losing their lives in 
the course of carrying out their primary assignment. Similarly, most 
parents have relocated their children to schools sited in environments 
mostly populated by people of the same faith (Onoja Audu 2010). 
 
Mahmud Lalo (2010) and I. Shobayo and I. Samuel (2010) report that 
there are public claims that the December 2010 multiple bomb blast 
and crisis might have been masterminded by unidentified Muslim 
fundamentalists, however it marked a new phase in the 
metamorphosis of Jos.  This new phase refreshes one’s memory of 
the metamorphosis of the Niger Delta crisis which went from protest 
writing to mass street protest in the days of Ken Saro Wiwa to 
kidnapping of expatriate oil workers, then to bomb-blasting of oil pipe 
lines and other installations. In this regard, Michael Watts (2004) 
argues that the ecological degradation, insecurity, deplorable 
conditions, and the spate of kidnapping of oil workers and the 
bombing of oil installations have been largely due to insensitivity of 
the stake holders to the cause of the oil producing communities and 
the need to nip the problem from its bud. The current development 
places one on a platform to predict the spate of suicide bombing in 
few years to come. It is probably going to be ‘a no-go entity’ existing 
within a larger entity. The areas of Jos dominated by Hausa-Fulani 
Muslims that have currently become ‘no-go areas’ for non Muslims 
may witness a gradual underdevelopment in terms of good road 
network and other basic social amenities which are exclusive 
responsibility of the state government that the ‘natives’ seem to 
largely control its machinery.  
Implications 
The conflict in Jos and its changing faces demonstrate the difficulty 
involved in deconstructing the barriers that exist among the people of 
Jos. Identity formation and protection seem to be on the increase 
among members of the various tribes in Jos. The heterogeneity of 
Jos which has been made possible by identity differentiation seems 
to engender ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ slogan. Such construction of slogan 
tends to widen the natural dichotomies that abound between the 
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‘natives’ and the ‘settlers’. The ‘natives’ feel challenged by the 
struggles put up by the ‘settlers’. By this development, the former 
employ all available intrigues, strategies to protect its identity and 
rights associated with it; edge out the ‘settlers’ from the mainstream 
of governance and other opportunities. By extension, the claim by the 
migrant Hausa/Fulani Muslims of their ownership of Jos, and their 
demand for other rights and privileges have spurred the dominant 
indigents-Afizere, Anaguta and Berom into constant designing and 
redesigning their master-strategies in order to maintain their 
hegemonic control of Jos. 
 
More importantly, the Jos crises tend to lend credence to what 
(Thomas Eriksen 2001) rightly points out that ethnicity is a biological 
concept that has assumed social and political expression and that 
ethnic, religion and culture are critical to integration of various levels 
of the society. By extension it supports the wide opinion that Nigeria 
is a mere geographical expression of faultily ‘integrated’ entities 
whose people and their respective ethnic loyalty and marked natural 
boundaries influence their vision and mission as they partake in 
societal development. 
 
The emerging new pattern of settlement in Jos affects a market 
economy in a cosmopolitan city operating along ethno-religious line. 
It also implies a lopsided infrastructural development. In order to 
protect and sustain their hegemonic control over their land, the 
indigent groups are likely to neglect or systematically edge out the 
Hausa-Fulani migrants from the mainstream socio-political 
development of Jos. A case that readily comes to mind is the 
relocation of the local government Secretariat from the migrants 
dominated area of Dogo Agogo to Jos Township, a settlement that is 
densely populated by the indigenous tribes and migrants from the 
southern part of Nigeria. An empirical study carried out by Marta 
Reynal-Querol and Jose Montalvo (2000) though on the continent of 
Africa, points to the dynamic implications of ethno-religious crisis on 
the growth of human society. Reynal-Querol and Montalvo argue that 
the ethnicity and other differences, and the inability of constitutional 
provisions of respective African countries to dissolve these 
dichotomies are responsible for Africa’s growth tragedy. Significantly, 
the incessant mayhem in Jos has gradual but steady negative 
implications for its growth in the area of uncertainty and dwindling 
investment rate. Although there are no available concrete data to 
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support this claim, the resultant human displacement and its publicity 
in the media remains a worrying indicator. The loss of human capital 
through killings of able-bodied men and women from all sectors of 
the economy and the use of public expenditure by the government as 
a mitigation device, especially for the provision of security, 
significantly slows down the economic growth of Jos. Another 
dimension of the negative implications of the Jos crises on its human 
capital has been researched on by Rose Obilom and Tom Thacher 
(2008) who in their study on stress disorder arising from ethno-
religious conflict in Jos, reveal a great deal of effects of traumatic 
stress arising from personal attacks, loss of possessions, death of 
close and distant persons and displacement, on the psychological 
health of victims. One can as well imagine the number of Jos 
residents, visitors and passerby who have either directly or indirectly 
had contact with death and stress of various kinds. The above 
incidents require responsiveness of and interventions by the 
government, individuals, nongovernmental organizations, ethnic 
leaders, cleric and other stake-holders. 
The Way Forward 
Basically, conflict is inevitable in human society. More so, conflict 
may not necessarily be violent. Some latent conflicts may develop 
into violence. Conflict and change are synonymous. Hence it is 
necessary for social change and development of the society. Growth 
and positive social change are possible when conflicts are properly 
directed and managed. The ethno-religious conflict in Jos has 
become endemic. The extreme positions which the conflicting groups 
take have not helped to transform the conflicts into peaceful and 
positive social change and growth. 
 
It requires that the government of Plateau State takes a deep 
understanding of the dynamics of the factors responsible for the 
conflicts in Jos; should be flexible enough to accept some innovative 
suggestions from stake-holders, and should be willing to compare 
and share ideas with the Hausa-Fulani community. Through this 
approach, a common mutual ground may be reached without the 
‘natives’ losing out their hegemony and without the migrant Hausa-
Fulani group losing out completely. 
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Through dialogue, renegotiation for the lost mutual social 
relationships that existed between the indigent tribes and the migrant 
Hausa-Fulani may be achieved. This will offer a golden opportunity 
for the warring parties to recognize their pains and loses, and 
apologize to one another. This can go a long way in healing their 
relationship. 
 
The Federal government on its part should set up a machinery of 
Constitutional law experts that will critically examine the ethnicity, 
indigeneity, and citizenship questions, bearing in mind the disparate 
access of Nigerians to scarce resources, and people’s age-long 
loyalty and protection of their respective ethnic, religious and cultural 
backgrounds. This is not to foreclose the current effort of the nation’s 
national assembly where amendments to the Nigeria’s 1999 
constitution are being made. The understanding of most Nigerians 
that indigeneity or ethnicity has a biological meaning rather than 
social and political expression should be well articulated in order to 
address the identity question in the constitution. The protection, 
rights and privileges of a ‘migrant’ or a ‘settler’ should be clear and 
not ambiguously duplicated in other sections of the constitution. The 
ambiguity of a law opens it to conflicting interpretations. 
 
Adequate number of security men should be deployed to every flash 
point of crisis. Security reports should be looked into and prompt 
actions should be taken accordingly. This will go a long way in 
nipping any security problem from its bud.  
Conclusion 
The catalogue of ethnic and religious conflicts, which are a hallmark 
in Nigeria’s history, begs for proactive approaches. While conflict can 
be seen as a descriptive and prescriptive tool for a better human life, 
it requires unflinching determination to implement recommendations. 
Conflict itself describes, reveals the fundamental reasons for its 
manifestation. Its self-description serves as a good frame for 
prescription of appropriate measure. Hence, it is an instrument of 
change that is inevitable in human society. The distance between the 
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indigenes and Hausa-Fulani settlers rendered the conflict 
uncontrollable, leading to negative change. 
 
The Jos ethno-religious conflict, between 1994 when it started with a 
peaceful protest and December 2011, has assumed different faces. 
The current level of its dynamism is a worrying indicator of future 
spates of suicide bombing in Jos. In order to guide against future 
catastrophe where Jos becomes a haven of bomb blasts, rampant 
cases of kidnappings and spontaneous mayhem, it is high time that 
stake-holders take bold proactive measures to restore lasting peace 
and stable growth of Jos and its environs.   
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Traditional Religious Practices in Axum 
Town, a Sacred Christian Center: Ethiopia 
Serawit Bekele  
Abstract: 
This article describes and analyses some aspects of traditional religious 
practices in Axum town, an ancient city accorded with a status of sacredness. 
The main focus is on the analysis of a ritual that is held on the first day of every 
month in the town with particular reference to what is practiced on Ginbot 
Lideta (May 9). In doing so, an attempt to show the multiplicity of religious 
practices within the dominant orthodox Christian frame work is made. The 
official narrative of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo Church posits the town as 
a ‘sacred’ Christian center where the history of Ethiopian orthodox Christianity 
starts. ‘Sacred’,54 according to the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo Christian 
institution, describes a condition of holiness separateness and cleanness as 
opposed to ‘impure’ which results from a mixing of different religious practices 
with an orthodox religious practice. By drawing on the ethnographic accounts 
obtained from informants,55 the paper describes and analyses the ritual. The 
main objective of this paper is then to show and analyze another dimension of 
religiosity which is downplayed by the official narratives of ‘sacredness’. The 
argument is that the empirical condition of Axum and the rhetoric of its ‘purity’ 
should be re-read in context of local lived realities in order to be able to 
understand the conditions of religious practice at the local level against the 
back ground of the taken for granted narration of ‘sacredness’ by the institution.  
 
Key words: Appropriation, Tradition, Ginbot Lideta, Religion, Prosaic 
                                                 
54 The Ge’ez (local language used for church service) version of Sacred is Qidus 
which translates as holy, sacred, pure.  
55 In addition to the conversations held with informants, personal observations also 
constitute the data used here to describe and analyze the ritual.  
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Introduction 
The history of the introduction of Christianity in to the Axumite 
kingdom is one of the contested subjects in the study of religious 
dynamics in Ethiopian history. This is mainly due to the fact that the 
church scholars and scholars on Ethiopian history present two 
distinct assumptions. Sources coming from the Ethiopian Orthodox 
Church trace the introduction back to the first century AD while 
scholars of Ethiopian history trace it to the fourth century AD. Below, I 
will give an over view of each of the account as it lies the foundation 
for the discussion about the construction of Axum as a sacred center 
of the Ethiopian orthodox Christian religious institution. According to 
the narrative of the church, Christianity was brought to the kingdom 
in the first century AD (Sergew and Tadesse 1970; Church History 
2000EC).56 During the time when Christianity was expanding in the 
Middle East, the religion was brought to the Axumite kingdom by an 
Ethiopian Eunuch. According to Sergew,  
 
Although Christianity became the official religion of the Aksumite 
kingdom in the fourth century, the religion had been known in Ethiopia 
since a much earlier time. In the Acts of the Apostles, VIII: 26-40, we 
are told of a certain Eunuch, the treasurer of Queen Candace of 
Ethiopia, who went to Jerusalem to worship the God of Israel. There he 
met Philip the Deacon and was baptized by him. Ethiopian tradition 
asserts that he returned home and evangelized the people. In his 
Homily on Pentecost, St. John Chrysostom mentions that the 
Ethiopians were present in the Holy City on the day of Pentecost. Later, 
when the Apostles went out to preach the Gospel, Matthew was allotted 
the task of carrying the good news to Ethiopia.57  
 
Despite the fact that the religion was introduced to the kingdom much 
earlier, Christianity began to have a strong hold in the kingdom since 
c.336 AD after its endorsement as an official state religion. Thus, this 
account asserts that Christianity was in Ethiopia long before its 
endorsement as an official state religion. What makes the year 336 
AD unique is not that the religion was introduced for the first time but 
the fact that it assumed the status as an official state religion 
                                                 
56 EC means Ethiopian Calendar, which is eight years behind the Gregorian 
calendar. 
57 ttp://www.ethiopianorthodox.org/english/ethiopian/prechristian.html 
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following the king’s conversion (Church history 2000 EC). On the 
other hand, scholars of Ethiopian history argue that Christianity was 
introduced to the kingdom in 336 AD when the two Syrian monks 
came to Ethiopia and converted the then king called Ezana and it 
expanded further down to the south of the kingdom with the coming 
of the nine saints in the 6th century. They are indifferent to the claims 
made by the scholars from the church and assert that the religion 
was introduced in the year 336 AD (cf. Taddese 1972; Levine 1974; 
Tekletsadik 1981; Teshale 1995; Mesay 1999).  
 
The main interest of this paper is not however the debate on the 
introduction of Christianity to the kingdom but rather the 
developments that followed orthodox Christianity’s declaration as the 
official religion i.e, the declaration of Axum as sacred Christian center 
and the banning of previous beliefs and practices because they were 
regarded as ‘pagan’ practices. The local religious practices were 
sidelined as a result of the newly introduced religionto the kingdom 
centered in Axum. Although these local practices were sidelined, 
theywere not abandoned and even in contemporary Axum they are 
practiced with more elements and justifications added from the 
church’s teachings. According to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, 
Axum’s status as a holy and chosen religious center goes back to the 
first Millennium BC when it was decided that the Ark of the Covenant 
should be placed in Axum after the legendary King Menelik I brought 
it from Israel. The church’s legend informs us that the king went to 
see his father, King Solomon of Israel, and managed to bring the Ark 
of the Covenant with him. Axum, the then capital city of the kingdom, 
was chosen as the abode for the ark and thus proclaimed a sacred 
city. Its acclaimed sacredness continued after the kingdom accepted 
Christianity in the 4th century AD and the city has remained the center 
for Ethiopian Christianity even to date (Kibra Nagast 1995; Ethiopian 
Orthodox Tewahdo Church; 2000 EC). According to the Kibra 
Nagast58 (glory of kings) not only Axum was nominated as sacred but 
the people of the kingdom were also chosen as holy. The following 
statement from the book explains this: ‘These things we have 
declared unto you in order that ye may keep and perform the Law of 
God so that ye may be blessed in this country, which God hath given 
unto you because of the heavenly Zion, the Tabernacle of the law of 
                                                 
58 Kibra Nagast (glory of kings) is a book written in Ge’ez in which stories about the 
Queen of Sheba, Christianity, Ethiopian emperors and all related accounts are found.  
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God...it is because of Zion that they have been chosen and our 
fathers rejected’ (Kibra Nagast, 1995:123).  
 
The contemporary Axum is a town in the Tigray national regional 
state of the federal democratic republic of Ethiopia. It was the center 
of the ancient Axumite kingdom. It is a town in which about 44647 
people live. More than 88 percent of the number of population living 
in the city is practicing orthodox Christian while about 11 percent are 
Muslims. The rest is composed of followers of Protestant (locally 
called pente) religion according to the local statistics office. 
Ethnically, it is mainly resided by Tigrigna speaking people except a 
handful of Amharas and Gurages who are involved in trade activities. 
Being the center of ancient Ethiopian civilization and Christianity, it is 
a very busy tourist center. It is also center of pilgrimage for many 
followers of Ethiopian orthodox Christianity from all over the country 
and the Diaspora. November 28 is an annual celebration where by 
followers of Ethiopian orthodox Christianity flock from all over the 
country and even from the Diaspora. The fact that it is believed that 
the Ark of the Covenant is stored in Axum St. Mary church of Zion 
adds to Axum’s sacredness and also attraction to tourists.  
The Literature on Christianity and Local Religions 
Talking about the adaptation or syncretization of the Ethiopian 
orthodox Christianity after its introduction in the 4th AD up until the 
time when it reached most of the inhabitants of the Christian empire 
in the 19th century, scholars have shown that the Ethiopian orthodox 
church is characterized by syncretic traits which came as a result of 
its contact with local practices (Mesay 1999; Teshale 1995; Tadess 
1972; Trimingham 1952; Levin 1974; Daniel 1984). According to 
Mesay (1999:2), ‘Judaism and Christianity exist in a form no longer 
current in their country of origin’ but rather they are ‘naturalized.’ 
Teshale (1995) also maintains the same stance and asserts that 
Orthodox Christianity has adopted elements from the then religious 
practices and Judaism up on its introduction to Ethiopia. Trimingham 
(1952) asserts that the Ethiopian Christianity is not authentic enough 
since it has been intertwined with indigenous belief systems and 
practices. Tadesse (1972) stresses on the same issue by discussing 
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the mixing up of Ethiopian orthodox Christianity with indigenous 
beliefs especially when it was expanding to the center and south. 
 
Concerning specific works which have been done so far about 
Christianity and local practices among different groups of people, a 
lot of studies can be found on spirits possession cults and their 
intermingling with orthodox Christianity in different parts of Ethiopia. 
For instance, in the southern part of Ethiopia, Braukämper, (1992), 
Shack (1969), among the Oromo (Knutson; Lewis 1989; Lewis 1983; 
Bartles 1983; Serawit 2009; Negaso and Crummy 1972) among the 
Amhara Yoftahie (1958) Aspen (2001), Setargew (2000). The works 
by these scholars describe and analyze interactions of Christianity 
with the indigenous belief systems and their syncretic features. They 
state that the introduction of Christianity has transformed the 
practices and has also been transformed in the process. 
 
However, less or no attention has been given to the Tigray region in 
general and to Axum in particular to study the belief systems that are 
practiced side by side with Christianity by the people in their 
everyday lives. Moreover, the above works deal basically with 
possessing spirits which are different from the spirits appeased 
during the time of the Lideta ritual. Yoftahe’s work which describes 
and analyses the guardian spirits celebrated on the birth day of St. 
Marry among the Amhara of Begemidr is an exception in this regard. 
The main contribution of this article is therefore the description and 
analysis of a ritual as it is practiced in the acclaimed sacred town of 
Axum. It also contributes to the literature concerning Lideta ritual in 
which the guardian spirits are appeased.  
 
In order to analyze the ritual, I take two main concepts. The first is 
the concept of prosaic religion as defined by Grieve. Although I take 
the definition and the concepts of prosaic religion from Greive (2006), 
I opt to use ‘everyday religion’ instead of prosaic for, according to the 
online Oxford dictionary quoted in Iltis (2008), prosaic means ‘dull or 
common place, mundane, consisting of written in prose, unpoetic 
unromantic unexting, flat’ and it is reductionist to name the creative 
and exiting as well as colorful religious ritual as such. Everyday 
religion ‘Indicates a strategy that is not confined to scripture but that 
consists of a ‘pragmatic ritual repertoire’. That is, it exists as a form of 
flexible, innovative, body-focused, hybrid praxis. [It] includes 
ceremonies, rites of passage, and religious processions to name a 
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few of the most important practices’ (Grieve 2006:3). Secondly I 
employ Meyer’s (1994) concept of appropriation in which she 
expounds how African Christians are active agents in historical 
process and how they translate Christianity in their own terms. 
Appropriation according to Meyer is ‘the process of making 
Christianity one’s own’ (ibid: 44). 
 
The church claims that people used to practice ‘pure’ worship of God 
since the endorsement of Christianity and all religions which were 
hitherto practiced by the society are abandoned in favor of 
Christianity (Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo Church 2000 EC; Sergew 
2003). However, as opposed to the church’s dogma and teachings 
about the kind of worship Ethiopians practice, empirical experiences 
suggest otherwise. Even in the sacred city of Axum, whose 
sacredness goes as far as the belief that the community living in 
Axum is also holy by default, there are practices which are not in line 
with the teachings and the dogma of the church. This is attributable 
to the history of the kind of religion practiced before the introduction 
of Christianity and people’s determination not to abandon it since it is 
as meaningful and important as orthodox Christianity. Sergew has 
the following to say on the belief systems that existed before the 
coming of Christianity,   
 
The Sabaean migrants who crossed the Red Sea in the first millennium 
B.C and settled in Ethiopia brought with them their own religion. They 
were polytheists, and worshipped different gods of heaven, the earth 
and the sea. Almouqah (Elmouqah), for example, was the principal god 
of the south Arabian pantheon, and was retained as such in Ethiopia. 
Other Sabaean gods, like Astar (Astarte), corresponding to Aphrodite 
and Venus of the Greek and Roman world, sin the moon god shams 
the sun god, were widely worshipped in Ethiopia. Later, with the 
introduction of Greek culture into Ethiopia, worship of the Greek 
pantheon became widespread.59 
 
Therefore, the pre Christian religious dynamics of the Axumite 
kingdom, as explained by Sergew, is that there were polytheistic 
religious practices even by the royal family until Christianity was 
introduced and adopted by the kingdom in the 4th Century AD. This 
line of argument which draws on works of scholars in the field of 
                                                 
59 http://www.ethiopianorthodox.org/english/ethiopian/prechristian.html 
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Ethiopian history informs us of dynamic traditional religious practices 
before the making of Christianity as a state religion. Scholars agree 
that the introduction of Christianity in the 4th century AD did not come 
to fill a religious vacuum. Rather, it came in a context of polytheistic 
religious practices (Kobishanov, 1981) and Jewish practices 
(Teshale, 1995). As a result of its early contact with the polytheistic 
as well as Judaic religions, Christianity had mingled and the people 
have not given up their previous practices even after conversion. 
Levine (1974) and Messay (1999) assert that Christianity has 
significantly changed after it was introduced due to the fact that it 
adapted itself to the indigenous and Judaic religious practices and in 
as much as Christianity has undergone some changes, so has been 
the case with practices before Christianity. According to Levin (1974), 
Ethiopians reception of foreign religious elements is creative as a 
result of which they take the new elements and ‘incorporate them in 
such a way that the resulting belief systems strongly reflect on 
indigenous traditions’ (ibid: 67).  Thus, it can be argued that since the 
very introduction of Christianity in the kingdom of Axum it was mixed 
with other practices which were there before the coming of 
Christianity to the kingdom. This would then challenge the church’s 
claim of the abandonment of the old practices and shift to purity after 
conversion. 
Local Realities of Religious Practice in Contemporary Axum 
Town: The Ritual on the Day of Ginbot Lideta 
According to the Ethiopian calendar, which derives its origin from the 
Ethiopian Orthodox Church, a month has thirty days and each day is 
devoted to the commemoration of specific religious figures. And once 
or twice a year, an annual feast is held to remember the religious 
figure. Accordingly, the first day of every month is celebrated in 
remembrance of of St. Mary’s birthday. The day is called Lideta 
lemaryam which literally translates to birthday for st. Mary. The 
annual celebration is held on the 1st of Ginbot according to the 
Ethiopian calendar (9th of May) every year. The day is celebrated as 
st. Mary’s birthday and the church teaches that this day is exactly 
when she was born even though every first day of each month is 
devoted to memorize her birthday. During this day, the institution 
instructs followers to come to church for service and spend some 
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time in the compound engaging in activities of honoring the saint in 
whose name the annual feast is held (Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo 
Church 2000 EC). For those who can afford to travel where there is a 
church in the name of st. Mary, it is believed that they get more 
blessings. Moreover, the celebration is more colorful if it is held in the 
church of st. Mary. On the day of the annual celebration, the ark is 
brought outside to the public from its bode for procession inside the 
church compound. A large number of people also gather around to 
share the blessing and honor the saint60. After the church service 
ends, people go back to their homes and the celebration continues. 
During the celebration at home, more rituals are added to give the 
holiday more symbolic meaning and more color. The extended 
celebration and the rituals that accompany the celebration are not 
part of what the church instructs as to how a religious holiday should 
be celebrated. It is rather something the church strongly opposes for 
it is mixing the religious with superstitions. On the other hand, the 
community members who participate in the extended ritual explain 
why they practice the ritual based on stories they claim to have 
learned from their forefathers about God, how the evil and good 
spirits are created, how they should be tamed and appeased and 
although the main frame is thest. Mary’s birthday. The main interest 
of this paper is therefore to show the celebration of the  in the name 
of st. Mary. It starts by describing the ritual below.  
 
The main ingredients required for the day are; freshly cut grass, 
coffee, perfume, incense, peas or beans, wheat, pop corn, goat or 
sheep, locally prepared beer known as tella61 bread, kitta (a thin flat 
pan cake made from wheat flour). Some of these items like bread 
and tella, are prepared ahead of time as their preparation takes 
longer than the others. The celebration starts early in the morning 
around 6:00 AM as people go to the church of st. Mary of Zion which 
is situated in the heart of the old part of the city of Axum. In the 
church, there is mass and chanting accompanied by church dance. 
This takes about two to three hours. Then the priest in charge of the 
celebration teaches some words from the Bible and says a farewell 
blessing to the attendants. On their way back they buy some of the 
necessary items mentioned above to make the celebration as colorful 
                                                 
60 “Feast days of Ethiopian Orthodox Church” an article accessed from  
http://www.ethiopianorthodox.org/english/calendar.html 
61Tella is not a must requirment, some families prepare it some do not. It also depends 
on the status of a family. Usually the poor do not prepare tella as it is more expensive.  
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as it should be. From the gate of the church they buy freshly cut 
grass and incense. From the near buy kiosk, they buy the coffee 
beans, popcorn and the grains.  
 
The ceremony starts around mid day with what is called nifro kikela 
which literally translates as boiling of grains. First, the woman in 
charge of the family looks for an appropriate place where to prepare 
a temporary stove for the grain boiling and the following activities. It 
should be an area which is convenient for people to sit around. Once 
the right place is chosen, a big pot is prepared for the grain and the 
fire is now set. Depending on the order of boiling she puts first the 
bean or peas then after a while the wheat is added so that they are 
cooked properly. While the nifro kekela is taking place, the family 
members are engaged in different activities. Tiding the place for the 
ritual, preparing the coffee ceremony, baking the kitta and inviting 
neighbors are the main activities. The first task is left for the men 
while the rest are of the mother and children. The mother takes care 
of the coffee ceremony and the kitta baking while children are sent 
out to tell the neighbors that they are invited.62 
 
The mother is observed running here and there trying to follow up the 
boiling of the grain and preparing the coffee ceremony. Once she 
made sure the grain is well cooked, then it is possible to start the 
next step. The food items prepared for the day are taken outside, the 
coffee ceremony is ready to start family members and invited guests 
are present, then it is time to start the ritual. Everything is arranged in 
order. The coffee tray is put on the freshly cut grass which is spread 
on the floor. In front of the coffee tray, the kitta, the boiled grain, the 
bread, the popcorn, the gadget for burning incense are put. No one is 
allowed to eat anything until they are told to start. The temporary 
stove on which the grain was boiled should have fire on it because 
there is one more frying it is needed for. So, before everything starts, 
the sheep or goat63 prepared for the day will be slaughtered by the 
head of the family, in this case the man. Then the meat is chopped by 
                                                 
62 Invitation depends on the size of the family, usually if it is a big family, they do not 
invite neighbors. Moreover, if the time of the celebration by the other neighbor also 
coincides there is no need to come around as they are busy with their own celebration. 
If the family preparing the feast is wealthy, it is a moral obligation to invite those who 
don’t have the capacity to do so.  
63 Sheep or goat is not obligatory, but if a family can afford it is done. Black colour 
is usually preferred.  
BIGSAS Working Papers 2/2012: Trends, Discourses and Representations in Religions in Africa    [152] 
 
the mother and girls. And a big metal plate will be put on the 
temporary stove and the meat is fried. Once the fried meat, locally 
called tibis, is ready everybody sits making circles by the side of the 
coffee. Now it is time to start the celebration of st. Mary’s birthday, 
Ginbot Lideta. It all starts by first taking a small amount of each of the 
food item and the drink and throwing it in all directions spelling some 
words of prayer. This is done by the oldest man in the family. The 
prayers read as follows,  
 
Our father’s and mother’s Wuqabi64we are grateful for you have 
protected us through the year. Amen! 
We are thankful for you have kept your eyes on our country, on us, on 
our children, our cattle, on everything we have. Amen! 
We hope and pray for your protection for the years to come. Amen! 
We beg you to give us peace, love, health, productivity, fertility to our 
mothers, success to our children. Amen! 
We ask for your apologies if we have been out of the right way and we 
ask you to help us in the future. Amen! 
We ask you accept our offering, to test and bless the food we have 
prepared and also be with us tonight. Amen! 
God of Abraham and Sarah we give you honor and thanks for making 
us see this day. Amen! 
Mother of God [st. Mary] we give you honor for being with us all the 
year and for enabling us celebrate your birthday. Amen!65  
 
It is not allowed to take anything from the food and drink before it is 
thrown to the spirits (Wuqabis) and the explanation for this is, since 
the items are mainly prepared to appease the spirits, they should be 
the ones who first test it or otherwise it will have a drastic 
consequence on the person who ate or drunk anything before its 
thrown for them. It might cause the person a serious affliction as the 
disappointed sprits may take revenge on who did an act of 
transgressing their authority.  Thus, it is only after all participants said 
amen to the prayers and thanks giving, can start participants eat and 
drink what is served.. Finally the celebration gets to a closing session 
when all say blessings and prayers asking for their well being once 
again and asking for more blessings and protection until next year. At 
                                                 
64 Wuqabi “is a guardian sprit of an individual or a family” (Yoftahie 1958:78). It is 
not a possessing sprit like the zar. 
65  Prayer made by Gebremedihn Tadesse on May 9, 2010. 
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the end, no leftovers will be taken back to the house. Everything 
except the containers will be thrown in different directions as it was 
done at the very beginning of the ritual for the sprits themselves.  
 
According to one of my informants on the issue, the idea of 
celebrating st. Mary’s birthday in this manner has its origin from the 
very time she was born and there is nothing superstitious about it 
since what they are doing now is what st. Mary’s parents have done 
up on child birth. Leaving the leftovers out there for the spirits, 
throwing some amount for the sprits, appeasing them are also 
nothing unchristian or superstitious but rather have their roots in the 
bible and church stories they have been taught by the priests. He 
says,  
 
We are thought in the church that on this day Hana, mother of our lady 
and Eyaqem her father did the things we are doing here now except 
that they did not have coffee and that they did not slaughter a sheep or 
a goat. We are taught in the church that few days before Hana gave 
birth to st. Mary, she and her husband climbed a small hill in search of a 
nice place where she can rest and deliver the baby. On the top of the 
hill they settled at, they were staying in a small hut and they did not 
have a proper house. So when people in the surrounding area heard 
the news of a child born on top of the hill, they all went to see them. 
They also took food stuffs with them according to the tradition of the 
day. So as they reached and saw Hana with her newborn baby girl, 
they greeted her and congratulated her. They set fire outside and put a 
small pot on the fire to boil the grains they brought with them. They 
celebrated the coming of the long awaited St. Mary with it. They ate and 
they did not take the leftovers with them, as you can see, that is what 
we are doing now. We fed ourselves and we have to also feed the 
spirits who guard as because they don’t have any means to feed 
themselves unless we do. If we do not do, they attack us. They eat us 
because they will be starved. So that is the reason.66 
 
Bantalem’s (2010) assumption about the celebration of the day 
agrees with what the informant told me except that Bantalem argues 
differently about the leftovers. He says, the leftovers left by the 
visitors of Hana were not intended to feed the spirits since that is not 
in line with the teachings of the Orthodox church but rather, it was 
                                                 
66  Conversations with Gebremedihn Tadesse 
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meant to feed the birds. Yoftahie on the other hand, has another 
perspective about the boiling of grains and leftovers which connects 
it to what Jesus has done to save human kind. Accordingly, he says  
 
The popular belief for boiling nifro is that, before Christ was born to die 
on the cross and save mankind from Hell, sinners were thrown into 
boiling water and fire. But st. Mary was born; she gave birth to Christ 
and He, through His death and Resurrection, took all those sinners out 
of the unbearable boiling water and fire. Thus the boiling of nifro is in 
remembrance of that suffering and to show how the birth of St. Mary 
contributed to the redemption of our souls Yoftahie (1958 :78).  
 
He also adds that why leftovers are not taken back to the house is 
because it is believed that since the sufferings are symbolized by the 
boiled grain, taking them back to the house would mean calling the 
suffering once again to the house (ibid. 1958). However, both 
Bantalem and Yoftahie agree that the animal slaughter and coffee 
are not supported by the church. Bantalem and Yoftahie go in line 
with the church’s teachings and do not accept the assertion that the 
leftovers should be left for the sprits. Rather, says Yoftahie (1958:78), 
the religious significance of the celebration of St. Mary’s birthday has 
‘decreased in importance and the practice has become modified in its 
performance to include other elements apart from what is recognized 
by the church’ (italics mine).  He thus believes that the ritual is 
extended to include some elements which are not from the church’s 
teachings but rather brought in from the previous practices. It can be 
argued that these extended practices are continuations of the old 
practices which were performed by the people before they were 
converted to Christianity but at this time they are mingled to make 
more meaning and be expressive of the love for st. Mary, and their 
relationship with the guardian sprits. In addition, both Bantalem and 
Yoftahie do not give any explanations about throwing the food items 
to the sprits before anyone eats and drinks although priests with 
whom I have discussed the issue say it is superstition and that is it 
strongly opposed by the church. 
 
A priest informant from the church explains the inclusion of 
appeasing the sprits while celebrating st. Mary’s birthday as a total 
superstition which is against the teachings of the church and he even 
believes that it is embarrassing to see this practice in Axum among 
other places given its long history of Christian tradition and while it is 
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a sacred city chosen by God as an abode of the Ark of the 
covenant.67 He says that after all this long established tradition of 
Christianity the old traditions of this superstition should have been 
abandoned, but it is rather surprising how they found their way to be 
celebrated together with the birthday of our Mother, st. Mary. What he 
calls superstition is the inclusion of the killing and the coffee together 
with throwing food items for the spirits.  
 
However, an old woman who has been doing this for many years 
says that she cannot be without this practice since it is one of the 
bases of her well being in the day to day activities.  She believes that 
if she stops it anytime that the sprits will take out right revenge either 
on herself or her family or her property. She says ‘the church men 
themselves tell us that we have guardian spirits. Like the guardian 
spirits, there are also evil spirits which we need to handle carefully if 
we don’t want any troubles to befall us.’68  
 
Talking about the guardian spirits, my pries informants quoted a 
verse from the Psalms 91:1-16 and admitted that there are both bad 
and good spirits. However, he says, ‘there is no place in the Bible 
that says they should be handled the way these people are treating 
them. They do not need any appeasement and offering by people 
because their creator God himself takes care of the sprits and his 
people too. The people are just making this up to justify their bad 
practices which are impurifying our long lived Christian tradition.’69  
This is an interesting point where we can see how creative and 
innovative people are to interpreted and appropriate their knowledge 
from the church about the good and bad spirits and devised their own 
way of dealing with them.  
 
Meyer’s concept of appropriation captures the whole scenario here 
very well. According to Meyer, discourses on syncretism in Africa, 
although they are being challenged recently, down play the role of 
actors in the process and strip their agency off and also not gives 
attention to Africans understanding of Christianity. By using the term 
appropriation she argues, an ‘understanding of African Christians as 
active agents in a historical process’ (Meyer 1994) can be achieved. 
                                                 
67  Conversation with Gebru Gebrehawaria. 
68  Conversation with Ade Atsede Tesfaye. 
69  Conversaition with Zegebreyesus Lemma. 
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Appropriation is one of the ways through which the people under 
discussion make use of Christianity to explain their relationship to the 
sprits. It is stated above that informants go back to the church’s 
teachings itself to show that what they are doing derives its roots 
from the bible and what the church teaches its followers. This way, 
they make Christianity their own as Meyer (1994) says and 
synthesize it with their old practice before the introduction of 
Christianity. It has been shown above in the introduction that the 
people long before were practitioners of local belief systems and that 
they were polytheists. They did not need to abandon their old belief 
for the new one for it has always served them a purpose to be in 
good terms with the spirits. However, they have to also negotiate 
some elements with the church. So instead of abandoning the whole 
thing, they borrowed some stories from the church to justify their 
practice of appeasing the sprits. Moreover, the concept of 
multidimensionality also must be taken in to account. Local practices 
which were and are believed by the practitioners, to be important, 
tend to find ways to deal with the hegemonic institution by being 
rather flexible and creative. What they do is not standing against it or 
resisting it, rather, appropriating it and as we saw from the above 
ritual borrowing some elements and bring some Christian elements in 
it.  
 
Reading in to the prayer above, it is not difficult to infer that this 
practice is more concerned with the pragmatic issues such kind of a 
practice is believed to deal with. It is a practice which is in John 
Cort’s (2001: 187-200) quoted in Greive’s (2006) expression 
concerned with ‘the realm of well-being, health, wealth and mental 
peace emotional contentment, and satisfaction in one’s worldly 
endeavors.’ It is not much about the transcendental or the life after 
death but the well being of life while living on this earth. It is part and 
parcel of the effort of bringing well being and stability to the socially 
constructed everyday life of practitioners (Greive 2006). As such, the 
practice does not contradict with the teachings of the church in the 
eyes of the practitioners but rather compliments one another. They 
celebrate st. Mary’s birthday and in the same event they appease the 
sprits. While the former is in line with responding to their 
transcendental life the later replies to their pragmatic everyday life 
and this way they are seen complimenting each other (Greive 2006). 
In doing so, they appropriate Christianity in a meaningful manner and 
also deal with the sprits which are responsible for their everyday life. 
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This is more explained by Greive (2006:3) as follows. ‘The 
transcendental and the prosaic complexes do not collide or compete, 
nor are they in mere accidental association. Rather, each is a 
response to specific needs. They complement each other as they are 
utilized in what are essentially distinct and complementary contexts 
of application’.  
 
Historically, before the introduction of Christianity, it has been said 
above that the people in the Axumite kingdom were practicing 
polytheistic religions and they were also used to giving sacrifices to 
the sprits they adhered to. The introduction of Christianity however 
came with teachings which ban the practice of offering sacrifices and 
worshiping the spirits at all. This did not get much weight in the eyes 
of the society and it was not also something they could afford to stop 
for they have been connected with the practice for a long time and 
they have found it legitimate so far. But they were also faced with the 
influential institution which was attempting to impose the new 
teachings. At this point, they had to devise ways of negotiating the 
two, the former practice and the teachings by the new religion. Thus, 
they had to translate Christianity into ways which were 
understandable and applicable to their situation which is what makes 
it appropriation. And as Meyer (1994) argues, the church’s role to 
control the followers ways of practicing the religion in as much as it 
wanted is very much limited among the Christians in Axum for they 
have appropriated some elements from Christianity that are 
meaningful and related to their practices and relations with the spirits.  
Concluding remark  
If, according to Mary Douglas (2002), purity never gets along with 
ambiguities and compromises, the very time the religion was 
introduced to the Axumite kingdom purity could never be the case 
due to its interaction with Judaism and local practices which must 
have led to the ambiguity or conditions of ‘impurity’. The practitioners 
in this ritual have become actively innovative to the extent that they 
appropriate the Christian religious myths for negotiating their 
conditions in relation to the spirits and their institutional base which is 
the ‘pure’ Orthodox tewahdo Christian institution.  
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According to Nurnberger ‘in the current spiritual situation, you find a 
diverse spectrum of combinations, interactions, inter-penetrations, 
adjustments, new developments, deconstructions and simple decay. 
Local and detailed analyses would be necessary to know exactly 
what happens at grass roots level in specific communities’ 
(Nurnberger 2007: 20-21). Hence, there should be ways to go 
beyond idealized purity discourses in order to see the lived realities 
which are very much expressed by dynamic and creative practices. 
To this end, I analyzed a ritualized Christian religious practice which 
is appropriated by adherents to appeal to the non-Christian spirits as 
celebrated once in a year on the 9th of May which is Ginbot 1 
according to Ethiopian calendar. This day is the actual day when st. 
Mary was born and it is a day of big celebration although the 
Christian people actually continue to commemorate every first day of 
the twelve months.  
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Final Word: The Religious Situation in 
Contemporary Africa 
Kupakwashe Mtata 
Introduction 
Religion, as witnessed in such an extended geographical region as 
Africa, expectedly exhibits much diversity. Both inter-religious and 
intra-religious diversity are evident on the African religious landscape. 
Intra-religious diversity arises from the fact that ‘[religion] is not just a 
matter of belief, of internal commitment to the notion of existence of 
some transcendent power’ (Firth 1996:168). Rather, whether it has 
any ‘purely religious’ origin or not, religion as it is lived out has other 
stimuli than transcendental or metaphysical ones. Human interests, 
economics, social organization, historical developments, politics, 
charismatic personalities, psychological conditions and many other 
historical (as opposed to transcendental) realities shape religious 
beliefs and practices. The multiplicity of these motivations and factors 
unavoidably gives rise to diversity in the shades in which religions 
appear. 
 
In the same vein, common influences may give rise to noticeable 
parallels in the religious practices of different communities. Common 
historical conditions in much of Africa result in comparable forms of 
religious practices. In addition, comparability of religious 
manifestations across the different religious situations presented in 
this issue may partly be accounted for by reference to the similarity in 
the characters or types of religions. 
 
This essay will adumbrate the contours of a typology that will 
illuminate some aspects of the cases presented in this issue which 
are significant for comparison’s sake. A seemingly superficial meta-
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level observation is that all the cases examined are instances of 
religious grouping. What is more insightful and to be considered here 
is the nature of solidarities and boundaries that characterise the 
groupings. That is, what are the bases upon which groups of people 
cooperate or differ in, or even fight over matters of a religious nature? 
Religious groups are influenced by both by the religious contents of 
their religions and the non-religious aspects of their environment. 
What are those religious and non-religious elements that have an 
effect on the complexion of religious solidarity or divergence in the 
cases under investigation? And what complexions of religious 
solidarity and divergence can be observed? 
Typology of religions 
Religions have certain qualities which generally define how their 
adherents are mobilised. A number of proposals have been made 
regarding how to categorise religions.70 Reference is made here first 
and foremost, to the typology proffered by Jan Assman (2010). 
Assmann’s is not precisely a typology of religions in general. It is 
rather particularly a classification of monotheisms into exclusive and 
non-exclusive religious discourses. Assmann perceives in Egyptian 
history two paths to monotheism which lead to two types of 
monotheism: 
 
One, the evolutionary path, leads to an inclusive monotheism, a 
monotheism that is nothing other than a mature stage of polytheism. 
The other, the revolutionary path, leads to an exclusive monotheism, a 
monotheism that cannot be arrived at through any developmental 
process but only through a revolutionary break with all that went before 
it. The distinction between true and false religion pertains solely to this 
exclusive monotheism. (2010:36) 
 
Assmann borrows from Karl Jaspers the notion that the Axial Period, 
a period encompassing c. 800 – 200 BCE, saw the rise of novelties 
of a religious and non-religious nature. For Jaspers, the Axial Period, 
                                                 
70 Since religion, like all other cultural phenomena, is in an on-going process of 
reproduction it should be expected that new variations continue to arise which do not 
necessarily fall neatly within any suggested categories.  However, broad categories 
organise data into manageable sets before complexity may be introduced. 
BIGSAS Working Papers 2/2012: Trends, Discourses and Representations in Religions in Africa    [164] 
 
a period of acute cultural transformation in global history, was the 
time in which humanity became conscious of consciousness, started 
to strive for redemption, attempted to convince each other through 
communication of thoughts, reasoned discussions and essayed 
arguments, a development which led to the formation of parties and 
the rise of religious conflicts. In religion, ethics attained priority over 
myth. The former period, what Jaspers regards as the mythical age, 
an age of tranquil unconscious acceptance of ideas and customs, 
gave way to an age of the conscious rational examination and 
demolition of what hitherto had been accepted without question. 
Additionally, in its relation to the world, humanity adopted a new 
disposition, namely spiritualisation. That is, asceticism, philosophy, 
and speculative mysticism gained currency. (Jaspers 1953:1-8) 
 
For Assmann therefore, it is in the Axial Period that religions with 
exclusive monotheistic theology, which he also labels counterreligion 
or secondary religions, came into existence. The emergence of these 
self-conscious and exclusive religions whose gods are unique and 
cannot be translated to those of other cultures happened in the same 
period as the rise of other cultural and intellectual aspects, viz: the 
judgement of the dead, personal piety, separation of state and 
religion, writing and literacy, the canonization of scriptures, violent 
self-exclusion, violent exclusion of others, martyrdom, and 
conversion. (Assmann 2010:8-30, 2008) 
 
The main feature of exclusive monotheism as is seen in the Torah is 
the demand for exclusive contractual loyalty to a god. To worship any 
other gods attracts jealousy and retribution from the god. Inclusive 
monotheism on the other hand is an idea of a god who is manifest or 
concealed in multiple images which complement, offset and 
illuminate one another. Inclusive monotheistic religions affirm the 
world as a divine world, and their divinities participate in worldly 
affairs of politics, economics, and health. Rulers are identified with 
divinities and intercede with the divinities to ensure the health and 
wellbeing of the territory under their jurisdiction. They are the 
representatives of the gods to their people. On the contrary, the 
exclusive monotheistic god is a transcendent individual who is 
removed from the world and negates it. The god and the world are 
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set apart; his kingdom is not of this world.71 Redemption from this 
world is a major feature of exclusive monotheism. Religions with a 
theology of exclusive monotheism also usually require personal piety 
which involves a temporary detachment from the world in order to 
commune with the god (Assmann 2010:31-56). 
 
Another important feature of exclusive monotheism is an emphasis 
on law, morality and justice as integral aspects of religion. Moral 
stipulations that require care for the poor and the powerless, as well 
as following other given moral behaviours or prohibitions, are an 
important element of exclusive monotheistic religions. In societies 
with inclusive monotheism, such moral stipulations are usually not 
aspects of religion but of the profane wisdom of rulers in their duty as 
patrons and protectors. The gods of inclusive monotheism generally 
do not give laws of an ethical nature. Exclusive monotheistic religions 
therefore tend to attribute lawlessness and indecency to non-
adherents. (ibid.) 
 
The turn from inclusive monotheism to exclusive monotheism 
correlates with the turn from ritual to text or from orality to 
scripturality. In inclusive monotheistic religions, ritual is believed to be 
necessary to keep the world going, while in exclusive monotheism it 
is not ritual performance but the will and action of a transcendent god 
which ensures world continuity. The priest type is the key religious 
specialist in those religions in which ritual is the main medium, 
whereas the scholar, exegete or preacher is prominent in book 
religions. While what is required in the former is ritual performance 
involving the proper handling of sacred objects and appropriate 
behaviour in sacred spaces, in the latter reading, reciting and 
exegesis take precedence. When emphasis is on ritual performance 
the observance of purity rules that govern the ritual is critical, and 
when the text is what is fundamental remembering and obeying 
scriptural guidelines and ethical rules assume most significance. The 
transcendent god of exclusive monotheism reveals his will through 
scriptures, and the gods of inclusive monotheism manifest in nature 
and other worldly media. (ibid.) 
 
                                                 
71 This is not to say that there have not been many times when exclusive monotheistic 
religions have colluded with politics. 
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The typology of religions as primary and secondary is borrowed by 
Assmann from Theo Sundermeier. This typological classification of 
religions is widespread. In a lecture delivered at the University of 
Bayreuth on 12th January 2011, Michael Pye, spoke of primal 
religion, critical religion and civil religion. He characterized primal 
religion as that religion not formally recognised as religion by its 
adherents. It is taken for granted as the customary practice of the 
natural community. Primal religion, therefore, has no formal name. 
The great majority of participants in primal religions are not 
reflectively aware of participating in a religion. Critical religions, on 
the other hand, are reflective, self-critical, and critical of society or 
culture. Their teachings are disseminated by teachers or preachers, 
but their survival and growth ultimately depend on people’s decision 
to accept or reject them. Pye defines critical religion as ‘a voluntary 
system of symbolic concepts and ritual behaviour which enables 
individuals to determine meaning independently of a natural 
community’, and civil religion as ‘a complex of symbols, concepts, 
and values accompanied by ritual activities and calling forth feelings 
such as historical nostalgia, national loyalty, and commitment to a 
common future’ (Pye 2011). 
 
Along the same lines as Sundermeier, Assmann, and Pye, Raymond 
Firth makes reference, on the one hand, to small scale particularistic 
religious systems, and, on the other, to religious systems that make 
claim to universality. The former can be said to have the following 
characteristics: emphasis on honourable conduct and proper ritual 
performance rather than adherence to a clearly articulated set of 
beliefs; no need for proselytizing; rarity of sceptics, who in any case 
have doubt limited only to specific rites, priests or divinities. There is 
no need to mention the characteristics of the universalistic religious 
systems as they are just the reverse side of those of small scale 
particularistic religious systems. (1996:157-158) 
 
Of importance at this point is to note that once spiritual 
consciousness or self-reflectivity enters into the history of a people, 
religion among those people can assume many different forms 
depending on how elements from different religions are associated 
and blended, and on how other historical factors impinge on religion. 
Different emphases lead to different designs of religion. The arrival of 
critical religions did not lead to a perfect retreat of non-reflective 
forms of religion. Rather, in some case the old forms gained 
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consciousness and became defensive. The gaining of consciousness 
was already an adoption of a characteristic of critical forms of 
religion. Likewise, the new critical religions more often than not 
adopted elements of the primal forms of religion, and had to do so if 
they were to survive. 
 
The unreflective-reflective dichotomy dominant in all the typologies 
above is only a broad typology which ignores intermediate or 
different forms which are so rife in reality. Only Pye refers to one 
such instance, namely civil religion. Different emphases may lead us 
to more types with different or more refined nuances, such as 
popular religion in contrast to official or elite. 
Types of religion in Africa 
In Africa the two most proselytizing religions, Christianity and Islam, 
are distributed in such a way that the north is largely Muslim while 
the south is largely Christian. Nigeria is one of the religious 
borderlands of this demarcation. These self-reflective and 
missionizing religions collide at the frontier, but the nature of the 
collision depends on other extenuating circumstances. In the 
particular case of Jos, as presented by Baiyewu in this issue, 
religious conflict merely provides a superstructure to conflict that is 
already simmering on socio-economic grounds. Difference in 
religious affiliation coincides with ethnic and economic disputes 
thereby heightening the conflict. Is it not possible though that the 
perceptions of global conflict between the Christian and the Muslim 
world, especially as dramatized since 11th September 2001, have 
similarly contributed to accentuating imaginations of violent conflict 
on the basis of religion? In any case, religious affiliation in exclusive 
monotheistic religions has the effect of creating religion-based group 
identities, or, where other identity markers were already in existence, 
of intensifying exclusive identities. 
 
Like Nigeria, Sudan before 9th July 2011 was one of Africa’s 
Christian-Muslim borderlands. The case presented by Omer in this 
issue is one in which a dominant exclusive monotheistic religion 
unjustly imposes its ethical rules of just wealth-creation and 
distribution on minority groups. Non-Muslims are required to pay 
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zakāt and thereby contribute to the social welfare pool, but they are 
not entitled to benefit from it. Non-Muslims are required to follow the 
Islamic rules of banking. Again in Sudan, like in Jos, Nigeria, the 
religious difference coincided with ethnic identity and economic 
issues. Where it has its way exclusive monotheism is likely to crush 
difference and to disregard the rights of minorities. 
 
The same can be noticed in the media representations in Kenya 
whose wholesale demonization of Muslims in the face of terrorist 
attacks in Kenya and beyond is due to a Christian majority taking 
advantage of its dominancy of the social and cultural space. The 
binary opposition of good and peaceful Christianity versus evil and 
violent Islam is the exaggerated and stereotypical belief that already 
existed in embryonic form in the antagonistic attitude between self-
conscious, competing, and aggressively self-propagating religions. 
 
The type of monotheistic religion emerging in the Axial Period is well 
illustrated by the case of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat, an apolitical, fast-
growing, lay missionary movement in Kenya. Wario tells us that 
Tablīghī Jamāʿat’s principal method is the missionary journey upon 
which members are expected to embark frequently, a strategy 
calculated to swell membership through sending out a great number 
of preachers. The preacher and the teacher are therefore the 
principal actors. To be noted is the emphasis on reading of the 
Qur’an and other texts. Texts and sermons, typical of exclusive 
monotheism, and not the ritual of primal religions, are prominent in 
this case. The preoccupation of Wario in this issue is to draw the 
reader’s attention to the bureaucratic support system behind Tablīghī 
Jamāʿat’s core activities. This movement demonstrates a high sense 
of self-reflectivity through its evaluation and planning sessions. 
However, from Omanga’s essay, it seems that the Kenyan mass 
media landscape is more attuned to an atypical violent Islam in 
Kenya, and oblivious to the positive, successful, peaceful and more 
authentically Kenyan Islamic movement, the Tablīghī Jamāʿat. A 
general latent hostility between competing faiths predisposes even 
newspaper editors’ representation of the religions. 
 
In the essay by Wafula we get another verdict on religion in Kenya. 
Wafula argues that Christianity in Kenya is losing grip of young 
generations because of pastors and priests’ failure to consistently 
demonstrate the ethical standards they preach to their 
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congregations. Christianity is one of the religions arising from the 
Axial Period with a set of moral imperatives to be followed. However, 
in practice religious communities have never managed to fully uphold 
the moral injunctions they teach. If the youth in Kenya are beginning 
to be conscious of the disparity between what is taught and what real 
happens in practice then what is to be investigated is how the new 
critical consciousness came about. Even the white missionaries were 
not consistent in their ethical behaviour. For instance, according to 
Wafula, the white missionaries worked in cohorts with the coloniser. 
 
In Ethiopia, the terms ‘Christianity’ and ‘Islam’ may hide more than 
they reveal the forms of religion there. There are varieties of 
Christianity and Islam which may have more affinity with each other 
than with other kinds of Christianity and Islam respectively. The 
indigenisation of Christianity and Islam in Ethiopia gives these 
exclusive monotheistic religions an inclusive character. The argument 
given by Mebratu Baye, a deacon of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, 
in Zeleke’s essay above, demonstrates how inclusive monotheistic 
types of Islam and Christianity can harmoniously live together and 
even cooperate while they feel far removed from and cannot 
collaborate with the exclusivist varieties of their respective religious 
denominations. 
 
The essays by Bekele and Zeleke give evidence to the fact that the 
evolution of religions is not unilinear. Former secondary religions may 
assume a primary nature so that the relevance of the terms ‘primary’ 
and ‘secondary’ is put into question. In the case of both the Ginbot 
Lideta and the Sufi shrine of Teru Sina, as presented by Bekele and 
Zeleke respectively, the ordinary people put emphasis not on the one 
true god or on correct belief or conformity to scriptures but instead on 
ritual observance and devotion to intermediary divinities. In light of 
the theoretical outline in this essay it is no surprise that the Islamic 
reform movements complain that the ritual practice of paying tribute 
at the shrine of Teru Sina is shirk (polytheism). From the Islamic 
reform movements’ perspective, given that there is no God but Allah 
and his prophet is Mohammed, veneration of saints is shirk and 
therefore erroneous. 
 
When we categorize Sufis, Orthodox, Salafis and Protestants under 
the inclusivist-exclusivist dichotomy it becomes clear that at the 
shrine of Teru Sina there is hardly any boundary to cross. Rather this 
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is a case of inclusive monotheistic religious forms translating their 
gods with concordance. Even though they part when it comes to 
eating, they remain one joint community that venerates shaykh Siraj 
Muhammad Awel together. It is notable that they did not set apart 
different days for Christians and Muslims for the veneration. They 
come together at the same time and, apart from eating, they do 
everything together. Inclusive monotheism is more inclined to 
demolish borders rather than erect them, except in reaction to the 
violence of exclusive monotheism. 
Conclusion 
The typology reviewed in this essay is a heuristic device by which to 
understand the state of affairs of religion in Africa today. Religious 
behaviour tends towards inclusive monotheism or exclusive 
monotheism. In some contexts even typically exclusivist religions 
may don an inclusive monotheistic nature. Exclusivist religions tend 
to accentuate exclusivist identities and to erect boundaries. They 
compete with and attract competition from other exclusivist religions. 
Reference  
Assmann, Jan. (2010) The Price of Monotheism. Translated by 
Robert Savage. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Assmann, Jan. (2008) Of God and Gods: Egypt, Israel, and the Rise 
of Monotheism. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 
 
Assmann, Jan. (1996) Translating Gods: Religion as a Factor of 
Cultural (Un)Translatability. In: Sanford Budick and Wolfgang Iser 
(eds.). The Translatability of Cultures: Figurations of the Space 
Between. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp.25-36. 
 
Firth, Raymond. (1996) Religion: A Humanist Interpretation. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Jaspers, Karl. (1953) The Origin and Goal of History. Translated by 
Michael Bullock. London: Yale University Press. 
BIGSAS Working Papers 2/2012: Trends, Discourses and Representations in Religions in Africa    [171] 
 
 
Pye, Michael. (2004) The Structure of Religious Systems in 
Contemporary Japan: Variations on Shinto Buddhist Pilgrimage. 
Occasional Papers No. 30. Centre for Japanese Studies: 
University of Marburg, pp. 3-15. 
 
_______ (2011) Lecture on 12 January 2011 on ‘Shinto, Primal 
Religion, and Civil Religion’. University of Bayreuth. 
Kupakwashe Mtata 
Kupakwashe Mtata holds an M.A. in Religious Studies from the 
University of Bayreuth. He is currently a BIGSAS Junior Fellow 
pursuing a PhD on religion and nature conservation in African 
contexts with a case study on the Zimbabwe Institute of Religious 
Research and Ecological Conservation (ZIRRCON). His research 
interests include cultural encounters and the history of ideas, with a 
particular focus on the religious field. 
